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Abstract 
This dissertation examines federal farm policy between 1933 and 1965 and its 
implementation in North and South Carolina.   It argues that restricted economic 
democracy in the Farm State – the full array of agriculture regulations, programs, and 
agencies associated with the federal government – enabled policy makers to adhere 
strictly to the principles of progressive farming and parity in the development and 
implementation of farm policies.  These ideals emphasized industrialized, commercial 
farming by ever-larger farms and excluded many smaller farms from receiving the full 
benefit of federal farm aid.  The resulting programs, by design, contributed significantly 
to the contraction of the farm population and the concentration of farm assets in the 
Carolinas.  They also steered rural economic development into the channels of 
agribusiness as a strategy to manage the consequences of those policies.  The processes 
and programs that drove the smallest farms out of business in the early post-war era 
were beginning to threaten even larger, commercial farming enterprises by the 1960s.  In 
this context, the economic and political interests of farmers became separate from and 
oppositional to those of industry or consumers and removed incentives to seek common 
ground.  The unwavering pursuit of commercial farming and agribusiness prevented 
diversified rural development in the Carolinas and contributed to uneven distributions 
of prosperity in the region.   
 v 
Using the methodologies of policy, business, and social history, this work draws 
upon evidence from a wide variety of sources including the papers of government farm 
agencies, correspondence of farmers, political office holders, and  personnel of the 
USDA.  It also consults the farm press and local press, the writings of farm policy 
leaders, and Congressional hearings and reports.  These documents provide a 
multifaceted perspective on the development and implementation of farm programs in 
the Carolinas and offers a new look at the contested process through which farm policy 
was made and implemented in the post war period. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
I come from a farming family in eastern North Carolina.  My grandparents live 
on the farm that has been in my family since the 1740s, now owned and operated by my 
brother and his wife.  My father spent nearly a quarter century as a manager of a 
different farm, the one where I spent my childhood.  Cotton, peanuts, soybeans, and 
grains were the mainstays of this farm, and we continued to grow these crops when my 
parents began farming independently, renting land and working it alongside the farm 
they managed when I was in high school. While I was in college, my parents, in 
partnership with four other local farming families, formed Sandyland Produce, LLC, 
through which we would store, pack, market, and ship fresh produce.  We built a facility 
capable of curing and storing all of the sweet potatoes the constituent farms grew on a 
combined 500 acres.  We installed a packing line and launched ourselves into the deeply 
competitive world of the fresh produce industry 
Sandyland required the sustained attention of a dedicated manager who would 
quickly pick up the special skills required for successful vegetable packing and 
marketing.  None of the families involved had scaled down their existing farming 
activities to accommodate the demands of operating Sandyland. I graduated from 
college in the spring of 2001, and had no established niche in the business.  This made 
me the obvious choice to take on greater responsibility in the new company, and 
especially to oversee the day-to-day operations on the packing floor.  My parents 
 2 
handled much of the managerial work while I learned the ropes, but my responsibilities 
increased rapidly. I stayed at Sandyland for five years, as assistant and then general 
manager. 
During my time there, I began to ponder the questions that form the foundation 
of this dissertation.  Why, for instance, was I the only female packer that I knew?  Many 
women work in the produce industry, completing difficult and important jobs from 
harvesting to bookkeeping to sales, but no other packing house or packing line 
managers of my acquaintance  – and I knew many packers from North Carolina to 
Florida – were women.  Furthermore, why did we rely on migrant labor in the field and 
the packing house, and what alternatives were there to participating in a labor system I 
found increasingly troubling?  The structures of produce production and packing for the 
mainstream market made this system seem inescapable when viewed from the inside, 
and I wanted to know why this was so.  Finally, why were the long-established federal 
marketing quotas and associated price supports for many of the commodities we grew 
disappearing? Why have they ever existed at all?   
I was conscious of the fact that I was working in agriculture in a time of change, 
and that my very presence in the occupation I pursued was both anomalous and, 
potentially, a product or symptom of those ongoing changes.  Any number of academic 
disciplines could have shed light on certain aspects of my questions.  But beneath it all I 
wanted more than to understand the economics or politics of how agricultural markets 
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functioned in the present.  I believed that fuller, more satisfying answers to my 
questions, with their focus on how things came to be, were best answered by historical 
analysis. I found the most compelling answers to these questions in examination of the 
mid-twentieth century interactions between farmers and the state.   
My own experiences suggested that this would be a fruitful avenue of inquiry. In 
the late 1990s, eastern North Carolina’s farmers began to explore alternatives and 
supplements to “program crops,” staple commodities such as cotton and tobacco that 
enjoyed the benefits of federal market stabilization programs in exchange for production 
regulations.  As the twentieth century came to a close, those programs no longer assured 
shelter from the uncertainties of the commodities market.  First came the incremental 
and tenuous shifts away from production controls included in the 1996 farm bill, 
commonly known as the “Freedom to Farm Act” (a moniker, which we shall see, had 
roots in the debates over farm policy in the 1950s).  A second harbinger of change was 
the building momentum of the legal cases against cigarette makers that contributed to a 
growing conviction that that tobacco marketing supports would soon come to an end.  
Sandyland Produce was an experiment, undertaken in part as a response to this shifting 
policy context.  Vegetables offered high-value diversification that would help see us 
though anticipated transitions.   
The degree to which the vegetable industry differed from commodity production 
– from infrastructure development to price stabilization – had to be experienced to be 
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truly understood.  The production and marketing of staple commodities benefited from 
nearly a century of government intervention.  Tobacco warehouses, cooperative cotton 
gins, and peanut storage and shipping facilities were important local institutions with 
established histories of a generation or more.  Many tobacco warehouses sprang up after 
the 1915 Tobacco Warehouse Act, and public sources of financing dedicated to 
agriculture infrastructure development created a process for obtaining credit on terms 
suited to farm business cycles.  From the time of the New Deal, quotas and on-site 
inspectors, commodity loans and price floors, gave structure of the process of buying 
and selling.  Staple commodity agriculture was not without risk,  nor did these 
programs offer equality of opportunity and access to all farmers.  But the markets for 
regulated staple commodities functioned in predictable and familiar ways, always with 
the safety net that cushioned many farmers from the impact of market fluctuations and 
natural disasters. As long as those farmers who possessed marketing quotas stayed 
within their limits, they were assured that their goods would find always find a buyer.  
It is one thing to know that governmental institutions provided important 
structure to farm production and marketing, infrastructure development and disaster 
assistance, but the impact of many of those interventions was never so obvious as in 
their absence.  In September, 1999, while my parents’ first sweet potato crop was nearly 
ready for harvest and Sandyland’s facilities were under construction, two hurricanes 
pummeled North Carolina’s coast.  Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd arrived back to back, 
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bringing record-setting rainfall, and the ensuing flooding devastated the region.  
Sandyland’s sweet potatoes, some of which spent time under water and some of which 
were merely rain-soaked, were badly damaged.  In 1999, there was no federal crop 
insurance for sweet potatoes.  The Non-Insurable Crop Disaster Assistance Program 
(NAP) program offered only limited compensation.  While other public programs and 
private insurance policies responded to the loss of real estate and machinery, the loss of 
the crop itself had to be absorbed largely without aid.  This was a difficult beginning for 
our fledgling business.   
The following year, we competed Sandyland’s storage and packing facility, and a 
new crop of potatoes found a home under its roof.  We then took on the challenges of 
marketing. We grew, harvested, cured, and stored our produce, which we packed and 
shipped directly to our customers.  Vegetable crops enjoy no allotments or marketing 
quotas, no stable structure that absorbs surplus production.  Competition on the basis of 
price and quality is fierce, and those who cannot compete simply do not find buyers for 
their crop.  Not only are produce markets uncertain and highly competitive, demand 
fluctuates widely with the seasons, making economies of scale difficult to achieve and 
maintain.  In an effort to increase sales volume during the summer months when the 
seasonal demand for sweet potatoes is low, Sandyland diversified.  We began to grow 
other vegetable crops, where we met increased challenges of perishability and quality.  
 6 
While no federal programs regulate or subsidize fruit and vegetable production 
and marketing in the United States, the policy infrastructure that supports agricultural 
production and making, which I call the “Farm State,” is present in the industry in many 
other ways.  My work at Sandyland offered a unique view of many different facets of 
agriculture and agribusiness, and our interactions with the institutions of government.  I 
worked with the local office of the North Carolina Employment Security Commission to 
find qualified workers.  I consulted researchers at North Carolina State University, who 
developed the sweet potato hybrids we grew and who helped us to understand the 
problems we encountered in the packing process that shortened product shelf life.  I 
participated in the North Carolina Department of Agriculture’s “Goodness Grows in 
North Carolina” marketing initiative.  I also scheduled product inspections and 
established and maintained Sandyland’s USDA-approved food safety program.  I 
achieved certification for the company as a supplier of produce to military 
commissaries, and when we met with administrative challenges in this process, I 
worked with the office of one of North Carolina’s senators to clear the confusion.   
These were the routine tasks of doing business in the produce industry, but they 
took on additional significance because the policy context of agriculture was changing in 
these years.  The 2002 farm bill terminated marketing quotas for peanuts, and two years 
later, tobacco quotas followed suit.  By no means was this the end of government 
supports for staple commodity growers, and indeed, established growers received 
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compensation from the government for the loss of quotas that had become, in the years 
since the New Deal, an important determinant of farmland values.  What was 
undeniably true was that the old marketing structures of staple commodities were 
eroding.  We recognized this as an end of an era.  With some experience in the 
capriciousness, and occasional impenetrability, of the open market for fresh fruits and 
vegetables, we waited to see what the end of production controls would mean for staple 
commodities.  In what manner would we meet our customers, without the mediating 
influence of marketing quotas that brought buyers and sellers together in a familiar, if 
imperfect system? 
I do not know how common it is for a graduate student to eventually produce 
the dissertation imagined at the outset of her studies, but in many ways, I have managed 
to do exactly that.  This is not because I anticipated my research findings.  They have 
surprised me at many turns.  Rather, it is because the foundational questions have 
remained salient, even as I added new questions to my list.  I wished to understand how 
farmers had come to have such a close relationship with the state, why the changes in 
farm policy in the twenty-first century were important, and what they actually meant for 
farm communities.  I came to understand the historical processes that created social and 
economic structures in which I grew up and worked.  Policy decisions, founded in the 
social, political, and economic priorities of the Great Depression and the post-World 
War II years echoed through the decades to influence how we worked the land and 
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marketed our produce, how we managed our farms, and who did, and did not, 
undertake the work of production and management. 
This dissertation examines the development of the Farm State in the United 
States in the twentieth century.  By “Farm State,” I mean the full slate of 
instrumentalities and farm support and subsidization programs that formed the policy 
structure in which American agriculture occurred from 1933, onward.  I argue that 
restricted economic democracy in the Farm State enabled policy makers to adhere 
strictly to the principles of progressive farming and parity in the development and 
implementation of farm policies.  These ideals emphasized industrialized, commercial 
farming by ever-larger farms and excluded many smaller farms from receiving the full 
benefit of federal farm aid.  The resulting programs, by design, contributed significantly 
to the contraction of the farm population and the concentration of farm assets in the 
Carolinas.  They also steered rural economic development into the channels of 
agribusiness as a strategy to manage the consequences of those policies.  The processes 
and programs that drove the smallest farms out of business in the early post-war era 
were beginning to threaten even larger, commercial farming enterprises by the 1960s.  In 
this context, the economic and political interests of farmers became separate from and 
oppositional to those of industry or consumers and removed incentives to seek common 
ground.  The unwavering pursuit of commercial farming and agribusiness prevented 
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diversified rural development in the Carolinas and contributed to uneven distributions 
of prosperity in the region.   
Such a result was not inevitable.  Contemporary observers recognized the 
potential of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to expand political participation by 
marginalized citizens.  The New Deal had not only the potential to stabilize the farm 
economy, but to expand the franchise, democratize access to farmland, and provide 
mechanisms for direct influence on policy making and implementation by the 
individuals most directly affected by those decisions.  The USDA would regulate the 
production of selected, important agricultural commodities, but initially those 
regulations applied only to those farmers who volunteered for the programs.  The 
administrative processes that assigned allotments and kept track of individual farms’ 
production histories remained perpetually at work once set into motion, but the actual 
enforcement of marketing quotas took place only with the approval of farmers, 
expressed in policy referenda specific on each commodity.  The local-level 
administrators of the programs of the AAA and its successor agencies were themselves 
farmers, chosen for the job by their neighbors.   Throughout the 1930s farmers on all 
rungs of the land tenure ladder attended the informational sessions and went to the 
polls, taking active interest in farm programs as they developed. With the institutions 
for economic democracy in place, the USDA embarked on what one political scientist of 
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the 1950s assessed as “the most ambitions – indeed, the most thoroughgoing – attempt” 
at administrative democracy in the United States to that point.1   
Many factors stymied that potential. Even at its most inclusive, in the crisis years 
of the early New Deal, full participation in the Farm State’s economic democracy was 
difficult or impossible for many farmers, especially minorities and share croppers.  
African-American farmers participated in the AAA’s “economic elections” at a higher 
rate than they voted in “political elections,” but white landowners lowered the barriers 
to participation for reasons that had more to do with political expedience than any 
ideological commitment to the democratic process.  While policy referenda enjoyed high 
voter turnout, the administrative county committees quickly became the province of a 
few elite farmers, and voter turn-out weakened.  Women and black farmers held few 
elected offices, and administrators and election officials made little effort before the early 
1950s to ensure that women voted at all. 
These limits to the practice of economic democracy had real consequences for the 
development of federal agriculture policy after World War II.  The unrestricted practice 
of economic democracy could have facilitated the inclusion of multiple voices and 
varied points of view into the process of farm policy development.  Instead,  policy 
referenda and farmer-elected committees flattened any critiques those participants 
might have wished to express.  Any participation, even when voting against proposed 
                                                     
1 Reed L. Frischknecht, “The Democratization of Administration:  The Farmer Committee System,” The 
American Political Science Review, 47:3 (September 1953): 704. 
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policies or sitting committeemen, implied approval of the system.  Those who did not 
participate, either by exclusion or in protest, were irrelevant and invisible.  They could 
never question the foundational ideologies upon which federal farm programs operated. 
Instead of an economic democracy, the USDA created an echo chamber that 
continuously affirmed its own notions. 
Commitment to “progressive” commercial farming and the parity principle in 
the USDA and Congress created institutional logics within farm programs that narrowly 
defined worthwhile agricultural endeavors, limited the scope of federal aid to farmers, 
and separated agriculture policy at the farm level from the broader economic concerns 
of labor and consumers.  A direct and intentional by-product of these institutions’ 
success in implementing farm programs was the dramatic concentration in farmland 
assets, creating many fewer, much larger farms over time.  As smaller farmers left 
agriculture they also lost their right to participate in the USDA process of economic 
democracy.  Commodity acreage allotments and marketing quotas, and the farmer 
committees that administered them, served as effective gate keepers to protected and 
subsidized markets. 
Farm programs and their administrators prevented new farmers from gaining 
access to federal programs even if they met criteria for experience and education and 
demonstrated the potential to become full-time commercial farmers.  A family farm that 
was excluded from the stabilizing influence and protective subsidies of the Farm State 
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contended with steep taxes on commodities it marketed, little or no attention or 
information from Extension agents, and difficulty in obtaining credit.  As the farm 
population shrank through attrition and exclusion, any remaining pretentions to real 
economic democracy in farm programs also receded.  Agriculture supports were no 
longer programs for the masses, but only for the ever-dwindling few. 
This was not accidental.  The ideological foundation that informed farm policy 
making in the mid-twentieth century was that of “progressive farming.”  This was an 
approach to agriculture production, with roots in the Progressive Era, that deferred to 
the authority of the agricultural expert.  Such experts were not practicing farmers 
(though many had farm backgrounds), but instead were the newly professionalized and 
college-educated experts who, from institutional perches in land grant universities and 
state and federal departments of agriculture, conducted research and dispensed advice 
in the specialized fields of chemistry, agronomy, economics, engineering, and home 
economics.2  These experts developed “scientific” methods, what we today might call 
best practices, for nearly all facets of farm life.  They used demonstrations, club work, 
promotional literature, and the press to instruct farming families on scientific methods 
of seed selection, soil preparation, machinery operation, canning, sewing, and general 
housekeeping.  Using these methods, the experts declared, would make farmers efficient 
                                                     
2 Deborah Kay Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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in their production, self-sufficient in their household needs, healthier in body and spirit, 
and ultimately, more profitable.3 
The Cooperative Agricultural Extension Service, officially founded in 1914, made 
the proliferation of knowledge about scientific agriculture and the promotion of 
progressive farming its primary mission.  The Extension service was an educational arm 
of the USDA whose agents served as a conduit for scientific agricultural expertise, 
transmitting knowledge from researchers to farmers.  Prior to the New Deal, Extension 
agents were the most visible and accessible representatives of the USDA at the ground 
level.  Extension’s commitment to progressive agriculture shaped their interactions with 
individual farmers.  It was the lens though which agents chose which farmers would 
receive the greatest share of the Extension Service’s efforts, and it was these farmers who 
most fully participated in the New Deal’s expanded FarmState. 
The New Deal created new institutions to provide credit, assist low income and 
landless farmers, and stabilize and subsidize commodity prices.  The role of the 
Extension Service was central to this work, as educator and de facto regulator.  The 
Extension Service’s ideas about progressive farming shaped the regulatory efforts of the 
                                                     
3 For studies of Extension in the South, see Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land:  The Transformation of Cotton 
Tobacco, and Rice Cultures Since 1880, (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 1985); Lu Ann Jones, Mama 
Learned Us to Work:  Farm women in the New South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002), 14-15Jack Temple Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost:  The American South, 1920-1960 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 49;; Sarah T. Phillips, This Land, This Nation:  Conservation, 
Rural America, and the New Deal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 13-15.  On 1920s 
efforts to identify and address social problems in the rural United States, and particularly the South, see 
William L. Bowers, The Country Life Movement in America, 1900-1920 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat 
Press, 1974). 
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Agricultural Adjustment Administration and its successor agencies, and informed the 
terms on which individuals received credit from the Farm Security Administration and 
its post-World War II replacement, the Farmers Home Administration.  In the context of 
an expanding and evolving Farm State, the ideology of progressive farming also 
evolved.  To be a progressive farmer was to interact with the Farm State, frequently and 
with some sophistication, not only as a client or recipient of credit and aid, but as an 
active participant in the process of administration and policy making.  
During and after World War II, as the American economy strengthened, the 
ideology of progressive agriculture further narrowed the possibilities for participation in 
the Farm State.  In a case of political irony, the success of farm programs – if we define 
success in those programs’ own terms – limited and constrained the potential of 
economic democracy by restricting the definition of “farmer” to an ever-smaller 
population of modernized, well-financed, land-owning white commercial farming 
families. This approach excluded other kinds of agriculture from the protective circle of 
the Farm State – such as smaller or cooperative farms, or part-time farming, pursued by 
a diverse rural population. 
The restricted understanding of acceptable and supportable farming also limited 
the ways in which contemporaries understood farm policy within the context of the 
nation’s wider macro-economic policy.  In this period the Farm State solidified its 
commitment to the “parity principle.”  In the years prior to the Great Depression, parity 
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for agriculture meant achieving equal advantages of collective action and policy 
protections, particularly the tariff, for the farm sector that the federal state provided for 
the industrial sector.  Parity translated well to the Roosevelt administrations early 
notions about the Great Depression, that it had its roots in the depressed spending of 
American consumers.  Individual famers required adequate compensation for their 
work, on a scale similar to what they could earn as wage workers, without the 
encumbrances of perpetual mortgages and furnishing debt that plagued Southern 
farmers, in order to become the active consumers.  These new consumers would put 
industrial workers back on the job.  Parity advocates of the 1920s and 1930s understood 
farming and industry as dependent upon each other. 
As the economy recovered and the consumer market expanded along with many 
Americans’ disposable income, farmers faced new economic challenges.  They saw their 
income and profit margins squeezed between fast-rising prices of inputs and more 
slowly rising prices received for their produce.  The 1950s saw a marked loss of 
individual farms and an attendant growth in farm sizes.  In this context, the politics of 
farm policy cast farmers as an ill-used minority, victimized by the industrial sector and 
by consumers who failed to understand the importance of agriculture.  Farmers felt 
threatened as they watched their neighbors rent or sell their land, giving up on farming 
and moving on to other work.  Commercial interests in near-by towns, even those who 
had cooperated with rural elites to drive the New South economy of tobacco and 
 16 
cigarettes, cotton and textiles, came to see agriculture as a hindrance to progress rather 
than a help.   
Parity became the symbolic language of interest-group politics, one that set up an 
oppositional relationship between farmers and all other economic sectors. To be in favor 
of parity was to support the farmer against profit-mongering manufacturers and 
suppliers and from selfish and myopic consumers.  In the New Deal order, where other 
essential industries enjoyed sanctioned monopolies in their markets in exchange for 
strict rate regulation, vocal segments of the farm sector demanded parity of public 
support as well as parity of compensation.  The politics of parity demanded the 
continued subsidization and stabilization of agriculture by the federal government, even 
when the economic emergency of the Depression in which they had been born was past.  
The new purpose of farm support was to protect farmers from the rest of the economy, 
rather than to heal the farm sector in order to stimulate the entire economy. 
These commitments to progressive agriculture and to the parity principle 
affected the development of agriculture and agribusiness in the Carolinas after World 
War II.  In the Carolinas, family-based agriculture was the goal of most policy makers.  
Post-war political Progressives imagined modernized and commercial farms of 
relatively small size, working cooperation with each other and using primarily family 
labor. The polices that emerged from the USDA focused on family management of larger 
farms that worked independently of each other.  Family farms grew beyond anything 
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imagined in the 1930s as farm programs and related federal policies created incentives to 
achieve economies of scale.   
Simultaneously, advances in technology steadily increased the potential yield 
per acre of every crop, and fed the perennial problem of over-production. American 
farmers also faced increasing competition from foreign producers and new synthetic 
replacements for natural fibers.  The AAA and it successor agencies responded to the 
surplus threat by reducing allotments.  Farmers who were able to do so responded to 
these conditions by purchasing or renting more farm land, accruing larger total 
allotments, while famers unable to invest in more land left agriculture.  While 
proponents of progressive farming applauded the exit of low income and part-time 
farmers from the agricultural economy, the inescapability of the cycle demanded that 
new markets for American agricultural products be found in order to protect the 
commercial family farms that federal programs had created.  
Farm boosters of the 1950s and 1960s hoped agribusiness was the answer.   The 
integrated system of production, processing, and distribution that includes packers, 
canners, food service distribution, and retail grocery chains promised to open new 
markets for farm goods through value-added processing and large scale distribution.  
State and federal policy makers, as well as farm organizations, administrators of farm 
agencies, and leaders of land grant colleges in the Carolinas aggressively steered a 
course of agribusiness boosterism. This piqued the interest of commercial lending 
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institutions.  The bankers to southern industry, such as the Winston-Salem-based 
Wachovia Bank, saw in agribusiness investment opportunities in expanded processing 
and distribution enterprises and the potential for profitable rural customers.   
A new agribusiness coalition of progressive farmers, commercial bankers, farm 
supply and machinery manufacturers and retailers, and large scale distributors worked 
together to direct rural development in the countryside into ever larger scale agriculture 
and successfully opposed diversified commercial development that could bring an end 
to the steady flow of federal dollars in support of agriculture to rural communities.  
Meanwhile, other parts of the South were becoming the Sunbelt, an archipelago of urban 
and suburban communities that dotted the southern landscape from Virginia to Arizona 
who increasingly hitched their fortunes to high tech research and development such as 
aviation, nuclear technology, and computing, as well as health care and military 
contracting, and even advanced agronomic research and development. 
The Carolinas experienced the development of the Sunbelt and the effects of 
federal farm policy in tandem, creating a bifurcated economy.  For this reason they make 
an ideal location to study the effects of farm policy in the context of the developing post-
war economy.  These states had long histories of agricultural commodity production, 
plantation slavery, tenant and share cropper systems of labor, and extensive, though not 
exclusive, dependence on non-food staples.  North Carolina excelled at flue-cured 
tobacco production, while South Carolina focused heavily on upland cotton, and the 
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piedmont region that ran though the central regions of both states had become the heart 
of United States textile manufacturing. In the 1950s, both states joined the burgeoning 
Sunbelt.  South Carolina became home of the Savannah River Site and the Savannah 
River National Laboratory, which conducted research and produced nuclear materials 
for atomic weapons, while North Carolina constructed the Research Triangle Park.  The 
land grant colleges in Raleigh and Clemson produced skilled workers and managers for 
farms and laboratories alike, and military installations large and small dotted the 
landscape. 
The Carolinas were important to the politics of agriculture on the national stage.  
Both consistently elected Democrats to Congress, which ensured that the congressional 
delegations of both states enjoyed the benefits of seniority.  They exercised their 
influence on behalf of agriculture.  Between 1933 and 1970, many congressmen and 
senators from North and South Carolina served on the agriculture committee of the 
House and Senate.  North Carolina’s Harold Cooley was chairman of the House 
agriculture committee for sixteen of the eighteen years between 1949 and 1967.  South 
Carolina’s Olin Johnston and North Carolina’s W. Kerr Scott sat on the Senate 
committee.  From these positions, legislators from the Carolinas held considerable and 
consistent sway over the direction of federal farm legislation.  Furthermore, bureaucratic 
innovations in North Carolina resonated throughout the USDA, and South Carolina’s 
strivings for an agribusiness economy set the example of public-private partnership in 
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the development of family farm-based, vertically integrated, highly capitalized large 
scale production in the Carolinas. 
This study is situated at the intersection of several strains of scholarly work.  It 
draws upon and contributes to rural and agricultural history, southern history, business 
history, and the political history of the United States.  Interdisciplinary fields also inform 
this work, especially the study of American political development.  Such a broad 
scholarly foundation allows this dissertation to examine the evolution of multi-level 
institutions of government and the manner in which the society in which those 
institutions were embedded shaped and were shaped by them. 
Rural and agricultural historians have charted the development of commodity 
cultures, the evolution of farm technology and methods of production, the rise and fall 
of radical agrarian politics, and the career of the USDA.  Several classic studies of 
American agriculture from the 1940s through the 1970s examine the consequences of 
government policies and evolving technology on the work cultures and community 
organizations of American famers.   They demonstrate that in this period, sometimes 
called the era of “the great disjuncture,” federal farm policies greatly altered farming 
practice and rural communities by supporting and rewarding technological 
advancement  and increased scale in farm operations.  These advancements often came 
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at the expense of established folk ways and to the detriment of vulnerable populations. 4  
This dissertation builds upon these works by examining the interactions of farmers and 
the state from a different perspective.  I demonstrate that the institutions of the Farm 
State did not act as outside forces, intervening in local farm matters from above.  Instead 
those institutions were well-integrated into farm communities.   Farmers themselves 
undertook active and important roles in shaping and implementing federal farm policies 
and programs and thus, in reshaping their communities and their farms. 
This work also contributes to our evolving understanding of southern history in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  Southern historians of this period have argued 
convincingly for the increased importance of urban and suburban politics of the region 
and the reduced influence of the old rural elites.  This historiography examines the 
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effects of an influx of people and investments from outside the South, and especially the 
investment of federal dollars in the form of research support, military expansion, and 
infrastructure development.  The economic and cultural ascendency of southern cities 
created the Sunbelt, a region populated by skilled and well-educated workers whose 
political influence increased with political reforms, such one-man-one-vote laws, that 
curbed the disproportionate power that rural elites previously enjoyed.  Vocal urban 
and suburban voters in the growing middle class influenced state and local politics, and 
made their mark on the key issues of the era, such as school integration.5  The rural 
South and the effects of farm policy after 1950 is mostly missing from these accounts.6   
This dissertation brings farm policy and the rural economy back into the equation of 
southern political life after World War II.  I argue that these policies remained important 
factor steering the economic development in the Carolinas. 
While this is a southern story, it is also contributes to a wider discussion about 
American history in the second half of the twentieth century.  A better understanding of 
post-war farm policy, its mechanisms, and its effects is essential to explaining the role of 
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federal government in American life after World War II.  As William Novak argued in 
his essay “The Myth of the Weak American State,” the federal government has 
accomplished some of its most important,  if also sometimes subtle, governing though 
the exercise of “infrastructural power.”7  This is government at the far reaches of the 
state and at the most local of levels. The apparatus of the Farm State are perfect 
examples of infrastructural power at work, shaping farm practices and agricultural 
markets and drawing the individuals most affected into the business of governing in 
broad-based, localized institutions.   
These are also key questions for scholars of American Political Development 
(APD).8  By drawing upon the methods and insights of historically-focused political 
science, I put the institutions of the Farm State at the center of my story.  These 
institutions do not simply provide the context or a set of rules that influence the actions, 
values, and goals of the individuals in this study.  Instead, these institutions are at the 
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center of my questions.  Where did they come from?  Why did they take particular 
forms?  With what effects?  
To that end, this study relies heavily on the papers of governmental institutions.  
The North Carolina and South Carolina Cooperative Agricultural Extension Services 
generated copious records of their work.  The correspondence, speeches, and other 
writings of local, state, and national level officials throughout the USDA provides 
insight into the priorities, goals, concerns, and political maneuverings of these policy 
makers and administrators.  The annual reports of county and state level Extension, 
Production and Marketing Administration, and Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service offices further illuminate agency objectives, their progress toward 
implementation, and the manner in which various agencies worked together.  PMA and 
ASCS annual reports in particular offer rare insight into the functioning of these offices 
at the county level.  I use campaign rhetoric, the transcripts of Congressional hearings, 
and the correspondence of members of Congress to understand how farm politics 
operated at the national level among the executive and legislative branches of 
government and within political parties.  Contemporary press coverage puts farm 
politics in context for various constituencies.  Scholarly investigations – including M.A. 
and doctoral theses produced in the 1940s and 1950s and the work of established 
agricultural economists who joined contemporary farm policy debates – were valuable 
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sources of data and illuminate the questions and concerns that occupied interested and 
influential observers as the Farm State evolved. 
The correspondence of individual farmers, most often directed to USDA officials 
and congressional representatives, demonstrates how policy decisions  played out on 
the farm.  Additionally, questionnaires and survey responses by farmers, particularly 
those who competed for or won honors such as the Master Farm Family award provide 
snapshots of individual farming families at moments in time at which agricultural 
leaders deemed them to be the epitome of progressive farming success.  Letters of 
advice, appeal, complaint, and distress from farmers across the spectrum demonstrate 
the manner in which farm policies biased toward creating and supporting the Master 
Farm failed to support or actively undermined struggling farmers or families whose 
goals differed from the progressive ideal.  Farmer’s journals and oral histories help 
round out the farmers’ perspective on the Farm State. 
Chapter 1 explores the reasons why the architects of New Deal farm programs 
included mechanisms of economic democracy in their policies.  It looks to earlier 
agrarian political movements and the influence of associationalism to understand why 
voluntarism, policy referenda, and democratized administration characterized the early 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and how these processes evolved during the 
Roosevelt administration.  This chapter also examines the flawed and incomplete 
manner in which economic democracy was actually practiced, often to the exclusion of 
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minorities and women, as well as vulnerable farmers on the lowest rungs of the land 
tenure ladder. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the politics of parity.  It begins with an examination of 
immediate post-war politics on the left that drew connections between labor, consumers, 
and farmers and proposed dispensing with parity as the basis of federal farm supports 
in favor of policies that offered more aid to small farmers and reversed incentives for 
asset concentration.  This chapter then turns to the prevailing narrative of the farm 
economy that cast farmers in opposition to consumers and demanded parity as a 
remedy for farmers who were not able to take part in post-war economic growth.  The 
politics of parity locked farm policies into commodity support and production 
regulation policies that only exacerbated farmers’ economic distress over the long term. 
Chapter 3 seeks to understand the central role that administrative politics 
occupied in the debates between different visions for farm policy in the 1950s.  The 
farmer committees of the Production and Marketing Administration and the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation service came under fire from the new 
Republican administration.  New rules governed their activities and asserted the 
authority of the  office of the Secretary of Agriculture to supervise the committees’ work.  
Heated debates ensued along two separate but related vectors.  One debate focused on 
the advantages and disadvantages of administrative centralization and the other on 
party politics.  But centralization proved the preference of the Secretary of Agriculture, 
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regardless of his party affiliation, as the Kennedy administration upheld and even 
attempted to strengthen the Benson era policies.  The tendency of 1950 and early 1960s 
administrative polices were to further restrict farmer participation in the development 
and implementation of farm programs, while maintaining the rhetoric of grassroots 
democracy. 
Chapter 4 turns to the administration of farm programs in North Carolina, and 
specifically the efforts of the Director of the Extension Service, David Weaver, to 
overcome the challenges of implementing disjointed federal and state farm programs 
with little unifying leadership from Washington.  Weaver and his associates also 
pursued bureaucratic solutions, rather than democratic ones, to the problems of farm 
policy implementation while seeking, and failing, to spur a grassroots social movement 
in support of the Farm State. 
Chapter 5 examines the effects of farm policies on commercial farms in the 
Carolinas.  It demonstrates that the ideology of progressive agriculture was devoted to 
the support of a particular kind of family farm.  These farms were commercially focused, 
1 economies of scale and vertical integration where possible.  They were white, 
increasingly middle class in their embrace of consumerism and domesticity, and they 
emphasized family management of the farm rather than family labor.  Farm policies 
intended to support such farms were ill-suited to help smaller, low-income farming 
families.  By the late 1950s and early 1960s, policy makers concluded that small famers 
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should no longer receive assistance in remaining in agriculture.  The politics of “get big 
or get out” associated with the 1970s USDA was in fact actively at work in the 1950s. 
Chapter 6 explores the turn to agribusiness in the late 1950s and early 1960s in 
the Carolinas.  It illuminates the tensions between two potential paths to economic 
development in the region.  One favored a diversified economy in which federal 
subsidies and infrastructure investments would help the region attract more industrial 
firms, a strategy that would reduce the importance of agriculture to the local economy.  
A second path of development would maintain the region’s reliance on agriculture, 
developing the farm supply and commodity processing and marketing sectors of an 
agribusiness economy.  Agribusiness was attractive to many rural communities because 
it built upon the existing foundations of rural economies and was better suited than 
many diversification schemes to the particularities of farm programs that made it 
difficult for farmers, especially small tobacco farmers, to sell any land without 
jeopardizing their incomes.  A coalition of boosters – comprised of USDA agency works, 
state government officials, farm and news publications, local Chambers of Commerce, 
and commercial bankers – for to forge a new agribusiness economy.   Their goal was to 
help local agriculture remained competitive in national and international markets in 
which even the largest Carolina farms were still comparatively small and inefficient. 
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Chapter 1.  Economic Democracy and the New Deal for 
Agriculture 
The South Carolina Cooperative Extension Service was extraordinarily busy in 
early 1933. District agent A. A. McKeown made regular rounds to visit his subordinate 
County Extension Agents, and reported back to his own supervisors in Columbia that, 
in the face of a worsening credit shortage, nearly all county offices were “overwhelmed 
with Federal crop production loan applications.”  Extension offices had fallen so far 
behind in their routine work that in March they had not yet issued the 1932 Extension 
Service annual report or published a formal plan for work in 1933.1  Perhaps it was just 
as well that no formal plans had yet been published for that year, because new 
legislation under the incoming president, Franklin Roosevelt, would soon redirect 
nearly all of the Extension Service’s resources toward entirely new efforts. 
In mid-March, soon after Roosevelt’s inauguration, McKeown and other South 
Carolina district agents attended a conference in Columbia to map out the state’s 
response to the new “National Agricultural Relief Bill” then under consideration by 
Congress. We know this bill as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  The bill 
proposed to institute voluntary production limits on several commodity crops grown in 
the United States and to guarantee a minimum return on produce harvested within 
                                                     
1 A. A. McKeown, “Monthly Report, Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics, 
State of South Carolina,” March 27, 1933, p. 2, Box 22, Folder 665, Cooperative Extension Service, Field 
Operations, 1918-1985, Series 33, STI. 
 30 
those limits.  All of this was in the hopes of reducing the surplus that had driven farm 
prices to devastating lows.  For the program to work, it would have to be implemented 
on a massive scale, on as many farms as possible.  Recruiting farmers to participate and 
then implementing the many details of the program would require considerable 
administrative effort, well beyond those that were already stretching South Carolina’s 
Extension offices to their limits. 
USDA officials in Washington developed an approach to implementing the AAA 
that they believed would encourage farmer support and address the administrative 
challenges the law posed.  Extension agents would appoint committees of farmers at the 
township and county levels.  These committees, in partnership with the Extension 
offices, would do much of the heavy lifting:  meeting with individual famers, securing 
contracts, and enforcing their provisions.  McKeown and his colleagues quickly 
determined which farmers they would recruit onto local AAA committees.  Time was of 
the essence, as it was spring and farmers were preparing to plant the new crop.  “In 
order to be in a position to get this work under way at the earliest possible moment 
when the bill is passed we visited all the county agents in the district and conferred with 
them in reference to the selection of county committeemen and township or community 
committeemen.”2  The bill did not pass as quickly as the South Carolina Extension 
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officers expected.  Nevertheless, McKeown assured his bosses that with committee 
appointments prepared, “we are ready to proceed the very minute we are notified of its 
passage.”3   
McKeown’s words paint a picture of the USDA, at its local levels, poised for 
action, anticipating the “very minute” in which federal agriculture policies would 
change and take on the characteristics that defined them for the remainder of the 
century: commodity price support, tightly linked production regulations and 
conservation measures, and locally-based program administration and enforcement.  
The Agricultural Adjustment Act, and other legislative measures that would follow over 
the next decade, created entirely new bureaucracies and programs that altered and 
intensified the relationship between farmers and the federal government.  These 
measures also built upon older approaches to agriculture policy and reflected the 
concerns and priorities of earlier policy makers and farm organizations. 
The “farm problem” of the Great Depression was not a new development, nor 
was the New Deal the first attempt to craft federal policy that would address it.  In the 
years since Reconstruction, as the American economy industrialized and the consumer 
market expanded, farmers faced economic instability that spawned a social movement 
and a political party.  Numerous private and public approaches to organizing the widely 
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dispersed American farming sector emerged in the period.  Many focused on 
cooperative institutions that could take collective action to address the agriculture’s 
systemic problems.  They concluded that the problem was one of supply and demand, 
or, as one skeptical observer put it, that “the root of all evil is the surplus – the solution, 
the elimination of the surplus.”4  Production too often exceeded demand depressing 
farm prices as the surplus in the hands of processors, grain elevators, warehouses and 
gins grew.  In addition to the supply and demand and problem, policy makers and 
farmer organizations recognized that many farmers also faced difficulties in achieving 
access to adequate credit and many were trapped in exploitative labor and land tenure 
arrangements. For advocates of cooperative marketing, such organization seemed to 
offer a way out of the over-supply problem, as well as credit shortages, caused by a 
“lack of orderly” expansion, production, and marketing in the agricultural economy 
since the late nineteenth century.5   
In the 1910s and 1920s, federal policy makers attempted to build frameworks that 
would support cooperative formation and coordination among those institutions and 
the government.  Cooperative schemes of the Populist era had hoped to counter the 
growing national economic and political power of industrial capitalism.  Twentieth-
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century cooperatives, and the policy makers who supported them, embraced 
industrialization and the developing consumer economy.  They encouraged farmers to 
organize precisely so that they could participate more fully in the modern American 
economy.  The hallmarks of state efforts to assist agriculture in these years were 
decentralization and self-government.  They created no mechanism for the centralized 
regulation of commodity production.  The role of new public institutions created in this 
period, such as the Federal Farm Board and the Cooperative Extension Service, was to 
facilitate goal-setting and coordination among cooperatives and to educate farmers in 
the methods and benefits of modernized agriculture. 
These associative state strategies proved too weak to respond adequately to the 
circumstances of the Great Depression.  The New Deal dispensed many Hoover era 
institutions.  Instead of encouraging cooperative formation in partnership with the 
government, New Deal agencies, especially the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, made the government itself the institution through which farmers 
would organize and cooperate with each other.  The AAA imposed production and 
marketing regulations on producers of staple agricultural commodities, a final step that 
associationalists had considered unwise, if not nearly impossible.  While deviating from 
associationalist efforts in purpose, the New Deal farm institutions did reflect earlier 
values of self-government and decentralization.  They used voluntary participation, 
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policy referenda, and local, elected administrative committees in order to incorporate 
the input and participation of farmers into the new farm programs. 
The premise of self-government and a “farmer-run program” was integral to the 
identity and justifications for New Deal farm programs.  Economic democracy was the 
central principle and most important justification for the expansive intervention to the 
farm economy instituted by the New Deal.  In its idealized form, economic democracy 
allowed production regulation and farmers’ economic independence to co-exist.  This 
was key to the legitimacy of programs that, if fully implemented, would directly affect 
the productive economic activity of nearly half the nation.  Economic democracy was 
also an important concept for the New Deal in general.  It as a feature of labor policy in 
which workers voted for their union representation and employers were obliged to 
recognized those representatives.  Consumers who monitored pricing and rationing 
during World War II were also taking part in economic democracy.   
The practice of economic democracy in the Farm State fell short of the ideal. 
Referenda and committee election rules allowed for and even incentivized expanding 
the pool of voters for farm programs beyond those people who usually participated in 
southern political elections.  Even so, participation by black farmers, women, and all 
farmers on the lowest rungs of the land tenure ladder was limited.  The degree of 
inclusivity diminished over the course of the 1950s and 1960s as the farm population 
shrank and became less diverse. No longer necessary to the political justifications for the 
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existence of federal farm programs, these populations became effectively excluded from 
the workings of the Farm State.   
Economic democracy had the potential to make farm programs responsive to the 
needs of all famers.  Instead, the practice of economic democracy relied on a circular 
logic that restricted participation to those who benefited most from the USDA’s bias 
toward commercial farming and allowed programs detrimental to many other farmers 
to continue under the legitimating cover of a referenda process and active farmer 
participation in program administration.  There would be serious consequences to this 
restricted and self-affirming practice economic democracy for the development of rural 
communities and agricultural economies.  To understand why, we need to explore the 
manner in which the government crafted and implemented New Deal farm programs. 
Pre-New Deal Farm Sector Organization 
The farm economy of the 1910s and 1920s experienced extreme highs and lows 
that led farmers, farm organizations, and public officials to experiment with a variety of 
private coordination and public policy measures that would stabilized the market.  
Cotton was an important crop for the Carolinas, and its history serves as an example of 
the market instability that many American farmers endured, especially those who grew 
commodities that relied heavily on export markets.  Near the end of and immediately 
following World War I, cotton sold for the then never before seen highs in excess of 
thirty cent per pound.  Similarly high prices in other commodities, notably wheat, fueled 
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land speculation and an expansion of farm production in the late 1910s.  In the early 
1920s, prices fell sharply as demand for American exports fell, a result of increased 
foreign competition and the strength of the American dollar.  In 1921, cotton sold for 
only half of 1920 prices.  Cotton cultivation dropped from 35 million acres in 1918 to 
only 28.6 million in 1921.  But the opening of new lands and the advance of farm 
mechanization contributed to a new increase in cotton production, which surpassed 
World War I levels over the course of the decade, reaching 43 million acres by 1929.6   
The unstable balance between domestic and export markets, competition and 
currency woes, mechanization and farmland expansion, became boiled down in popular 
and political understandings of the farm problem as a problem of surplus.  In this 
reckoning, farmers simply produced too much, in excess of what the market could 
support, and prices would not rise until farmers reduced their overall production of the 
commodities in surplus.  This was no easy feat when the same forces that necessitated 
the reduction in aggregate production also drove individual farmers to produce more 
and more.  Debts left over from the boom years, often for land that was worth much less 
than the purchase price, required land owners to keep farmland producing as much as 
possible in order to pay for itself in some way.  Southern tenants and share croppers 
often had no choice but to plant cotton, regardless of price.  They followed the directions 
of landlords with the knowledge that they could be easily replaced.  Land owners and 
                                                     
6 David Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal:  American Farm Policy from Hoover to Roosevelt, 1928-
1933, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 10-12. 
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tenants alike who might have wanted to plant something else found that cotton was the 
only acceptable currency for their debts.  Creditors, including mortgage holders, often 
extracted their payments in raw cotton rather than cash.  In such a system, individual 
action had little hope of offsetting the momentum of the system. 
American farmers have long considered collective responses to systemic 
economic problems.  In the late nineteenth century, an agrarian social movement formed 
in response to the difficulties small farmers faced in the growing American mass market 
and the shifting base of political power away from agrarian communities and toward 
urban centers and industrial interests.  Populism challenged the growing primacy of 
large-scale centralized industry and finance in American political and economic life.  
Populist activists opposed railroad, banking, machinery, and supply trusts and 
advocated for government control of these infrastructures.  Millions of farmers, acting, 
individually, their critique held, could not extract fair terms for essential goods and 
services when their purveyors monopolized the supply.  Populists organized 
cooperative marketing organizations constructed facilities for crop storage and shipping 
and marketing institutions, attempting to realize the advantages of economies of scale.  
Populist politics of the late nineteenth century offered a radical vision for restructuring 
American society that went beyond concentrating the purchasing and marketing power 
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of farmers.  Populist politics reached its apex in the 1890s.7  As a conservative resurgence 
pushed back Populist successes at the turn of the twentieth century, agrarian 
cooperative politics also grew more conservative – less focused on social change and 
more focused on commercial success.8  
Commercial success without political commitment to Populist economic ideals 
proved difficult for many cooperatives to achieve.  When economics were the only 
motivation for an individual’s participation, cooperatives became vulnerable to 
freeriding and an internal erosion of collective values.  Agrarian reformers and policy 
makers throughout the early twentieth century observed this trend and lamented that 
farmers who failed to organize and cooperate with each other were behaving 
“irrationally.”  The reality was more complex.  It was often a better strategy for a farmer 
to enjoy the increased prices that cooperatives could create, even if only locally or 
temporarily, himself remaining outside of the responsibilities and restrictions of 
cooperative membership.  This free-rider problem plagued cooperative ventures and 
                                                     
7 The classic account of the populist movement is Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Movement:  A Short 
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limited their effectiveness.  Furthermore, agricultural cooperatives operated in murky 
legal waters prior to the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act that clarified how such organizations 
could coordinate agricultural production and marketing without running afoul of anti-
trust regulations. But even under Capper-Volstead a key tenet of the cooperative 
philosophy remained constant: membership must be voluntary.9 
While attempts at economic cooperation faced significant barriers to long term 
success in the 1920a, political organizations representing farm interests flourished.  
Three groups most prominently claimed the right to speak for American farmers.  The 
Order of the Patrons of Husbandry (the Grange), the National Farmers Union (NFU) and 
the American Farm Bureau (AFB).  The national farm organizations had different 
philosophies about the nature of farm problems.  They also had different ideas about the 
government intervention in the economy.  These groups were influential in shaping 
farm policies at the federal level throughout the century, and in particular in the 1920s 
and 1930s while many different potential policy responses to the farm problem vied for 
support.   
                                                     
9 Historians have studied individual cooperatives from the 1910s and 1920s and found that cooperatives 
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The National Farmers Union generally favored commercial agriculture on 
smaller scale farms, made possible by cooperation.  Only farmers could join, as the NFU 
did not allow other professionals to gain membership, even if their work was closely 
related to agriculture.  In the years before World War II, the NFU advanced the 
argument that farmers were a class of their own, one that was specifically in opposition 
to middle-men in the commodities market and distinctly separate from industrial 
managers and workers.  The Farmer’s Union operated some of the largest and most 
successful cooperatives in the United States in the 1920s, including the Union Grain 
Terminal Association, generally accepted as the “largest cooperative grain market” 
operating in the country at that time, as well as a substantial farm supply cooperative.10  
Other organizations favored stronger government actions. The Grange was an 
older organization with roots in the Populist movement.  In the 1870s, the first Virginia 
and Carolinas Grange chapters worked for market reform in opposition to 
“monopolistic” tobacco marketing associations.  By the 1920s, the Grange had become 
more conservative, and its leadership supported Herbert Hoover’s election in 1928.11  
The American Farm Bureau was also a conservative organization that represented the 
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interests of commercial farmers.  Membership divided primarily between Midwestern 
and Southern commercial farmers.  Initially an organization focused on farmer 
education, the Farm Bureau promoted scientific agriculture, and formed a close 
relationship with the Extension Service.  Until the mid-1920s, county agents worked for 
both the USDA and the Farm Bureau.12  At the county level, the Farm Bureau was a 
community organization, with branches for women and children, that provided a forum 
for sharing information and developing community resources.  By the 1920s, it was 
rapidly developing into what has been called the most influential interest and lobbying 
group in twentieth century American politics.13   
Facing an agricultural depression in the 1920s, the federal government began to 
consider ways in intervene in the farm economy, for the first time attempting to craft a 
unified agriculture policy.  The national farm organizations and large cooperatives 
exercised considerable sway over the shape of these various policies, along with the bi-
partisan congressional Farm Bloc.14  Under the presidencies of Wilson, Coolidge, and 
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Hoover, policy makers and interest organizations – such as think tanks, trade and 
professional groups, social welfare organizations, and other “technocratic and scientific 
elites” -- to build an “associative sector,” that would bring private organizations into 
cooperation with the federal government to solve social problems and regulate the 
economy.15  This was an American vision for a corporatist state.16  Unlike the tactics 
favored by Progressive Era reforms, the associative state would not make and enforce 
new regulations through an expanded bureaucracy or through independent 
commissions of experts whose decisions carried the force of law.  Instead, the associative 
state would coordinate and help administer private action and voluntary self-regulation.  
As one historian has explained, the associationalist approach to government held that 
“through partnerships of the public and private sectors, American society could develop 
an enhanced ability for self-regulation, self-government, and economic rationalizations.  
The nation might have national management and forms of economic coordination 
without creating large scale bureaucracies.”17   
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The principles of agricultural cooperation found a home in associationalist 
politics.  In the associative state, the government was primarily empowered to act as 
educator and advocate for cooperative approaches to economic coordination.  This was 
the mission of the Cooperative Extension Service, officially established in 1914 in order 
to educate rural people on modern farming and homemaking.18  In addition to 
promoting scientific agriculture, the Extension service encouraged and facilitated farmer 
organization on the local, state, an national level.19   A second institution from the 
Woodrow Wilson era was the Federal Land Bank.  Founded contemporaneously the 
Federal Reserve and mimicking its structure, the FLB provided capital for farm 
mortgages.  The FLB also created lending institutions dedicated to financing 
cooperatives in order to build marketing infrastructures such as grain elevators. For the 
tobacco industry, the Federal Warehouse Act of 1916 sought to ease the harvest-time 
glut by providing public warehouse facilities.20  In all of these measures, the government 
intervened to encourage cooperation, ease credit availability, and stabilized markets, but 
they stopped short of creating measures to subsidize or regulate production.  These were 
important interventions, though limited.  They signaled the development of “farm 
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policy” as a distinct area of policy making, much like industrial policy or labor policy.  
Congress and presidents would began developing legislative agendas whose goals were 
to respond to economic and social problems understood to be distinctly farm-related or 
rural issues, requiring their specialized interventions.21 
The first attempt at guaranteeing minimum prices for agricultural commodities 
the in the United Sates was the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief Bill. The Grange made 
passing this bill its “major legislative objective” in the mid-1920s, and it also enjoyed 
support from the Farm Bureau. McNary-Haugen was highly controversial, and the bill 
received Congressional approval twice, only to be vetoed by Calvin Coolidge both 
times.  The bill proposed a government guarantee of minimum prices of certain 
agricultural commodities. The bill obligated the government purchase surplus 
commodities, but it did so with no reciprocal adjustments to production by farmers.  
Farmers would continue to be allowed to grow as much as they chose without 
restriction to and market the produce in any quantity.  Farmers would, however, face 
mandatory “equalization fees,” equivalent to half of the difference between the market 
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price and the government price on the surplus portion of the crop that government 
purchased.22   
Opponents of the McNary-Haugen bill feared that even with equalization fees, 
guaranteed minimum prices would drive farmers to produce more of the commodities 
most severely in surplus because the bill lacked any mechanism for centralized 
coordination of agricultural production.  James Boyle, professor of rural economy at 
Cornell University published a lengthy and scathing “brief” detailing the weakness of 
McNary-Haugen in 1928. Boyle proposed an alternative plan that called for centralized 
planning by a federal farm board, but stopped short of calling for compulsory 
production regulations.23  His proposal was very similar to one that was winding its way 
through Congress with the support of the new president, Herbert Hoover.   
Hoover was a champion of the associationalist approach to state-building, and 
from his positions as the director of the World War I-ear Food Administration, as 
Secretary of Commerce under Coolidge, and as president he favored cooperative 
economic organization and mobilization.  Hoover made agriculture policy a focus of his 
administration, culminating in the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act.  The provisions of 
the act were in large part inspired by Hoover’s experience with the war-time Food 
Administration, where he discovered that the absence of strong coordinating structures 
in American agriculture made organized efforts mobilizing production for the war effort 
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very difficult.  As secretary of Commerce, Hoover had been occupied by the notion of 
“waste,” which for him encompassed all of the inefficiencies of the agricultural 
economy, found in outdated production methods, unstable prices, and repeated farm 
crises.  He believed that only organized collective action on a national scale could 
address the systemic problems that led to this waste.   
In the 1920s there were approximately eleven thousand agricultural cooperatives 
active in the United States, accounting for roughly two billion dollars in sales.  The AMA 
was designed to harness and direct the potential power of these cooperatives. The law 
created the Federal Farm Board whose job was to act as a coordinating body that would 
facilitate cooperation among these organizations, and in so doing minimize speculation 
and waste.  The eight-member Board was also intended to educate farmers in 
cooperative marketing and to study market conditions in order to understand the causes 
of overproduction.  In response to prevailing low commodity prices, the Agricultural 
Marketing Act also created “export debentures” that were intended to, in the 
terminology of the time “make the tariff effective” for agriculture.24  The AMA was a 
compromise bill between Hoover and the many remaining supporters of McNary-
Haugen.  Farm organizations supported it as well.  The Farm Bureau pushed for the 
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inclusion of the Farm Board, while the Grange fought for the export debenture 
measure.25 
The purpose of the AMA was not to offer immediate or even significant price 
relief.  Instead, over time and under the leadership of the Farm Board, cooperatives were 
to better coordinate production in order to reduce surpluses and stabilize the market.  In 
the interim, the debentures were to provide some income relief by making it possible for 
the farm sector to benefit directly from tariff protections.  This was an issue that 
animated most farm marketing reform activists and that appeased the concerns of many 
remaining McNary-Haugenites in farm organizations and in Congress who continued to 
prefer the abortive Coolidge era bill.26  The AMA proved incapable of adequately 
responding to the combination of drought, falling prices, banking system collapse, and 
international depression that overtook the economy in late 1920s. The Farm Boards 
cooperative marketing policies met with practical challenges and general criticism 
throughout its existence and it was mostly defunct by late 1932.27  New solutions were 
desperately needed. 
In the Agricultural Marketing Act’s place, the New Deal created a Farm State 
that exceeded the scope of any program imagined by early twentieth-century 
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proponents of corporatism.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act was informed by similar 
understandings of what the farm problem entailed and the philosophy that thorough-
going organization of the farming sector was the only real solution to the over-supply 
problem.  But the New Deal broke significantly from the associationalist approach in 
that it sought to organize famers under the umbrella of the government instead of 
within private cooperatives.  With the election of Franklin Roosevelt, the promoters of 
associationalist answers to economic problems, especially those on the farm, were 
replaced by policy makers more willing to expand the government’s scope of action and 
to create and enforce binding production regulations.  The New Deal for agriculture 
would be based upon the tenets of economic liberalism while also reflecting the old 
concerns of McNary-Haugenites and corporatist policy makers that any regulation of the 
farm economy must embody the principles of democracy and self-government.  The 
result was a unique experiment in administrative democracy.  
Economic Democracy 
The New Deal created a farm state of unprecedented proportions. Through a 
series of related legislation, the government set production limits and using its authority 
to tax and enforce contracts to reduce the total acres of the most important agricultural 
commodities in the country.  In 1933 the Agricultural Adjustment Act instituted the first 
federal framework for regulating agricultural production in the United States. Although 
the Supreme Court found the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional in 1936, 
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Congress quickly replaced it with the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 
and, in 1938, the second Agricultural Adjustment Act.  Supplementing these acts were 
two 1937 laws, the Bankhead Cotton Reduction Act and the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Control 
Act.28  The differences between these acts are important and often subtle, but they 
shared a similarity of purpose.  Under these various authorizing acts, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation regulated 
commodity production and subsidized prices. The AAA also facilitated the construction 
of storage facilities and encouraged the adoption of soil conservation measures.  These 
core functions of the AAA would remain essentially unchanged even as the authorizing 
legislation evolved and the agency itself changed names.  The Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration became the Production and Marketing Administration after World War 
II, and in 1953, the PMA became the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
service.29 
The AAA was not the only new agricultural institution created by the New Deal.  
The Farm Security Administration and the Resettlement Administration worked with 
tenants, share croppers, and landowners facing foreclosure to implement farm 
modernization and crop diversification methods and to facilitate stable land ownership 
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among the poorest, most vulnerable farmers. The Soil Conservation Service was 
originally independent of the USDA, and worked with state level soil conservation 
departments to implement conservation measures combating the severe erosion that 
was destroying soils in the South and Midwest.  The Production Credit Administration 
created local cooperative banks, seeded with federal money, from which farmers could 
borrow operating capital.  Other institutions joined the roster over the course of FDR’s 
administration, most notably the Farmers Home Administration (FHA), which provided 
government-guaranteed or -financed credit for rural home mortgages and farm 
purchases.    All of these institutions were integrated into the federal government.  They 
were not independent organizations separate from the authority of Congress or the 
executive branch. 30  
This was a significant break from associationalist policy.  Proponents of the 
McNary-Haugen bill and the Agricultural Marketing Act hoped to avoid establishing a 
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new a massive bureaucracy to administer farm relief and stabilization schemes.  Instead, 
the government was to act as Hoover described his World War I era Food 
Administration had, to “centralize ideas and decentralized administration.”  While 
cooperatives encouraged and attempted to incentivize voluntary production controls, 
under associationalist schemes, there were to be no government-issued and enforced 
production regulations.  Any degree of compulsion in farm production adjustment was 
undesirable, because associationalists feared that strict, mandatory regulations would 
lead to a loss of self-government and negate any incentives for developing private 
cooperatives.  A large farm bureaucracy was to be avoided. 
New Dealers did not share this squeamishness about bureaucracy. They 
incorporated voluntarism, cooperation, and self-government into the functions of the 
new farm bureaucracies they created.  The AAA was to be administered locally by 
Extension agents and committees of farmers from the local community who would draw 
upon their local knowledge and their relationships with their neighbors to make 
determinations about allotment assignments.  The Soil Conservation Service operated 
only in areas where farmers voluntarily formed soil conservation districts, which were 
administered by local committees. The FHA relied on farmer committees to review loan 
applications, and the Production Credit Corporation issued credit through cooperative 
lending institutions.  The Bankhead Cotton Reduction Act and the second AAA required 
referenda approval before allotment and subsidy measures took effect.  Running 
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through all of these programs as a thread of voluntarism, in which participation was, at 
least technically, a matter of choice.  To understand the advantages and limitations of 
this approach, we need to better understand the function of the AAA and the challenges 
it faced in its early years. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Commodity Credit 
Corporation attempted to curb surplus production and stabilize prices by forming what 
was, in effect, a very large cooperative, one that had the legal standing to enforce 
production agreements and that commanded the geographical and jurisdictional scope 
to organize the majority of American farmers to stabilize the market.  The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 created growers’ associations in every county for each of the 
seven commodities:  tobacco, cotton, wheat, rice, corn, swine, and some dairy products.  
The secretary of agriculture set production goals for each of these commodities for the 
entire country in 1933, goals that were below the actual productive capacity of American 
farms. 
Farmers who joined the associations signed a contract in which they agreed to 
reduce their production of regulated and supported commodities by a percentage to be 
determined by the USDA.  The acreage each grower would be allowed was his 
“allotment,” which was a percentage of the average yearly planting on that farm.31  
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Complying with allotment contracts meant planting less than one normally did, and in 
that first year of allotments in 1933, actually destroying some portion of the crop already 
in the field.  To offset the lost income on the uncultivated acres and to provide an 
incentive for compliance, the AAA issued acreage reduction payments to growers.  The 
money was to come from new taxes levied on commodity processors.  To slow the 
introduction of newly-harvested crops on the market, ease the rural cash shortage, and 
support commodity prices, the newly formed Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
would lend farmers money collateralized by their crops at a rate that served as a 
minimum guaranteed price for produce within their quotas.  If market prices rose above 
the loan rate, farmers could sell their crops and repay the loan.  If market prices 
remained below the loan rate, they could keep the CCC money and turn over the crop to 
the government, which would have purchased it at a price above that offered by the 
open market.32 
                                                     
 
amount of produce that could be marketed without penalty.  Acreage allotments and marketing quotas were 
determined in relation to each other, but marketing quotas prevented farmers from far exceeding the total 
amount of produce they should have been able to market based on the land area they were allowed to 
cultivate in regulated commodities.  Very high per-acre yields could be achieved by planting crops in more 
narrow rows than was the standard.  Throughout this dissertation, I attempt to distinguish between 
allotments and quotas in appropriate contexts, except in direct quotations. 
32 For a historical analysis of how these loans were issued and their immediate effects on farm cash-flow 
and investment in see Clarke, Regulation and Revolution in United States Farm Productivity, 162-202.  
This system, still in use today, is known as “no recourse loan” because the government’s only option if the 
loan is not repaid is to take possession of the crop.  For a modern description of CCC loan processes, See 
E.C. Pasour, Jr.,  Agriculture and the Statelmes & Meier, 1990), 189-190. 
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The AAA became law on May 12, 1933, and Extension agents embarked on a 
public relations and informational tour to explain the commodity reduction programs to 
farmers and to encourage them to sign up.  On June 26, A.A. McKeown traveled to 
Camden, South Carolina, for one in a series of mass meetings he held with farmers in his 
district.  Nearly a thousand people packed themselves tightly into the local courthouse. 
It must have been an oppressively hot space in the South Carolina summer, but 
McKeown’s audience endured the meeting with unflagging attention.  He recalled that,  
“although the court house was so crowded that every available foot of space was taken 
up and everyone had to stand in order to see and [hear], I do not believe a single person 
left until the public meeting adjourned.”33  The scene replayed in counties across the 
country, in schools and churches and courthouses.  McKeown held daily meetings 
throughout the month, explaining “in detail” the new cotton program to all 
administrators and participants.   
While production allotments went into place quickly, many of the details 
regarding marketing regulations were not yet in place in May when the AAA became 
law.  This left room for producers and processors to lobby for their interests.  Many 
farmers demanded concrete marketing agreements that would guarantee relief from 
prevailing market trends.  North Carolina tobacco farmers in 1933 successfully forced 
government intervention when tobacco markets opened to prices below cost and 
                                                     
33 McKeown, “Monthly Report,” June, 1933, p. 2. 
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significantly below the already low prices received the year before.  Growers 
successfully persuaded the governor to declare a market holiday until they could wring 
concessions from the tobacco processing oligarchy.  Growers, buyers, and politicians 
alike looked forward to the conclusion of policy negotiations that would structure the 
tobacco program for 1934.  By the end of January 1934, ninety-five percent of North 
Carolina’s tobacco growers signed up to participate in the program.  Southern cotton 
farmers proved more reluctant to enter into AAA contracts than their tobacco producing 
neighbors.  Scholars attribute their hesitation to the complicated land tenure and crop 
sharing system that characterized cotton production that made participation 
disadvantageous to many tenants.  By the end of 1933, only half of North Carolina’s 
cotton acreage was under AAA contracts.34   
This lackluster enthusiasm for the cotton program, which might have been 
construed as a failure of policy implementation, served as a key defense of the USDA 
when the AAA faced scrutiny by the Supreme Court.  The dire conditions of the farm 
economy and the strength of the inducements to participate in AAA programs appeared 
coercive to the United States Supreme Court in 1936.  In the case of U.S. v. Butler, which 
found the first AAA unconstitutional, the Court rejected the USDA’s assertion that 
farmers joined the commodity organizations voluntarily.  
                                                     
34 B. Hahn, Making Tobacco Bright, p. 167-171.  Daniel, Breaking the Land, p. 93, 110-114. 
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The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse 
to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount offered 
is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him to agree to the proposed 
regulation. The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to 
coerce or destroy. [. . .]  The coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not 
obscured by the fact that it has not been perfectly successful. [. . .] It is clear that 
the Department of Agriculture has properly described the plan as one to keep a 
noncooperating minority in line. This is coercion by economic pressure. The 
asserted power of choice is illusory 35 
Just as such voluntary action had failed to insulate the AAA from judicial review it also 
failed to bring adequate cotton acreage under production control.  The 1933 cotton crop 
was only slight smaller than the 1932 crop, and it fetched similarly dismal prices.36  
Therefore, the first AAA offered both voluntarism and regulation in only half measures.  
The Court and other critical observers of the Administration found it both ineffective in 
its work and indigenous in its assertions that participation was voluntary.   
The first Agricultural Adjustment Act was thus proved to be a transitional step 
between associationalist resistance to compulsion and the compulsory, but popularly 
approved programs that began the following year.  The 1934 Bankhead Cotton Control 
act instituted compulsory acreage reductions by severely taxing cotton marketed in 
excess of quotas.  In the same year, the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Control Act instituted 
similar policies for tobacco.  Those who favored the bill claimed that these compulsory 
controls were actually instituted in response to popular demand by farmers who wished 
                                                     
35 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, January 6, 1936. 
36 Paul J. Kern, “The Bankhead Experiment,” 362-363. 
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to expand “cooperation” (never “compliance”) with the AAA.37  The provisions of the 
Bankhead Act were set to expire after two years, but even the second year would not be 
enforced without approval of the majority of cotton growers.38  In Georgia, Arthur Raper 
found that farmland owners overwhelmingly favored the continued application of the 
Bankhead Act, and that they influenced their tenants to vote the same.  “On election day 
the farmers swarmed to the polls and expressed themselves overwhelmingly in favor of 
the bill.”39  Their support derived from the much improved 1934 cotton process, 
although Raper observed that it the improvement in the market was more likely a result 
of a devastating drought in Texas than the provisions of the Bankhead Act.   
The policy referenda that defined the Bankhead and Kerr-Smith acts became 
permanent features of the second AAA, enacted in 1938, repeated regularly on most 
regulated commodities.  First we will examine how these referenda were designed to 
work, and then look more closely at serious problems that undermined their 
effectiveness as tools of democracy. The office of the Secretary of Agriculture 
determined which staple commodity crops would benefit from subsidy support.  
Surplus supplies on had in public and private warehouses exceeding twenty percent of 
“normal usage” automatically triggered the Secretary’s office to set a national allotment 
                                                     
37 Kern, 362; Robert E. Martin, “The Referendum Process in the Agricultural Adjustment Program of the 
United States,” Agricultural History 25:1 (Jan 1951):  36. 
38 Robert E. Martin, “The Referendum Process in the Agricultural Adjustment Program of the United 
States,” Agricultural History 25:1 (Jan 1951):  36. 
39 Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry:  A Tale of Two Black Belt Counties,  (Chapel Hill:  The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1936), p. 250-251. 
 58 
and implement marketing quotas and price supports. The Secretary based the total, 
national allotment and marketing targets based on the projected needs of industry and 
the military and anticipated opportunities for export.  The Secretary’s price support 
plans did not become binding until they received approval from a two-thirds majority of 
growers of each individual commodity in referenda held around the country.40   
Conducting farm program referenda was an annual task for local offices of the 
AAA and its successor agencies.  These offices partnered with the Extension Service to 
educate farmers about the details of the policy measures up for approval and to 
encourage voter participation.  Instructions of Extension officials for one wheat program 
referendum stated that, “it is essential that all wheat farmers understand the operation 
of marketing quotas.  They must know just what will happen if marketing quotas are 
approved and what will happen if they are disapproved.”41  While the Extension Service  
                                                     
40 Under Bankhead-Jones, there had been a provision that the measure had to receive the support of 2/3 of 
growers or of growers representing ¾ of total acreage, so a smaller percentage of larger farmers could 
approve the measure.  This acreage provision seems to have fallen away when the referenda were made 
part of the second AAA. 
41 David Weaver to All County Agents, July 23, 1953, Box 8, Folder “County Agents, 1953,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  Educational 
materials included pamphlets that explained the reasons for the referenda and the specific provisions of the 
program as proposed by the Secretary’s office. Regarding the 1953 wheat referenda, growers read that a 
yes vote would affirm marketing quotas, established price support at ninety percent of parity.  Additionally, 
“quotas can be expected to hold down production, helping to bring supplies more nearly in line with the 
effective market demand.”  If the measure was not approved, farmers would face 323no marketing quota 
restriction, but they would be asked to observe acreages allotments, in return for which they could be 
eligible for price supports at 50 percent of parity in the event of a precipitous decline in wheat prices (and 
no price support at all for exceeding their normal allotment.)  In the event of a no vote, the pamphlet 
warned farmer that “production can be expected to continue at higher levels – possibly adding to the wheat 
surplus.” (“The Wheat Referendum . . .” U.S. Department of Agriculture, July 1953, Box 8, Folder “County 
Agents, 1953,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, 
NCSU.) 
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Figure 1:  USDA Informational Pamphlet for 1958 Corn Referendum.42 
                                                     
42 USDA, “The Corn Referendum:  An Important Decision for Corn Growers,” Publication PA-383 
October 1958, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters July – December 1958,” UA102.01, NCSU.  Used with 
permission.  This informational pamphlet is typical of the literature distributed by USDA offices advertising 
commodity program referenda and explaining how the process would be conducted.  The inside pages 
explained the specific regulation up for approval in more detail. 
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could not explicitly urge voters to vote in favor of marketing quotas, Extension’s tacit 
support for these measures was generally understood.  In a 1947 open letter from the 
North Carolina Farm Bureau executive vice president to the Extension Service, 
published in the Extension Farm-News, the Farm Bureau expressed gratitude to the 
organization for its persuasive efforts in the tobacco referendum held that spring.  “I 
think the results clearly demonstrated the effective manner that you people used in 
placing the facts before the farmers.  I never worry about the outcome of any question of 
this kind when properly presented to our farmers.”43 
For federal farm agency leaders, strong voter turnout was more important than 
the results of a given referendum.  North Carolina Extension director David Weaver 
argued that active participation of all eligible farmers in allotment referenda was 
essential to maintaining the legitimacy of farm programs.  In the early 1950s, Weaver 
explained that “emphasis has been placed upon the idea that if farmers are to have their 
own program, they must be the ones that make it.  We have stressed the fact that a large 
vote will point out to everyone that farm people are capable of having their own 
program.”44  Weaver believed that participation by farmers should be the defining 
feature of all farm programs, and he put this principle to work in Extension programs in 
                                                     
43 R. Frank Shaw, quoted in “Farm Bureau Thanks Extension for Help in Flue-Cured Vote,” Extension 
Farm-News, 32:8 (April, 1947): 3, Box 25, Folder “Home Demonstration Annual Reports, 1947,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service Annual Reports, 1908-2007, NCSU.  
44 David Weaver to M.L. Wilson, July 18, 1952, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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his state. In this belief, Weaver demonstrated the persistence with which self-
government remained the key to the identity and legitimation of farm programs in the 
post-war period.  As these programs neared the end of their second decade, it remained 
essential that eligible farmers continued to be actively engaged in the process of the 
Farm State. 
The North Carolina Extension Service incorporated farmer participation into 
local programs in order to perpetuate and strengthen the practice of self-government in 
the Farm State.  “Nickels for Know-How” was one such local program that levied a 
check-off-type fee on all seed and fertilizer sales in North Carolina to provide 
supplemental funding for agronomic and horticultural research by the Extension 
Service.  The check-off measure underwent annual referenda, in which all purchasers of 
these products were eligible to vote.  This included young farmers below the official age 
of voter of eligibility for political elections.  Weaver viewed this as an opportunity for 
youth to practice the habit of voting for farm program initiatives and to urge their 
parents to do the same.45  The importance of “Nickels for Know-How,” according to 
Weaver, extended beyond the benefits of additional research funding for the Extension 
                                                     
45 David Weaver to All Extension Agents, September 27, 1954, Box 8, Folder “Co. Agents, 1954,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  North 
Carolina Cooperative Leaders of the Nickels for Know-How program expressed the same anxiety about 
voter turn outs as did allotment referenda organizers.  At a meeting of the North Carolina Board of Farm 
Organizations and Agencies, former North Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture L.Y. Ballentine  was 
“pleased” by the 93% favorable vote in favor of maintaining the program, but “distressed about the number 
voting.”  He urged that “an effort should begin at once to impress upon the people the importance of an 
expression by them in this referendum, the next time it is held, as it is just as essential to have a large 
number voting as a good percentage in favor of the program." 
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Service.  “Here is an outstandingly successful program conducted by farm people in the 
interest of their own welfare.  It may well serve as a pattern for even more important 
matters.  Farm people must learn to work together and support a common program.  
‘Nickels for Know-How’ . . . not only demonstrates to farm people that they can and are 
working together, but it is an outstanding example to be observed by the non-farm 
people.” 46  The relevance to the allotment and conservation programs was clear.  Nickels 
for Know-How was a practice ground for the important work organization and 
participation required by allotment and subsidy programs. 
Voter eligibility for federal farm programs was more restricted than the locally 
run Nickels-for-Knowhow.  Any person with “an interest in” – that is, a financial 
interest in – a regulated commodity during the previous crop year was eligible to vote in 
individual commodity referenda.  Farmers with an eligible interest included 
landowners, tenants, and share croppers, but what should have been a simple definition 
proved open to interpretation.  For instance, could farmers’ wives vote in these 
referenda?  They could, but many did not.  After 1950, agency personnel began to target 
those women as an under-utilized source of voters from which to bolster turnout.  In the 
run-up to the 1951 flue-cured tobacco program referendum, North Carolina’s State 
Home Demonstration Leader, Ruth Current, instructed all of her Home Demonstration 
Agents to urge women to vote.  Other women in leadership and public roles worked the 
                                                     
46 David Weaver to All Extension Agents, September 27, 1954, Box 8, Folder “Co. Agents, 1954,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.   
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radio waves to reach farm women with information about the flue-cured program and 
the news of their eligibility to vote.  The President of the North Carolina Federation of 
Home Demonstration Clubs gave a “radio talk” on the subject, and May White Scott, the 
wife of Senator Kerr Scott and former first lady of North Carolina, “made a broadcast 
urging eligible farm women to vote and get their men folks to vote.”47   
The importance of high voter participation made AAA referenda more open to 
black voter participation than were the political elections of the same period.  In the 
1940s, Robert Earl Martin, a University of Chicago political science graduate student, 
conducted an in-depth study of two counties in the Carolinas:  Wilson, in North 
Carolina, and Darlington, in South Carolina.48  Martin surveyed, as nearly as possible, 
every farmer in each of the two counties, inquiring into their voting habits and attitudes 
regarding AAA programs, administration, and participation.  Martin found that black 
                                                     
47 David Waver to M.L. Wilson, July 18, 1952, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.   Determining women’s 
eligibility to vote could be tricky.  The national office of the PMA distributed guidelines for referendum in 
1952 that affirmed that when married couples jointly farmed regulated commodities, the wives were 
eligible to vote in allotment referenda.  (See USDA – PMA, Tobacco, “Questions and Answers on Flue-
Cured Tobacco Referendum,” p. 2, June, 1952, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, July-December 1952,” 
North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.)   Tthis 
led to confusion about the wives of farmers who were not land owners. The Virginia State ASC committee 
interpreted the regulations in 1961 thusly:   A woman who owned farmland with allotments in her own 
name could vote, as could a women married to a landowner with allotments.  The wives of tenants and 
share croppers were not eligible to vote unless their own names specifically appeared on tenancy/share 
agreements, in other words, unless the woman was herself the tenant.  Marriage to the tenant alone was 
insufficient.  The same was true for some wives in multi-generational farm enterprises.  If a father and 
son(s) together farmed land owned solely by the father, the father’s wife could vote in her capacity as part 
owner by marriage; the sons could vote in their capacity as managers; the sons’ wives could not vote.  If a 
son did own a portion of the land, then his wife could vote.  (Virginia ASC State Committee to Deputy 
Administration, State County Operations, November 17, 1961, Box 2, RG 145, NARA.) 
48 Robert Earl Martin, “Negro-White Participation in the A.A.A. Cotton and Tobacco Referenda in North 
And South Carolina:  A Study in Differential Voting and Attitudes in Selected Areas,” Ph.D. diss, 
University of Chicago, 1947.  
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farmers supported and participated in AAA programs at high rates.  The degree of 
referenda participation for both groups depended more on their tenure status than on 
their race.  In fact, among land owning farmers in Wilson County a higher percentage of 
black farmers voted in AAA referenda than white, with 100 percent of black land 
owners having voted at least once in an AAA referendum, and 92.5 percent of white 
land owners.  Black tenant farmers far outstripped white tenants, voting at a rate of 90 
percent versus 79 percent.  Black voting participation fell off sharply as they descended 
down the tenure ladder. Only 64 percent of black share croppers voted, compared to 
nearly 94 percent of white share croppers.49  Darlington County landowners’ voting 
records differed from Wilson County’s, but tenant and share cropper voting rates 
showed similar trends.50  
Table 1:  Composite data on voting rates found by Robert Martin, 1947.  Voting 
rates basted on survey responses, counted as a voter any individual who reported 
voting at least once in any AAA election since 193851 
 % 
White 
Landowners 
% 
Black 
Landowners 
% 
White 
tenants 
% 
Black 
Tenants 
% 
White 
Croppers 
% 
Black 
croppers 
NC 92.5 100 79.3 90 93.7 64.4 
SC 75 68.6 68.8 85.2 75 68.6 
 
Martin’s research investigated the reasons why people voted, on what basis they 
decided to vote for or against marketing regulations, and the quality of their experiences 
                                                     
49 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 181. 
50 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 182.   
51 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 181-182. 
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at polling places.  What he found illuminates the differences between the reasons that 
black farmers exercised their right to vote in AAA referenda and the reasons that white 
farmers allowed this participation with a minimum of interference.  Black farmers 
reported, nearly unanimously, that they voted in favor of AAA allotment programs 
because they resulted in higher prices for the crops they grew.52  Most black farmers 
who voted reported trouble-free polling.  They told Martin that white farmers “treated 
us fine” and “they acted like I was as welcome as anybody else.”53   
This optimism was tempered, though, by many black respondents’ suspicion 
that the reason while land owners welcomed them at the polls was because black 
farmers’ votes were necessary to demonstrate popular support for the AAA. Many share 
croppers reported experiencing pressure from their landlords to vote for the programs.54  
“They were very anxious for us to vote – they wanted to carry the program,” one told 
Martin.55  A number of Martin’s white informants in Darlington County agreed, 
asserting that they tolerated black referenda participation because they “wanted ‘em all 
to vote –it’d help carry the program;’ and ‘they didn’t care [that black farmers voted] 
‘cause they knew [blacks] was gonna vote like they wanted ‘em to.’”56  Some tensions 
between white and black farmers were evident in the survey responses.  Some self-
                                                     
52 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 276, 210, 212. 
53 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 246. 
54 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,”182; Raper, Preface to Peasantry, 249-251. 
55 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 246. 
56 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 247.  
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identified small farmers in South Carolina opposed black farmers’ referenda 
participation because they believed black farmers “voted with the big farmers.”57  In his 
observations of the AAA in Georgia, Arthur Raper encountered similar attitudes.58 
Anxiety over voter turnout reflected some uncertainty about support for farm 
programs by both the general public and by farmers.  The law required a two-thirds 
majority of actual voters only, not of all allotment holders.  Low turnout had the 
potential to undermine support from Congress and the American people.  Weaver 
cautioned his Extension Agents that “unless a strong vote is cast, the whole agricultural 
situation may be endangered.  Certainly, the non-agricultural public must be shown that 
farmers themselves are interested and believe in agricultural programs.”59  “No” votes, 
which did occasionally happen, reflected farmers’ evaluation of the state of the market 
and demonstrated that the referendum process was working.  Therefore, officials saw 
disengagement with the program, as indicated by failure to turn out for the vote, to be 
more dangerous than even the defeat of a given year’s marketing quota at the polls.   
The referendum process was structured so that it excluded the possibility of 
serious and thorough-going critique or revision of the program by voting.  When any 
vote – yes or no – implied support for the program, voting offered no avenue for critique 
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or revision.  Withholding the vote was the only method of protest.  Some farmers 
understood this dynamic, and appealed to agency leaders’ concerns when they 
expressed their dissatisfaction with various farm programs.  Susan Farmer, a tobacco 
grower from Beulaville, North Carolina, wrote to the ASCS offices in Washington to 
protest the continued reduction in tobacco allotments that was disproportionately 
affecting small farmers.  “There is a lot of farmers talking of voting on the farm program 
no more if [the current proposal is] approved.”60   
Such talk did not even begin to address the problems the referendum process 
posed for those who aspired to be farmers, but for any number of reasons were note 
even eligible to vote.  In 1960, Mrs. Wesley Walden, from Ashland City, Tennessee, sent 
one such letter to her senator, Estes Kefauver. A USDA official had upheld the ASC 
county committee’s denial of her application for a new tobacco allotment.  He justified 
the ASC’s actions on the grounds that “in a referendum held February 24, 1959, . . .  
Burley tobacco growers . . . favored marketing quotas on the 1959, 1960, and 1961 crops.” 
Some commodity-specific version of this language was the standard reply to nearly all 
complainants, whether from agriculture or industry. Walden convey her incredulity at 
this response in her letter to Kefauver.  “How could this apply to us or any other farmer 
who does not grow tobacco since we have no vote in the referendum?  Sounds as if the 
                                                     
60 Susan Farmer to Harry Evans, Jr., November 13, 1963, Box 13, RG 145, NARA. 
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farmers have their own brand of segregation.”61 Walden, and many other would-be 
commodity growers thus shut out of their chosen occupation by regulations they had 
not opportunity to approve or reject, recognized that the referendum system facilitated 
the gate-keeping functions of the marketing regulations.  The laid the responsibility for 
her exclusion on both the USDA and the farmers who cooperated with the system. 
Walden’s allusion to segregation in the USDA’s economic democracy 
unwittingly pointed to dynamics that made the kind of protest that she and Susan 
Farmer proposed difficult to accomplish.  Within the bounds of the included farm 
population, AAA referenda expanded the franchise to people who otherwise faced 
resistance to their participation.  Black farmers in Wilson and Darlington Counties found 
it difficult to set such an opportunity aside, though they found the reasons for their 
relatively easy access to the polls galling.  One black informant told Martin, “some of the 
colored I talked to said they [weren’t] going to vote ‘cause they hadn’t been letting us 
vote before in the political election; and now they want us to vote ‘cause they need us – 
and I ain’t gonna do it.”  One black farm owner explained his own difficult decision to 
vote.  “’Some said they hadn’t let them vote before and so they were not going to vote 
now.  But the colored county agent told all of us we ought to go and take advantage of 
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the opportunity – and I felt we should, too.’”62  As a land owner, this informant 
determined that he had some economic benefit to gain from the AAA.  Black tenants and 
share croppers came to different conclusions. 
As Robert Martin noted, the rates at which black farmers voted decreased 
sharply as they descended the land tenure ladder.  One of the greatest effects of the 
allotment system was to increase farm size and decrease the number of total tenancies 
and share cropper opportunities in rural communities.  Because Martin measured black 
voter participation based on whether an individual had ever voted in a single referenda, 
his numbers did not reflect whether and to what extent individual voters ceased voting 
as their status receded.  Black farmers were often pushed down the ladder, to poorer 
quality tenancies, or into share cropping and wage hand work before they left 
agriculture entirely.63  If their voting behavior reflected their tenure status at the time of 
the referenda, then the level of black voter participation over time was likely 
considerably less than that of white voters over time, whose status receded more slowly 
and who experienced less of an associated drop off in voting rates than black farmers.64 
Policy referenda were popular tools for the expansion of democracy and for 
making government more responsive to the will of the people.  During the Progressive 
                                                     
62 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” 254.  The informant did not feel that the black Extension agent was 
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Era, some states governments adopted referenda mechanisms  as part of their good 
government initiatives that combated corruption and the influence of special interests.  
As adopted by the USDA, however, policy referenda could not shape or repeal the basic 
structures of commodity production and marketing regulations.  They could only 
approve or reject their application to specific commodities for limited periods of time.  
The possibilities for real policy in this aspect of the Farm State’s economic democracy 
were more illusory than real.  Paradoxically, farmers who could vote in these referenda, 
even when they realized the effect of such voting was minimal, had a vested interest in 
the status quo.  Those who met voter eligibility requirements benefited from the 
production regulation and subsidization programs, including the way in which they 
acted as gate-keepers, preventing new producers from entering the fray.  These farmers 
had little incentive to challenge the manner in which the referenda system functioned. 
Further complicating the practice of economic democracy in the Farm State was a 
second institution that depended on farmer participation, was the “farmer elected 
committee system.”  The first farmer committees established each farm’s production 
history for the five years prior to 1933 and assigned allotments as percentages of the 
five-year average.  This established production history, or “base acreage” (referred to by 
farmers and policy makers alike simply as “base”), served as the foundation for an 
individual farm’s yearly allotments of regulated crops, which the committees also 
assigned.  The committees ensured that farmers complied with their contracts, and for 
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the first committees in 1933, this work began with the plow-up of excess acreage planted 
before the AAA became law.65  Committees distributed plow-up payments and loan 
dispersal funds to growers.  
Farmer committees were not part of the original 1933 Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, but rather the USDA’s solution to the administrative task of assigning production 
allotments to millions of individual farmers across the country.  The United States had 
413.2 million acres of land, divided among 6.3 million separate farms, under cultivation 
in 1930.  Nearly two million of these farms, located almost entirely in the South, grew 43 
million acres of cotton; 386 thousand farms in the South raised 1.7 million acres of 
tobacco; and the region was home to 56 million live hogs. The United States had 62 
million acres of wheat, 83 million acres of corn, and 740 thousand acres of rice in 
production that same year.66  Each of these six commodities had their own, separately-
administered AAA programs with their own regulations.  These regulations had to be 
applied individually to every single grower who signed commodity reduction contracts, 
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and every county in which these commodities grew required their own administrative 
apparatus.   
The first farmer committees were appointed by the Extension agents who made 
these appointments from among the local leading farmers. These were the committees 
that A.A. McKeown and his colleagues hand-picked in anticipation of the AAA’s 
passage. They choose white farmers, usually land owners, who were already involved 
with Extension research and educational projects, or were alumni of the agency’s 
programs for children and youth. In addition to the farmer members of the committee, 
the county Extension agent served as ex officio member of the county committee.  In June 
of 1933, McKeown met with the local committeemen in the counties that made up his 
South Carolina district, where he reviewed the cotton contract “in detail,” “item by 
item” with the new committeemen.67  Training those farmers who helped implement the 
program was, in McKeown’s opinion, the most important part of his job.  “I shall not 
attempt to explain the work in many counties in connection with training committeemen 
prior to sending them out in the field for the purpose of signing up farmers in the cotton 
reduction campaign, but [I] wish to say that the training of committeemen, in my mind, 
was about the most important work in connection with the sign-up campaign.”68   
Committees took on a task that would have completely overwhelmed the county 
Extension offices while avoiding sending “hoards of bureaucrats” into farm 
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communities to begin from scratch, with little knowledge of local farming practices.69  
The first task was to established each farmer’s production history, and, according to 
McKeown, “in order to do this, it was necessary to confer with both county agent and 
the community and county committeemen and especially community committeemen.”  
In the process, committeemen and Extension officials interpreted ambiguous 
instructions and devised procedures on the fly when instructions were missing.  “The 
work of the county agents and the committeemen has been very hard but they have 
stuck to it day and night and in most cases have worked all day Sundays, and in my 
opinion the campaign has been an outstanding success to date.”70   This “outstanding 
success” often depended on the committeemen’s social capital, and sometimes, personal 
economic sacrifice.  In Alamance County, North Carolina, committeeman and tobacco 
farmer Dallas Anderson went door-to-door with his county agent to persuade his 
neighbors to sign up for the program, and even voluntarily reduced his own tobacco 
acreage below what was required of him in order to help the county reach its goal and to 
set an example in his community.71 
The committee system had three tiers.  First was the community or township 
committee, consisting of two to three farmers elected directly by others in the same 
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community.  Second was the county committee of three to five men who were chosen by 
the community committeemen from among themselves. Originally each county had 
separate committees for each commodity (e.g. corn committees, tobacco committees, 
etc.), but after the first two years, a single farmer-elected committee administered all 
AAA programs in the county. State committee oversaw the work of all county 
committees.  Three to five non-elected political appointees, chosen by the Secretary of 
Agriculture on the advice of Senators from his party served on these committees, and 
they had the authority to audit, review, and overturn county committee decisions.  
The farmer committee system suffered from some significant shortcomings, 
including a lack of diversity among both the committee members themselves and the 
people who voted for them.  Committee members were, with only a small few 
individual exceptions, men.  They were usually land owners, well established but not 
elderly, and generally the best educated of their peers.  Martin determined that “these 
implicitly understood qualifications—ownership and education—have helped to bring it 
to pass that the AAA committee posts have revolved very slowly among the small circle 
of the top tenure group.”72  In Edgecombe County, North Carolina, where roughly forty 
men served as community committeemen every year, the same five men dominated the 
county committee for the entire decade.  Robert Martin’s research in Wilson and 
Darlington counties shows similar trends in the 1940s, and the Department of 
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Agriculture would cite this as a common trend in the 1950s.73  Even at the height of 
interest in the AAA’s proceedings, turn out for these elections were generally lower than 
the turn out for allotment referenda.74  Many observers attributed this low turnout to the 
uncontested nature of most elections.  
Table 2:  Committee members, Edgecombe County Committee, 1952-195975 
 
* committee chair 
 
                                                     
73 Martin, “Negro-White Participation,” p. 260; Martin, “Referendum Process in Agricultural Adjustment 
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75 Annual Reports of the Edgecombe County, North Carolina, PMA and ASC offices.  Originals in possession 
of Edgecombe County Cooperative Agricultural Extension Service, Tarboro, N.C.  Copies in author’s 
possession. 
 J.C. 
Powell 
(County 
Agent) 
H. 
Mayo 
Cherry 
R.B. 
Eason 
R.R. 
Brake 
P.A. 
Weeks 
H. P. 
Jenkins 
1952 
X X* X X   
1953 
X X* X X   
1954 
X X* X X   
1955 
X X* X  X  
1956 
X X* X  X  
1957 
X X* X  X  
1958 
X X* X  X  
1959 
X X*   X  X 
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While women and black farmers were welcome at the polling place for allotment 
referenda, they were excluded by measures de facto and de jure from serving as 
committee members or in leadership positions within agency offices between 1933 and 
1964.  Prior to 1964, not one county or state committee position anywhere in the South 
had been filled by a black farmer, and “only a handful” had served at the community 
committee level.76 In Mississippi, only four black men served as community 
committeemen in 1963, likely all in a single community in Bolivar County, Mississippi, 
which a USDA press release claimed had continuously elected black committeemen 
since 1934.  However, none of these community committeemen had ever served on the 
county committee.77  A concerted effort by voting rights activists in Mississippi resulted 
in the first state-wide cohort of fourteen black community committeemen taking office in 
1965.  Civil rights activists and black committee candidates met with furious resistance 
during the 1964 election.  A CORE activist who observed the elections in Madison 
County, Mississippi in December 1964 “was knocked to the ground and whipped with a 
belt buckle.”  Four other civil rights workers across the state were arrested on committee 
election day.78  USDA officials maintained they could offer neither candidates nor poll 
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observers any protection against such violence, and instead announced their intention to 
hold future elections by mail-in ballots to avoid future altercations.79 
The first black farmers received appointments to southern ASC state committees 
around the same time.  In March, 1965, ASC chief administrator Horace Godfrey, who 
rose through the ranks of the PMA and ASC in North Carolina, submitted his proposal 
to Secretary Freeman that a black member should be immediately appointed to the state 
committees in both Mississippi and Arkansas.  Furthermore, “when a vacancy occurs in 
any other state where the Negro farm population exceeds 10 percent of the total farm 
population, a Negro [should] be appointed to fill the vacancy.”80  This policy met with 
immediate resistance.  In Alabama, one senator facing re-election in 1966 feared that 
“such an appointment would be ‘hung around his neck’ and could lead to his defeat.”81  
Heated negotiations came to a “stalemate” with South Carolina Senator Richard Russell.  
He was a late-term replacement for the deceased Olin Johnston, and he was fighting  
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hard to hold the seat in the 1966 election. 82  The dispute was resolved only by an 
agreement to delay any new appointments to the committee until after the election.  The 
USDA observed their policy to make appointments of black farmers to the committees, 
but they appeased senatorial objections by increasing three member state committees to 
five members.  This gave whites four-to-one majorities on the committees and effectively 
isolated new black members and negated their votes.83   
Women’s positions in the formal structures of the ASC shifted between 1933 and 
1960, especially during the 1950s.  Like black farmers, women held very few committee 
seats across the county, although there were isolated cases.  However, white women 
were important sources of clerical labor in the local AAA, PMA, and ASC offices.  Young 
women from local communities filled these jobs as a way of further connecting the 
community to the administrative process.  Hiring local women was also an exercise of 
patronage (and sometimes nepotism) by the county committee.  The USDA’s higher 
level officials supported this practice.  M.L. Wilson, a chief architect of the allotment 
system and the national director of the Extension Service in the 1950s explained that 
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from his years of observation he had concluded that a “local girl” was often the “best 
office person in a county extension office.”  
Such a person might be a daughter of a farmer who lived in that county, 
have a family who is well known, and well known as a farmer’s daughter as a 
person that had this intimate, friendly, sympathetic connection and attitude to 
neighbors.  . . . A city girl  . . . might have a very much higher rate of efficiency in 
stenography and in office filing and those kinds of things . . .[but] they lacked 
this farmer neighborhood experiences, so that I feel that many of these problems 
in democracy, if you leave them to the people that are governing, so to speak, 
they get better solutions than otherwise.84 
 
Wilson understood the inclusion of local women in USDA county office staff as 
fundamentally democratic. The practice strengthened the connections between the 
community and the institution, but harkened back to older approaches to government, 
before the institution of a civil service.   
Women of respected farming families were to take on this work and put a 
familiar face on the institution.  They were not supposed to exercise authority or shape 
the ways those institutions functioned.  But for a space of time in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, women in some county PMA and ASC offices did exactly that.  In 1948, Thelma 
Doiron took a clerical job in Louisiana’s East Baton Rouge Parish, where she earned the 
respect of the county committee and local farmers.  In 1960, those farmers pushed to 
have Doiron named county office manager after the former manager, also a woman, 
died.  One letter of recommendation stated that “during the illness of . . . the former 
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office manager, Mrs. Doiron served the farmer of this Parish very satisfactorily as Acting 
County Office Manager and ran a very efficient office, giving fully of her time beyond 
the call of duty under the existing circumstances.”85  Doiron did not get the job.  She was 
disqualified because she lacked a bachelor’s degree in agriculture at a time when few 
women earned such degrees.86   Her predecessor had been hired during a time when the 
county manager job was defined locally by individual county committees.  But as of 
1959, State ASC committees had been “authorized to raise the standards” for new 
managerial hires in their offices.  “They have been specifically authorized to specify 
male applicants only for all counties in the State, or for certain types or groups of 
counties.”87  While barred from most managerial positions assisting the county 
committee’s work, local white women filled many lower level clerical offices and did 
much of the daily administrative work necessary to implement farm production 
regulations and commodity subsidies. Even so, women’s foothold on the positions of 
authority within the PMA and ASC offices proved tenuous, and like many women in 
government who rose to positions of authority in during the New Deal only to lose 
ground in the late 1940s.88   
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 There are no statistics documenting the rate at which women voted for 
the county committee representatives, but in the 1960s women’s participation in these 
elections drew some scrutiny that was resisted by the Agricultural Stabilization office.  
As black farmers, male and female alike, asserted their rights to vote, the barriers to 
women’s participation came more clearly into focus.  Most farmers received their ballots 
in the mail prior to elections, but many black tenant farmers had been excluded from the 
list.  ASC offices relied on landlords to report the names of individuals with an interest 
in crops grown on his farm.  Tenants and share croppers not on the list had to prove 
their eligibility by obtaining an oral or written statement from their landlord or 
producing written evidence, such as warehouse receipts or lease agreements.  Cotton gin 
receipts were not acceptable evidence.89  Such standards could be impossible to meet in 
the face of land owner resistance.   
Black women faced tougher standards than anyone else in obtaining ballots.  The 
USDA fielded allegations that Mississippi county committees required black women 
who wished to vote in committee elections to bring proof to county offices that their 
names appeared on land deeds or tenancy agreements before receiving ballots, while 
white women received ballots based on their word alone.  The USDA responded that all 
interested voters received ballots upon request, but conceded that such ballots could be 
invalidated before they were counted if the voter’s eligibility was not firmly 
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established.90  In the end, the Secretary’s office repeated the rules governing ballot 
distribution, but gave very little consideration to concerns that those rules were being 
implemented unfairly for black farmers or for women. 
This same dismissive attitude toward women’s participation in the process was 
in evidence again three years later.  In 1968, the ASC strongly rebuffed a suggestion 
from an internal USDA committee on program review and evaluation to study the 
participation of farmers’ wives in ASC committee elections.  Horace Godfrey replied that 
the ASC had no funds or personnel to undertake such a study and that “we question 
seriously whether or survey of the nature proposed is needed or would be useful.  In 
instances where spouses are eligible to participate in ASC community elections, they 
have every right to do so and are encouraged to do so.  Whether or not they do 
participate rests solely on the decisions of those individuals.”91  Godfrey had taken the 
lead in developing the USDA’s policy for racially integrating the ASC committees, but 
he scoffed at the suggestion that the limits to women’s participation merited study.  “In 
our judgment, present personnel can perform more important duties which are of 
benefit of farmers,” rather than diverting resources to such a study.92  In-depth 
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investigation under the auspices USDA of women’s interactions with the ASC would 
not occur until the 1980s.93 
Conclusion 
The declining inclusivity of AAA referenda and committee elections had 
implications for rural Southern society.  Some observers in the 1930s and 1940s hoped 
that the exercise of economic democracy would lead to an expansion of Southern 
political democracy. Gunnar Myrdal expressed such a hope in his 1944 study of 
segregation, An American Dilemma. “Although the unrestricted voting by Negroes in the 
A.A.A. referenda does not give them any political power, it, nevertheless, may be of 
great significance. It accustoms whites to the presence of Negroes at polling places and 
perhaps makes them think beyond the myth of black domination and consider the real 
issues involved in Negro voting. It provides the South with an example of elections 
based on significant issues and with less corruption than usual. It also gives the Negro a 
chance to vote and perhaps to discover the nature of the political process.”94   
This was the optimistic hypothesis with which Robert Martin, himself  African 
American, undertook his 1940s study of the AAA in North and South Carolina.  Like 
David Weaver, Martin saw evidence that voting in one context could lead to voting in 
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another context.  The black farmers he interviewed expressed the importance of the 
experience of voting in AAA elections.  Most expressed that the referenda provided 
useful experience in the mechanics of voting.  “You see votin’ was something new to me.  
Never had voted before.  Now I kind of know what it’s all about.  At first when I went 
up there, I didn’t know what I was supposed to do.”  Another explained that, “I know 
we learned – because I’ve been through it.  I know it for myself now.  It wouldn’t be 
strange to go up and vote now.”95  The overwhelming of majority of black respondents 
to Martin’s surveys agreed, but white land owners and tenants were less willing to 
concede the point.96   
The hopes of Martin, Myrdal, and many black farmers did not find fulfillment in 
the economic democracy of the USDA.  As the population of black farmers on all rungs 
of the land tenure ladder decreased, their votes became less important to creating the 
good showing at the polling place that officials so desperately craved.  Thus the 
participation of black farmers lost value to white farmers, and their insistence on 
participating in farm policy elections in the context of the civil rights movement met 
with violence.  Women were excluded from all but low level clerical work in the ASC, 
and unconnected women could not even access this work.  Suggestions that there was 
value in better understanding the voting behaviors of farm women met with incredulity 
and scorn at the highest levels of the USDA. 
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Nevertheless, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, proponents of farm 
support, congressional Democrats in particular, would cling to the notion that the AAA 
had been at the outset an example of nearly pure, grassroots, populist democracy in 
action.  M.L. Wilson looked back from the vantage point of the mid-1950s, and 
pronounced it “the greatest demonstration of democracy in action in the history of this 
nation.  Thousands of farmers and ranchers became part-time administrators of the 
largest civilian government effort in the history of the world.”97   
Economic democracy was a state-centered philosophy.  The federal government 
created institutions to implement economic policies with the specific consent of directly 
affected groups.  Farmers participated in referenda in order to approve or reject 
regulatory and subsidization policies, and then administered those policies themselves 
by electing representatives from among their peers to do the work.  These institutions 
reflected the principles of self-government while relying on the reach and authority of 
the federal government.  Herbert Hoover had called his pet project, the Federal Farm 
Board, his “grand instrumentality,” but in the end, the organization of farm production 
was most effectively accomplished by many small instrumentalities, the AAA, as well as 
other federal farm programs that were similarly administered. 
 In spite of this decentralization of program administration and the 
mobilization of farmers as administrators, economic democracy as practiced by the AAA 
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provided little meaningful opportunity for truly popular policy development.  With the 
practice of economic democracy so limited, the population that benefited from the 
associated policies was similarly limited.  This “democracy” provided no forum for 
debate and no means for protest and dissent within the system.  As a result, the farmers 
who bore the brunt of the ill effects of production regulations – share tenant, share 
croppers, part-time farmers, and the poor, as we shall see in future chapters – were those 
least able to make their voices heard.   
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Chapter 2:  The Politics of Post-War Farm Support 
R.W. Slate, president of Colonial Furniture House, Inc. in Greensboro, North 
Carolina, was outraged by a story he read in the February 13, 1950, issue of Newsweek.  
Slate fired off a letter to Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan and Congressman 
Clyde Hoey in which he reiterated the article’s assertion that the Department of 
Agriculture was considering a program “to transplant a million farm families into 
industry, training them for their jobs, and providing subsistence allowances until they 
are set.”1  Slate found the prospect of such special assistance for farmers to be unfair to 
other business owners.  “Recently a survey was made in Greensboro, and it was 
determined that there are too many furniture stores in this area for the population. . . . 
We are just wondering if the Government would be interested in moving us at 
Government expense into an area in which we would be more likely to succeed.  . . . We 
think it is unfair to go to the this trouble to befriend the farmers, as outlined in this 
article, and not befriend the rest of the people who are also having a hard time making a 
living.”2   
The staff of the Secretary’s office found this letter completely ridiculous, and 
passed it around among themselves, looking for the right person to respond to the 
                                                     
1 R. W. Slate to Charles Brannan, February 10, 1950, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA), RG 16, NARA; Greensboro (Guilford County, N.C.)City Directory, 
1952, (Richmond, Hill Directory, Co. 1952), Internet Archive and UNC Greensboro University Libraries,   
http://you.archive.org/stream/greensboroguil195152unse/greensboroguil195152unse_djvu.txt (March 17, 
2013) 
2 R. W. Slate to Charles Brannan, February 10, 1950, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA), RG 16, NARA. 
 88 
letter’s allegations. In the notes attached to the file, one staffer asked another:  “got a 
snappy retort?”3  Absurd as Brannan’s office found Slate’s concerns at first glance, their 
attitude sobered when they read the Newsweek item for themselves.  The entry appeared 
under what we shall see was an inflammatory heading, announcing the “Newest 
Brannan Plan.”  It claimed that a farmer relocation program was part of a ten-year plan, 
for which the USDA had requested nearly $450 million, to relocate “one-sixth of the 
present farmers.”  Newsweek claimed that this relocation plan, intended to direct such 
struggling farmers into industrial work, was essential to the USDA’s strategy for 
reducing surplus crop production.4 
Instead of a “snappy retort,” Slate received a three page letter from Secretary 
Brannan himself, plus additional supporting documents, that refuted the Newsweek 
piece’s assertions in detail.  Brannan claimed that its only “factual statement” was the 
assertion that “technology has sharply reduced farm-manpower requirements.”  He 
explained that it was true that mechanization threatened the livelihoods of “low-
income” farmers, particularly tenants, share croppers, and those with very small farms.5  
These people were, in fact, leaving the farm for other endeavors without the aid of any 
dedicated relocation program.  In the face of this reality, Brannan reasoned that some 
                                                     
3 Wesley McCune, Lyle Webster, and Phil Aylesworth, undated notes, Box 1883, Folder “General 
Correspondence, 1906-1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA),” RG 16, NARA. 
4 “Newest Brannan Plan,” Newsweek 35:7, (February 13, 1950):  11. 
5 Charles Brannan to R. W. Slate, March 2, 1950, p. 2, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA), RG 16, NARA. 
 89 
USDA response was appropriate.  “I would suggest that education, guidance, and credit 
assistance be available in order to help provide maximum opportunity for people to be 
profitably employed and to make their maximum contribution to an expanding 
economy.”6   
Slate and Brannan’s exchange, and the Newsweek article to which they responded, 
exemplified the struggle to define the goals and mechanisms of federal farm policy in 
the immediate post-war years.  How should they be framed and pursued:  as integral to 
a comprehensive national economic policy, working in tandem with labor and consumer 
policies to sustain a prosperous economy, or as interest group legislation, separate and 
oppositional to policies specific to other economic sectors?  Why should farmers 
continue to receive special assistance from the government in the much-improved 
economy and what kind of farmers should benefit from those programs?  Secretary 
Brannan and many other progressives proposed revising farm programs to funnel the 
bulk of price support and cash payment benefits to smaller land owners and ambitious 
tenant farmers.  They hoped to avoid and reverse policy incentives for the concentration 
of farmland assets into many fewer, much larger farms.  Stakeholders in the existing 
programs, including southern Democrats, the American Farm Bureau, and owners of 
rapidly expanding commercial farms, opposed any caps on benefits and obstructed 
programs intended to provide targeted help to low income and landless farmers.  They 
                                                     
6 Charles Brannan to R. W. Slate, March 2, 1950, p. 3, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
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argued that all farmers, even apparently successful commercial farmers, needed support 
and protection in an economy whose abundance was unevenly distributed.   
At its heart, this debate was about the character of and continued justification for 
farm programs that subsidized staple commodity production.  The AAA had been 
created in a time of economic crisis, but that crisis was over.  Rural poverty persisted, 
and even relatively successful farmers felt that American economic prosperity was 
advancing without them.  At best, they were being left behind by rising non-farm wages 
and, at worst consumers were making gains in their standard of living at farmers’ 
expense.  Commercial farmers demanded policy protections that would shield them 
from consumers’ demands for cheap food and help close the gap between farm and non-
farm incomes.   
This disagreement about how to allocate within the farm community the direct 
financial benefits of farm programs – subsidies, conservation payments, and credit – was 
part of a bigger disagreement over the importance of farm supports to the wider 
economy.  Progressives argued that farm policy should be an integral part of 
coordinated policies for agriculture, industry, and consumers. They advanced a vision 
for farm policy that put at its center fair compensation and stable prices for rural and 
urban workers and consumers, with the government shielding farmers and workers 
from the worst extremes of unregulated capitalism.  The more conservative framing 
separated the interests of farmers from other economic groups.  This perspective on 
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commodity support saw farmers in general as under-appreciated and economically 
vulnerable.  If there were not policy protections for agriculture, these competition 
economic actors would divert every dime of potential income from agricultural 
production and marketing away from the farmer himself, leaving him uncompensated 
for his toil and increasingly impoverished.   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a new, interpretation of parity that emphasized 
farmers’ separateness and unique economic vulnerabilities became the fundamental 
principle of farm politics.  The AAA had relied on a standard of parity that compared 
farm and consumer prices to those between 1910 and1914, and aimed to achieve some 
similar ratio of “purchasing power” for farmers in the midst of the Great Depression.  
After World War II, Secretary Brannan proposed to dispense with parity as the basis on 
which support levels were determined. He recommended instead that farm supports 
guarantee a minimum level or income, or standard of living, for farm families.  While 
Brannan’s proposal was very much in keeping with immediate post-war progressive 
politics, it failed to get any traction in farm policy circles.  Instead, re-consideration of 
farm supports in the period narrowed to a single question:  at what “percent of parity” 
should the USDA support staple commodity prices?  The AAA’s supporters among 
small farmers and landowners hoped to commit the USDA to high parity-based price 
supports.  Many Republicans and more conservative Democrats advocated more 
discretion for the Secretary of Agriculture to provide parity supports within a lower, 
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more flexible range. The disagreements between adherents to each approach disagreed, 
sometimes bitterly, but their shared commitment to parity at whatever level precluded a 
broader discussion of other approaches to the problems of the farm economy.   
Evolution of Parity 
The advent of World War II turned the goals of New Deal farm policies upside 
down.  New Deal era farm program, created with the goal of reducing surplus, was 
repurposed during World War II to maximize production while imposing ceilings 
(rather than floors) on commodity prices.7 The military’s demand for cotton, tobacco, 
and food, along with exports to American allies drew down the surplus in storage and 
commanded all of the agricultural commodities the country could produce.  The 
machinery of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was channeled into the War 
Food Administration.  The county committees encouraged individuals to maximize 
commodity production as well as food production for home and local use.  In the 
Carolinas, this meant an intensified focus on the cotton and tobacco, as well as some 
crop diversification.   
The 1944 annual report of the North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service 
showcased the state’s contributions to the war effort.  It addressed an audience of service 
members, young famers and former farm agency personnel now in uniform, and 
explained North Carolina’s contribution to the fight.  “Regardless of the branch of the 
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armed forces in which you are serving, whether at home or abroad, it is likely that, 
daily, you have been using some of the many products which originated though the 
efforts of farm families in North Carolina.”8  Cotton for “gauze, bandages, clothing, and 
ammunition;” oil from soybeans and peanuts; and cigarettes from “tobacco developed 
and grown in North Carolina” combined to make the state’s agricultural production 
integral to the war effort.  “Those of you who went to Manila with General MacArthur 
carried with you 40,000 quarts of frozen, pasteurized, homogenized milk processed here 
in North Carolina” for use in hospitals and on ships transporting the wounded.9   
The Extension annual report combined farm boosterism with wartime morale-
lifting propaganda.  Readers learned that North Carolina’s famers had significantly 
increased their yields on all crops in the years since Pearl Harbor, and that they 
maintained this burst of production in increasingly difficult circumstances.  The draft 
and the demand for labor in urban war industries siphoned rural workers out of the 
countryside.  The nation’s industrial focus on materiel and other supplies necessary to 
the war effort created a scarcity of new farm machinery, implements, and replacement 
parts.  The report’s refrain was that farmers were doing more and more with less and 
less.  The post-war tally bore out this conclusion.  The USDA reported to Congress in 
                                                     
8North Carolina Extension Service, “Annual Report, 1944,” p. 3, Box 17, Folder “Cooperative Extension 
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October, 1947, that just “as the dust storms of the thirties dramatized a long-time trend 
in soil destruction, so has the war dramatized a long-time trend toward greater 
efficiency . . .  Three farm people can now produce more than four could produce just 
before the war.”10  The USDA reported that individual farm worker productivity was up 
by 37 percent from the period just prior to the war.11 
  
Figure 2: Experimental Tobacco Plants12 
Agronomic research labs in land grand colleges across the South developed commodity 
hybrids for desirable marketing traits, as well as disease and drought resistance, all of 
which contributed to significantly increased yields in the 1940s and 1950s. 
 
                                                     
10 Charles Brannan to R. W. Slate, March 2, 1950, p. 2, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA), RG 16, NARA. 
11 Charles Brannan to R. W. Slate, March 2, 1950, p. 2, Box 1883, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-
1976, 1950, Organization 1 (PMA), RG 16, NARA. 
12 “View of man examining experimental tobacco plants in greenhouse possibly at North Carolina State 
College, June 1957,” 1957, Item7581, Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina State 
University Libraries, Raleigh, North Carolina., http://historicalstate.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/0007581 (accessed 
April 16, 2013).  Photograph used with permission. 
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Two factors combined to increase North Carolina’s war-time production. The 
generous acreage allotments and marketing quotas allowed farmers to grow and sell 
more, and they increased yields significantly on each of those acres.  “Improved” hybrid 
varieties led to a 35 percent per acre cotton yield increase in 1944 from 1943 by those 
growers who participated in the One-Variety Cotton Improvement Programs.  Machine 
shelling and seed treatments that warded off pests and decay produced an average per-
acre peanut yield increase of 52 percent on demonstration plots.13 Researchers made 
important breakthroughs in tobacco, the “most important G.I. morale builder,” by 
developing hybrid varieties resistant to Granville wilt.  This bacterial disease of bright 
tobacco, first identified in North Carolina’s “middle belt” tobacco growing regions, 
could destroy entire fields where it struck.14  New resistant varieties would increase 
tobacco production significantly. 
The production gains that had been integral to the war effort posed a threat to 
rural economy after the war.  These gains were not sufficiently off-set by post-war 
acreage reductions.  In 1948, American corn growers harvested the largest corn crop in 
American history while although they had significantly reduced total acres planted.  
                                                     
13 North Carolina Extension Service, “Annual Report, 1944,” p. 10, Box 17, Folder “Cooperative Extension 
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Potato growers harvested the second largest potato crop on the fewest acres planted in 
any of the previous seventy years.15  War-time Extension publications had promised a 
bright future to servicemen when they returned to North Carolina, “ready to take over 
again.”16  They would find that North Carolina’s agriculture had progressed sufficiently 
to “enable you to get into that phase of agriculture . . . which will be both pleasant and 
profitable.”17  Continued production increases threatened both the profits and the 
enjoyment in farming.  Rural families’ purchasing power was falling just as consumer 
products were once again widely available.  How to respond to war-time production 
gains and decreasing purchasing power in peace-time was a key question for farm 
policy makers.  Like their predecessors, they turned to parity policies in search of a 
solution. 
 Earlier associationalist and New Deal farm policy makers employed the 
parity paradigm to explain farmers’ struggle to maintain incomes that consistently 
allowed them to participate in the nation’s growing consumer market.  The notion of 
parity was rooted in the wide-spread perception that industrial workers received 
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greater, and therefore supposedly more equitable, compensation for their labor.18  
Industrial workers and investors were also thought to receive direct benefit from tariff 
protection against foreign imports that farmers did not enjoy.  North Carolina 
Commissioner of Agriculture Kerr Scott succinctly explained this framing of the purpose 
of farm programs to a constituent.  “The protective tariff in the Nation’s economy has 
been favorable to labor and capital who possess and manufacture raw materials,” he 
said.  Policies that provided analogous benefit to farmers, Scott continued, were 
“necessary to give the farmer his rights and protect his standards [of living] just as the 
protective tariff tends to hold up a high standard of living with our non-farm groups . . 
.”19   The McNary-Haugen Bill and the Agricultural Marketing Act (AMA) included 
mechanisms to help agriculture capture tariff revenues directly and offset what many 
believed was the active harm they caused by reducing demand for American farm 
exports abroad.  This was the primary purposes of the export debentures issued under 
the Hoover-era AMA.  It was the AMA, not the subsequent AAA, that first enshrined 
the principle of parity in law.20  
Parity’s attraction stemmed from its ability to describe the relationship between 
agriculture and other economic sectors.  Its proponents compared farm income both to 
                                                     
18 This model, of course, never takes into account the struggles of industrial workers for fair wages and safe 
working conditions.  The reality of industrial work is unimportant to the concept of parity, only the 
perception that farmers were underpaid for their work as price takers in commodities markets. 
19 W. Kerr Scott to Everett Nichols, December. 21, 1944, p. 2, Box 2, Folder “Cr-Fa,” Department of 
Agriculture, Commissioner’s Office, General Correspondence, 1936-1947, NCSA. 
20 David E. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal:  American Farm Policy from Hoover to Roosevelt, 
1928-1933 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 20-21. 
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that of industrial workers and to that of farmers in an earlier period.  The 1910s were 
years of prosperity on American farms, which benefited from expanded markets for U.S. 
farm exports.  The theory of parity held that during these years commodity prices were 
sufficient to compensate farmers for the value of their work at a rate approximately 
equivalent to industrial workers, as determined by the purchasing power of their 
incomes.  Those in favor of parity in the 1920s focused on the disproportionate effect of 
tariffs on farmers. 
In the New Deal, the USDA turned an eye to the effects of agricultural instability 
on consumers and considered how farm policy could aid farmers and consumers alike.  
New Dealers hoped that restoring the purchasing power of rural consumers would 
bolster the nation’s devastated economy and transform the South from dead weight into 
an economic engine.21  The Agricultural Adjustment Administration also had a small 
Office of Consumer Council tasked with advocating for consumer interests as the AAA 
pursued its primary goals of reducing production and raising farm prices.22  
Furthermore, AAA administrators at the state and local levels understood consumer 
concerns to be important to farmers.  In 1936, the chair of the first state AAA tobacco 
committee in North Carolina, C. T. Hall, gave a statement on behalf of the outgoing 
                                                     
21 On the importance of “purchasing power” to New Deal and war time economic policy, see Meg Jacobs, 
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committee in which he surveyed their accomplishments and detailed his vision for 
future committee work in which he paid particular attention to this dynamic.  “We must 
not overlook and fail to recognize and [we must] try to get the full support and 
cooperation of the consuming public . . .  You have heard time and again that we wanted 
to adopt the policy of ‘live and let live’ but I say let’s go further and adopt a policy of 
‘live and work to help others live.’”  Hall suggested that consumers had an 
“unwarranted fear of organized agriculture,” rooted in the misapprehension that fully 
cooperating farmers could raise the cost of food in the nation, acting on the principle 
that “’might makes right.’”  Hall stressed that farmers, manufactures and consumers all 
relied upon on another.  While the history of associationalism in the 1920s demonstrated 
that there was little chance of farmers behaving monopolistically, as Hall proposed, it is 
crucial that he considered farmers to be a dominant economic sector, on par with or 
even more powerful than consumers, and that farmers and consumers had a mutual 
stake in each other’s economic wellbeing.23   
North Carolina’s Commissioner of Agriculture, Kerr Scott, felt the same.   In 
1944, Everette Nichols, a high school student participating in a Future Farmers of 
America club public speaking contest, wrote to Scott seeking advice and information on 
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his subject, “Farmer!  Defend your Rights.” 24 Scott was intrigued by the question of this 
“young Patrick Henry,” and sent a thoughtful and lengthy reply.25  Scott first cautioned 
Nichols to think carefully about his rights, or those of farmers generally, in relation to 
the rights of other individuals and groups.  He explained that not only was this 
approach to farmers’ rights morally correct, as it recognized the rights and needs of 
others, it was also good politics. “Only by dealing fairly with other groups can you 
expect to have the sympathy of others in your program.”  The others Scott had in mind 
were consumers, with whom farmers should make common cause.  “For instance,” he 
asked, “should farmers exercise themselves over the problems of the consumer or 
should farmers be content to let the gulf between the producer and the consumer grow 
and grow and grow until the middleman has more than the lion’s share and both the 
producer and consumer are reduced to low income and restricted rights?”26    Scott and 
Hill put farmers and consumers on the same side, against manufacturers and processors, 
the classic middlemen long despised by agrarians.  Scott’s ties to the National Grange 
offer some indication of his sustained commitment to this farming for farm policies that 
saw farmers and consumers to be on the same side of this equation. 
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In the years immediately following the war, Progressives who shared Hall’s and 
Scott’s beliefs about the shared interests of farmers, workers, and consumers began 
offering a critique of parity-based farm supports.  They charged that these policies had 
failed to advance the best interests of any farmers or consumers, and had been especially 
ineffective in alleviating southern rural poverty. The Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare studied USDA and federal census information from which they determined that 
the economic and social conditions of in which many southern farming families labored 
remained one of poverty and exploitation.  In spite of the strides made in public health 
knowledge in the first decades of the twentieth century and the governmental and 
philanthropic efforts at improving living conditions, the 1940 census found that rural 
southerners lived in crowded and dilapidated housing and suffered from malnutrition.27   
In North Carolina, the Extension Service directed considerable energies to rural 
health and sanitation improvement.  Agents focused primarily on mosquito and rodent 
control, privy construction and animal waste control, and safe food storage.  They 
surveyed the state and found uneven implementation of good health and sanitation 
practices across the rural areas of the state.  For instance, in 1947, two-thirds of families 
involved in Home Demonstration Clubs in the south-east districts of the state had access 
                                                     
27 Only 13.6% of Southerners lived in housing listed as “acceptable” by census takers; 27.8% was listed as 
“repairable,” and 58.6%  as “non-repairable.”  The in the remainder of the United States, 52.5% of housing 
was deemed acceptable and only 24.3% non-repairable.  In those homes, 23.8% of individual lived in home 
with over 1.5 people per room, and 15% had “no toilet of any kind.”  “The South Needs Prosperous 
Farmers:  Wartime Progress Must Go Forward,” The Southern Patriot 3:8 (August 1945): 2. 
 102 
to “a safe, adequate and convenient water supply.”28  But, these encouraging numbers 
were offset by inadequate sanitation facilities.  In Johnston County 1204 rural homes 
visited by Home Demonstration Agents lacked any kind of privy.29  The SCHW charged 
that the AAA and the Production and Marketing Administration had failed landless 
farmers, and that persistent poverty was the result. 
There were many reasons why this was so.  Landowners captured many of the 
monetary benefits of the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s commodity reduction programs.  
They failed to deliver the rightful share of cash benefits to their tenant and share 
croppers and shifted the burdens of acreage reductions onto their shoulders by letting 
tenants go.  Locally driven implementation procedures insulated abusive landlords from 
scrutiny, and economically vulnerable, landless and minority farmers lacked the 
political clout to protest successfully.   
As the overall number of tenant farmers and share croppers fell precipitously 
between the 1940s and the 1960s, landlord and agency official appealed to “good 
management” as the primary reasons for reducing the tenant work force. In the 1940s, 
Robert Martin observed that while AAA rules prohibited landlords from reducing the 
number of tenants on their property in order to maintain a larger allotments or 
reduction payments for themselves, “the rules were extremely difficult to administer 
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and a determined landlord could usually find a way to rid himself of unwanted 
tenants.”  When tenants complained, landlords could justify their decisions “from the 
viewpoint of ‘sound management.’”30  This explanation did not lose its potency over 
time.  As the undersecretary of agriculture John Schnittker explained to the chair of the 
House agriculture committee in 1965 when questioned about safeguards for tenant in 
ASC allotment assignments, “Local ASC county committees, of necessity, must make 
some difficult determinations to distinguish between a reduction in tenants for purposes 
of participating in our programs and a reduction of tenants in the process of improving 
management for profitable farm operation.”  Schnittker stated that it was the position of 
the USDA that “no one is in a better position to judge the merits of each individual case 
than the local farmer-elected committees.”31 
After the war, progressives proposed adjustments to farm programs to help them 
better serve small farmers.  Programs intended to work specifically with these groups 
such as the Resettlement Administration, part of the Farm Security Administration, 
suffered from limited scope, inadequate funding, and low prioritization within the 
USDA, especially after 1936.32  In August, 1945, the Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare made southern agriculture the primary focus of its monthly publication on 
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social conditions and public policy, The Southern Patriot.  The SCHW applauded the New 
Deal’s accomplishments: increasing average farm incomes, decreasing the number of 
tenants on southern farms, and expanding the availability of fair credit in rural 
communities.33  The organization cautioned that “WE MUST NOT GO BACK.”34  They 
recognized that tenant farmers and share croppers bore the brunt of the burdens of the 
AAA, and their continued exploitation and poverty threatened southern political and 
economic progress.  The SCHW used the USDA’s own reporting to illuminate the fact 
that Southern farm continued to achieve the lowest yields of food and feed crops in the 
nation.  The region’s farmers tended the smallest farms, while earning the lowest 
incomes, of all U.S. farmers.  The problem, the SCHW argued, was the region’s 
continued over-reliance on cotton production and tenant labor.35 
The SCHW, therefore, favored policy measures aimed at “democratizing” access 
to land and encouraging crop diversification.  They proposed in 1945 that the federal 
government should institute a “program with the development of family size farms as 
its aim.”  Such a program would involve the government’s purchasing large tracts of 
farmland and reselling that land in small blocks to landless farmers, on long terms and 
with very low interest rates.  “This is an American program, a democratic program, and 
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alone can guarantee the living standard of the Southern farmer can be raised.”36  The 
Southern Patriot argued that this redistribution of southern farmlands would fulfill the 
SCHW’s interpretation of the lost promise of Reconstruction, that of “forty acres and a 
mule for every Southern farmer – Negro and white.”37  In order to prevent land 
speculation and intensified focus on soil depleting non-food crops, the SCHW 
recommended other measures to accompany their land proposal that would encourage 
crop diversification and soil conservation, make credit more easily available to tenants 
and small land owners, and support cooperative ownership of expensive farm 
equipment.  Additionally, the SCHW suggested tax reforms that would exempt small 
farms from property taxes while greatly increasing taxes on “larger than family-size” 
farms.38 The SCHW continued urging this program though late 1946, when they also 
came out in support of the new Farmers Home Administration (FHA).  
Congress fashioned the FHA from the remnants of the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA), which, among other duties, had administered the 1937 Bankhead-
Jones Tenant Farmer Act.  This act allowed the federal government to finance long-term, 
low-interest farm mortgages for tenant farmers seeking to purchase land.  These loans 
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could cover as much as 100 percent of the purchase price.39  Like the AAA, Bankhead-
Jones was administered by farmer committees, who assessed loan applicants and the 
farms they wished to purchase to determine if both famer and farm were capable of 
sufficient commercial production to repay the loan.40  Critics of the bill in its first year 
worried that Bankhead-Jones loans would drive up farmland prices by enabling bidding 
wars and funding speculation, or, alternatively, that determinations of credit worthiness 
would be too conservative and restrictive to make any real impact.  A critic of the latter 
school contended that the act’s “benefits are limited to farm persons without land but 
the intention is clearly to make loans available to tenants who already have considerable 
accumulation.  The highest type of tenant, in other words,” would be the primary 
beneficiary of the act.41   
Nearly ten years later, the SCHW found that Bankhead-Jones had indeed proven 
“highly inadequate.”42  No rural land bubble had formed.  Indeed, the number of FSA 
loans was far too few to make any real difference number of tenant farmers still laboring 
in the South.43  The SCHW blamed Congress, led by southern Democrats, for under-
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funding the FSA when “the answer,” to cotton over-dependence and exploitation of 
tenant and migrant labor, “is more and more FSA – multiply FSA by one hundred or 
more.”44  In August, 1946, the Farmers Home Administration (FHA)45 replaced the FSA.  
In addition to providing home and farm mortgages directly from the government, the 
FHA would guarantee such mortgages when made by commercial banks.  These loans 
would be available to all farmers, not just transitioning tenants.  The SCHW hoped that 
the FHA could expand the its scope well beyond what Bankhead-Jones had been able to 
accomplish.   
Above all, the SCHW feared that without robust programs to aid tenant farmer’s 
transition into landownership farms would grow to proportions that necessitated 
further expansion of tenancy and migrant labor systems.  “Any government program to 
serve the farmers’ interest must be directed toward the goal of a land of family-sized 
farms.  The farm operator and his family must have control over their resources and 
operations, have a farm big enough to provide a decent standard of living and small 
enough so the family can do the work without hired help or child labor.”46  Reliance on 
any but family labor would reinforce inequality in southern society and inhibit 
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development.  The SCHW favored progressive farming and the implementation of 
scientific methods, but within a social and economic structure that encouraged 
cooperation and ease the imperative to seek greater economies of scale.  
While the SCHW proposed “more FSA” and a more aggressive campaign to 
facilitate landownership, Harry Truman’s secretary of Agriculture, Charles Brannan, 
was rethinking farm policy’s fundamental premise of parity-based price support.  
Brannan was responding to the same rural economic distress that concerned southern 
progressives.  He believed parity-based farm support would never create the rural 
economic stability that was necessary for a thriving society.  “If we are to have stable 
and prosperous rural communities with schools, churches, health, and other facilities, it 
is plain that many farm people need greater economic security and opportunity.”47  In 
1949 Brannan offered an alternative to parity-based policy for the new farm bill that 
would become known as the “Brannan Plan.”  The Secretary asserted that his 
recommendations, though substantially different from previous farm legislation, were 
“not likely to startle anyone.  I have no revolutionary ideas to present to you.”  To those 
with vested interests in the established programs of parity-based support, revolution 
was exactly what Brannan’s plan threatened. 
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Figure 3: Charles Brannan as Secretary of Agriculture48 
Brannan found the parity price formulation of assistance levels to be overly 
concerned with per-unit commodity prices and insufficiently concerned with individual 
farmers’ standard of living.  In spite of parity goals, Brannan told Congress, “farm 
purchasing power turned downward in 1948 and is now at its lowest level since 1942.”49  
He recommended a new formula that would guarantee a minimum income for farmers 
growing already-supported commodities, and proposed an expansion of the domestic 
allotment and marketing quota programs to perishable produce such as fruits, 
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49 “Statement by Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan,” reprinted from Congressional Record , 
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vegetables, and tree nuts.  Such a program would encourage food production in 
addition to feed and fiber crops.  It would also continue to generate some surplus of 
staple commodities, but Brannan argued that modest surplus, was desirable.  “Free 
flowing trade,” he declared, promoted peace, and when peace failed, ready reserves had 
proven invaluable during the war.50 
Like the SCHW, Brannan believed that the best kind of farm was one that was 
large enough to realize some efficiencies of scale, particularly the advantages of 
mechanization, but not so large as to require significant amounts of hired labor.  He 
opposed farm policy measures that would “encourage the concentration of our farm 
land into fewer and fewer hands.”51  The Secretary argued that a proliferation of small, 
independent family farmers was necessary for thriving rural communities and for the 
health of American democracy, and that farm supports were essential to preserving 
these communities.  “One bulwark of democracy may be found in the prosperous rural 
community mainly composed of economically strong families farming in the traditional 
American pattern.  It is an ever-present answer to communism.”52  In order to buttress 
the family farm and off-set any policy incentives to form larger farms, the Brannan Plan 
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proposed to cap the amount of subsidy support and production payments a farm could 
receive based on total farm production. 
In addition to questions of democracy, the Brannan Plan made a case for farm 
support as part of the United States’ general macroeconomic strategy.  Brannan rejected 
the notion that farm sector support, even measures specifically for the benefit of small 
farms, should be understood as interest group legislation.  “Unfortunately, too many 
people still think of a farm program as some kind of class legislation.  There is too little 
appreciation of the direct and definite ways in which it can benefit all of the people and 
can help make this the kind of country they want it to be.”53  He explained in his 
statement to Congress that the economic welfare of agriculture and industry, farmers 
and workers, were closely aligned.  Farm and labor policy should work in concert, for 
the good of the American people, both rural and urban, who required plentiful food and 
sufficient income with which to purchase it.  Progressive industrial policy, especially 
policies that ensured workers earned good wages, was the best kind of agriculture 
policy, Brannan maintained.  Likewise, coordinated agricultural policies that 
encouraged production and supported prices were good for workers because they 
helped to create the rural consumers industry needed to grow, and good for consumers 
because they reduced and stabilized food prices. 
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Brannan’s recommendations for farm policy reform that would guarantee a 
minimum standard of living for farming families while also encouraging abundant farm 
production was very much in keeping with prevailing economic policy thinking on the 
left in the late 1940s.  Labor unions in particular advanced a vision of an American 
marketplace characterized by full employment at fair wages, abundant production, mass 
consumption, and the government interventions necessary to achieve these goals.54  
Legislative initiatives such as the defeated 1945 Full Employment Act would have 
committed the government to create jobs when the private sector failed to provide 
sufficient numbers of jobs.  The 1946 Employment Act compromised on some elements 
of the Full Employment Act, but it still affirmed the relationship between purchasing 
power and employment.55  In his 1947 economic report to congress, president Truman 
asserted that “the Congress, by setting maximum purchasing power as the objective of 
National policy in the Employment Act, pointed to the importance of purchasing power 
in keeping our economy fully employed and fully productive.”56 
It was in this intellectual environment that Brannan believed his 
recommendations to be neither startling nor revolutionary.  Events proved him wrong.  
His plan faced immediate and overwhelming opposition from nearly all directions.  
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North Carolina Extension Director at the time, I.O. Schaub, observed that individual 
farmers’ opinions of the plan seemed to depend on how it would affect them personally. 
“One man told me that under the unit plan that he would have no alternative except to 
dispose of a large part of his holdings.  Naturally, he does not approve of the plan.  It is 
very likely small landowners will be in favor of the plan.”57  The Farm Bureau and larger 
producers generally opposed the cap on benefits.  The proposal to shift from parity price 
supports to minimum income guarantees left conservatives sputtering that the Brannan 
Plan was rooted in socialism.58  Newsweek advertised its exaggerated and unfavorable 
reporting of later USDA activities under the heading of a “New Brannan Plan,” and on 
the presidential campaign trail in 1952, Dwight Eisenhower referred to the Brannan Plan 
as a “political monstrosity.”59  Brannan himself came under fire for handling the politics 
of his proposal badly, failing to secure a supportive coalition and underestimating the 
strength of vested interests.60  As a viable policy recommendation, the Brannan Plan was 
a mere flash in the pan, quickly dismissed as impractical, though it would continue to 
haunt the Secretary Brannan and the Truman administration. 
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The policy revisions proposed by Brannan and the SCHW were not perfect.  
With their emphasis on land ownership and the creation of small, commercial farms, 
they made no effort to fill the gaps in existing labor policies.  None of the New Deal’s 
labor legislation, including wage and hour, unemployment, social security, and child 
labor laws applied to farm workers.  Still, the strength of left critiques of parity-based 
farm polices was their recognition that not all farmers experienced the same effects of 
the farm economy’s instability, nor enjoyed the same benefits of federal programs.  
Landless farmers and those with very small farms were especially vulnerable, and 
received less benefit from commodity subsidy programs than larger farms, as will 
become clear when we look closely at North and South Carolina farmers in later 
chapters.  Brannan proposed limiting benefits of farm programs for larger farms, and in 
so doing cemented the opposition of the Farm Bureau and southern Democrats who 
retained influential positions in Congress.  As even liberals shifted to the right in the 
early years of the Cold War, articulating class differences among farmers would become 
politically untenable.  New interpretations of parity politics collapsed those categories 
and precluded possibilities for thoroughgoing farm policy reform.  
Post-War Parity Politics 
Parity achieved such salience in the 1950s because it captured the frustration that 
many farmers experienced with their position in the post-war economic order that left 
them feeling increasingly like junior partners in their relationship with consumers.  
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Leading voices in academia and the Farm State emerged to reinforce this perception.  
Willard Cochrane, an agricultural economist on the faculty at the University of 
Minnesota, published and spoke prolifically on the economics of the farm problem 
throughout the 1950s, and eventually joined the Kennedy administration as the USDA’s 
chief agricultural economist.61  He carried the message that according to his research, 
which tracked farmers’ income over time and compared it other non-farm incomes, 
farmers were indeed losing ground.  
Cochrane’s research showed a widening gap between farmer’s gross income and 
their net income between 1910 and 1957.  Farmer’s gross incomes began a sharp climb in 
1940, as did net farm income.  However, net income peaked at in 1947 and fell for the 
next decade.  According to Cochrane, farmers took in approximately $21 billion gross in 
1942 and realized a net income of approximately $12 billion, a difference of $9 billion.  
By 1948, gross income was up to nearly $35 billion, but that number was now about $17 
billion more than net income.  By 1957, the difference was closer to $20 billion.62  The gap 
between national per-capita farm income in comparison to per-capita farm income from 
all sources combined showed similar trends.  In 1950s, per-capita farm income lagged 
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behind total population per-capita income by approximately $1000.00.  In 1957, the gap 
had widened to approximately $1300.00.63  Cochrane interpreted his findings to mean 
that “the incomes of commercial farm operator families have slipped badly in the midst 
of unparalleled prosperity.”64   
As in the 1920s and 1930s, parity advocates continued to identify surplus or over-
production as the reason for farmers’ disadvantage in the market, but they identified 
different reasons for the persistence of surplus in the era of production regulation.  
Before the AAA, farmer’s disorganization was to blame.  After the war, mainstream 
agricultural economists identified technological advances, many of which had been 
achieved in government-funded agronomy laboratories, as the root of the problem.  
Cochrane coined the term “agricultural treadmill” to describe the technological and 
economic imperatives that drove over-production of staple commodities.  In this theory, 
land grant colleges and the Extension Service were government entities that existed 
primarily to conduct research into a host of potential methods for increasing agricultural 
productivity, increase farm incomes and standards of living.  But as a strategy for 
increasing farm income, research alone was a Sisyphean task, Cochrane explained.  First 
adopters of new technologies enjoyed increased yields and higher returns without 
moving the market in any significant way.  Then as new methods came into wide-spread 
usage because of reduced costs to adapt them, observed effectiveness of adaptation, and 
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government policies that encouraged their usage, overall production increased.  The 
result was surplus accumulation and the loss of market advantages for everyone as new 
base-line yields emerged.  The new technology became a necessity for maximizing 
production in a lower price environment in which attainment of greater economies of 
scale was the only way to secure profits until the next production-boosting technology 
came along.65 According to Cochrane, the problem of the treadmill was one with policy 
roots in the Extension and land grant 
  
Figure 4:  “Goal of Tobacco Research” – Informational Slide Used by North 
Carolina Extension Service, 195066 
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systems, and it required sustained regulation of production to solve.67 North Carolina 
Extension Director David Weaver observed this dynamic and concluded that parity-
based farm support was essential to solve the farmer’s dilemma.  “Machinery has 
reduced costs, saved labor, speeded up production, and in general enlarged farms, but 
farmers as a class have not been able to take full advantage of all of these benefits.  Study 
will reveal that the farmer has not retained unto himself the advantages that technology 
made possible.”68   
Who did retain the benefits of technology, if not farmers, from this point of view?  
According to the rhetoric of parity, those benefits accrued to manufactures, processors, 
and consumers. Farmers were generating higher total receipts, but they were also 
paying more for their inputs such as labor, rent, machinery, chemicals, and seed than 
they had before then war.  The result for farmers was ever-shrinking margins in a 
dynamic Cochrane popularized as the “price-cost squeeze.”  The price-cost squeeze was 
a short-hand phrase evoking the shrinking, per-unit farm profits in the 1950s and the 
slower rate of increase in agricultural commodity prices than the rate of increase in farm 
supply and consumer goods prices.  Furthermore, the percentage of their incomes 
American consumers spent on food decreased sharply in the 1950s.  Increased farm 
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productivity ensured Americans an inexpensive food supply, while at the same time 
manufactures provided a wider variety of consumer products to compete for 
individual’s discretionary spending.69   
Though this explanation of the farm economics problems focused on the 
economics of food crop production, the price-cost squeeze paradigm resonated with 
Carolina farmers who specialized in cotton and tobacco.  Neither crop could be 
classified as food, even though both crops had been included among the federally 
supported staple commodities from the earliest days of the AAA.  Cotton, a fiber with 
industrial, military, and consumer uses, and tobacco, a product for recreation and a 
staple of military rations, should have been well-positioned to capture the growing 
consumer market in the 1950s United States.  The greatest threat to Southern tobacco 
and cotton producers was not inelastic food demand, but rather domestic and foreign 
competition on price and quality.70  Cotton also faced increased competition from cheap, 
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durable synthetic fibers -- “test tube fibers” the cotton industry called them – developed 
in corporate research labs.71  Carolina cotton and tobacco farmers experienced the same 
increase in the cost of their inputs with which food and feed commodity producers 
struggled. 
The Rocky Mount Evening Telegram ran an editorial cartoon in 1953 that 
illustrated many farmers’ frustration with the price-cost squeeze.  It also neatly 
encapsulated the political problem this dynamic represented.72  The cartoon blamed “the 
housewife” and her hunger for cheap, high-quality proteins and starches for the 
farmers’ economic problems.  The artist depicted a woman who unthinkingly elbowed a 
passive and aggrieved farmer as she ate from a full plate, uncaring that the reduced 
prices she paid for the food created economic hardship for farmers.  In this popular 
narrative of the price-cost squeeze, farmers provided a service to the American 
consumer but received little respect or appreciation from a public that grew increasingly 
disconnected from and unsympathetic toward farm problems. An editorial in the 
Robersonville, NC, Weekly Herald struck the same tone:  “many people want the farmer 
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to produce life-sustaining food for free while they spend their money for pleasure 
gadgets.  Despite parity prices and farm programs of every type and nature, the 
consumers are still getting a bargain from the farmers of this country.”73 
 
Figure 5: "One Man's Meat," Rocky Mount Evening Telegram, May 6, 195374 
The price-cost squeeze posed more than an accounting problem for farmers.  It 
summarized the growing competition between two powerful and distinct political 
constituencies – farmers and consumers – whose opposing interests clashed over the 
fundamental issue of meat and potatoes. The Weekly Herald described the demand for 
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cheap food as a moral failing for consumers who, by spending more on their “pleasure 
gadgets” and less on their groceries, selfishly reduced farm incomes.  Extension officials 
and other farm policy makers approached the question from a different perspective, not 
blaming the housewife for her greed, but rather hoping to cure her ignorance about rural 
conditions.  Officials in the 1950s determined that agriculture had a “public relations 
problem.”  If the housewife, as consumer, and her husband, as wage earner, better 
understood the economics of farming and the farmers’ need for their fair share, then the 
American family would be willing to support tax-payer funded agricultural programs.  
If such programs were successful, they argued, farms would prosper and families would 
not need to choose between their gadgets and their groceries.75  Framed in this way, the 
question was not whether or not to provide parity-based support to farmers.  The only 
possible question was, how much support farmers should receive.  Parity provided a 
point of reference from which to address this question. 
More than an abstract concept, parity was the mathematical basis on which the 
USDA determined yearly crop support prices, or the “loan rate” at which the 
Commodity Credit Corporation issued no-recourse commodity loans.76  From 1933 to 
1948, the office of the Secretary of Agriculture use a formula to determine what price for 
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individual commodities reached the level of parity in a given year. The USDA derived 
this figure by multiplying the average price of a commodity between 1910 and 1914 by 
the “Index of Prices Paid by Farmers of Commodities and Services, Interest, Taxes, and 
Wage Rates,” otherwise known as the “parity index.”  The parity index also used 1910-
1914 the base period.  In 1948, the USDA updated the formula to determine parity based 
on the average price of the most recent decade and the index of all commodity prices for 
the same ten years.  The index of prices paid for farm supplies and consumer goods 
continued to take the 1910-1914 period as its base. 
By the late 1940s, farm programs did not subsidize commodities at the full price 
determined by this equation, but instead at some percentage of this price.  How to 
determine this percentage became the main point of contention between opposing 
camps of parity advocates.  One side favored Congressional mandates of rigid subsidy 
levels at 90 percent of parity.  Another favored more discretion for the Secretary, giving 
him the authority to set support prices within a lower, flexible range of 60 to 80 percent 
of parity.  The necessity for flexible price supports was the constant refrain of 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, throughout his eight-year 
tenure at the USDA.  Benson, backed by the American Farm Bureau, and many 
Republicans favored less extensive and more flexible support for agriculture.  Many 
Democrats, farm district congressmen, and farm organizations representing smaller 
farms such as the National Farmers Union argued for guaranteed higher levels of parity 
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support.77  When the Senate agriculture committee called Benson, then the presumptive 
nominee for Secretary of Agriculture, to testify about his plans for the Department in 
January, 1953, some Senators unsuccessfully tried to extract from him a commitment to 
maintain farm subsidies for all supported commodities at 90 percent of parity 
throughout his term.  He refused.78 
Instead, Benson lead the charge in the early 1950s for flexible parity.  “The truth, 
obscured though it might be,” he later wrote, “was that agriculture needed 90 per cent 
parity supports about as much as an athlete needs a strait jacket.”79  He began to 
compare farm programs to unemployment insurance, characterizing farm subsidies as a 
kind of disaster insurance meant to provide a safety net in extraordinary circumstances, 
not a permanent intervention into the agricultural economy to provide long term 
stability.80  The Rocky Mount Evening Telegram supported Secretary Benson and took 
their cue from him.  “The unemployment insurance program for industrial workers 
helped tide a man over a bad period but didn’t guarantee his normal salary, and the 
intent of the farm program was not too different,” the paper opined.  “Farmers had 
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some reason to feel that when the whole economy was shored up with controls and 
regulations, all for the protection of somebody, they should not be the only unprotected 
group.” 81  Nevertheless, the editors maintained, Benson’s plan would move the farm 
economy toward a more free market, with farm price controls “reduced to more 
reasonable – and less expensive – proportions.”82   
The Rocky Mount paper generally favored local commercial interests in its 
editorial stance, but the nearby Robersonville paper served a rural readership of tobacco 
farmers.  The Robersonville Daily Herald’s editors declared that Martin County farmers 
would support an unsubsidized agricultural economy only if and when industry gave 
up protective tariffs, labor gave up the minimum wage and social insurance, and the 
airline industry renounced rate and fare regulations.  Until “monopoly is scrapped, 
when all concessions are denied others and when guarantees are withdrawn from all 
groups,” Benson and his supporters should “keep their contemptible mouths shut.”83  
The Herald’s editors advanced an argument for nearly full parity, maintain that farmers 
as an industry and as a social group merited protections at least as much as industrial 
workers and regulated corporate monopolies.   
This disagreement between large and small famers and between farmers and 
other economic sectors was a debate over the manner in which farm support fit within 
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the liberal state.  For New Dealers of the 1930s and 1940s agriculture programs were part 
of a developing social safety net and system of economic regulation that was supposed 
to stabilize the American market economy.  The editors of the Robersonville Herald 
found New Deal order regulatory policies for other industries threatening.  They saw 
labor protections and regulated monopolies as a source of farmers’ woes.  The editors 
viewed these policies with the same skepticism that R.W. Slate, the Greensboro furniture 
seller quoted above, applied to agriculture polices.   
Mutual suspicion emerged when proponents of economic policies that should 
have been understood as related instead staked out oppositional positions.  Ezra Taft 
Benson believed that Americans had come to see farm programs as a necessary evil.  
“They go along because this appears, as they have been told again and again, to be the 
cost of preserving the family farm in America.”  But “what the American people will not 
stand for under any circumstances is prolonged, conspicuous waste.”84  The 
conservative rhetoric of flexible parity, with its comparisons to unemployment or 
disaster insurance evoked a much less expansive approach to farm supports.  The 
purpose was not to guarantee a minimum standard of living, but to provide a cushion 
from the market’s lowest extremes. 
The weakness of the both the conservative and progressive positions was that 
they ignored an inescapable reality of 1950s agriculture.  When David Weaver asserted 
                                                     
84 Benson, Freedom to Farm, 195. 
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that farmers did not retain the advantages of increased agricultural efficiency, he was 
wrong.  Some farmers did retain those advantages, and they did so at the expense of 
other farmers though a process advocated by Weaver’s own agency.  An NC State 
College-based Extension columnist in the Wilson Daily Times reminded famers that these 
were “just about the only ways the individual farmer can beat the price squeeze of 
higher costs and lower prices.”85  Extension agents suggested farmers cope by increasing 
the size of their farms, by bringing previously unused land into production, and 
automating tasks.    The often unacknowledged effect of increasing farm sizes in the 
early 1950s was the loss of smaller farms when their owners sold their land or rented it 
to other farmers with the means to increase their land holdings. 
This is why smaller farmers, and their representative groups such as the National 
Farmers Union, preferred higher levels of parity support.  They turned to Washington, 
pleading their case. “I am writing to ask if you have forgotten your promise to the 
farmers of the U.S.A. the year of 1952 when you were asking the people to elect you to 
the highest office of the land,” one Selma, NC, farmer wrote to Eisenhower.  He 
demanded to know why the administration was contemplating setting supports at lower 
levels of parity and closed by imploring the president to remind his secretary of 
agriculture of their campaign promises.  A woman from Lucama, NC, got straight to the 
                                                     
85 William L. Carpenter, “Increasing Size of Farm Business May Help Improve Labor Efficiency,” Wilson 
Daily Times, January 9, 1953.  Willard W. Cochrane, Farm Prices:  Myth and Reality, (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1958); Willard W. Cochrane, The Curse of Agricultural Abundance:  A 
Sustainable Solution (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 2003). 
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point in a short note.  “Mr. President, I don’t like your Parity Reduction Program for 
farmers.  We must live too you know.  Small Famers are already almost defunct.”86  
High levels of parity had done small farmers very little good, but with the demise of the 
Brannan plan, maximizing parity benefits was the best of the bad options remaining to 
small farmers. 
Conclusion 
In February 1958, the Saulston Township Farmer’s Club of Wayne County 
[North Carolina] wrote to Eisenhower to “voice their objection” to the President’s “non-
support of ninety per cent [sic] of parity on farm commodities.”  “Ninety per cent [sic] of 
parity may not be the solution to bring to the farmer a fair share of the national income, 
but we feel that if it is lowered” it would greatly “detrimental” to agriculture.  Nineteen 
club members signed the letter, all listing their occupation as farmers.87  Their petition 
captured the problem of parity politics.  It failed to offer a real solution for farmer’s 
economic problems, but it was also a position from which retreat was impossible.  Even 
Benson and Eisenhower would not officially recommend that Congress end parity until 
they neared the end of their terms in office, when the gesture was no more than 
symbolic and offered no alternative support schemes for small farmers such as the 
                                                     
86 Ellen Raper to Dwight Eisenhower, February 8, 1958, Box 13, Folder “Farm Program, February 1958,” 
RG 145, NARA. 
87 J. Norwood May to the President of the United States, February 11, 1958,  Box 13, Folder “Farm 
Program, February 1958,” RG 145, NARA. 
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Brannan Plan had proposed.88  The focus on the percent of parity issue came at the 
expense of real debates about the effects of farm programs upon the detrimental effects 
of commodity overproduction.  It served only to isolate farmers from workers and 
consumers, painting their interests as oppositional rather than allied. It also provided 
the USDA no viable political path out of the domestic allotment system that was proving 
woefully insufficient to off-set technologically created over-production and the 
concentration of farmland in fewer hands as growers sought economies of scale. 
Parity-based arguments for continued farm support thus prevailed. Pro-parity 
advocates maintained that policy decisions fed surplus accumulations and necessitated 
more expensive supports to farmers who nonetheless saw their margins shrink.  Those 
same farmers proved a vocal constituency that asserted the right to interest group 
treatment, not just as individual workers doing their duty for the nation, but as an 
industry like the regulated airlines or tariff-protected steel production whose essential 
place in the economy demanded special protection.  Farm supports also benefited 
consumers who enjoyed low food prices and increasingly diverse ways to spend their 
growing disposable income, but the politics of parity set the these groups in opposition, 
precluding meaningful inquiry into or critique of the source of the surplus or questions 
about why farm programs disproportionately benefited larger farms. 
                                                     
88 Benson, Freedom to Farm, 193-194. 
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With the inauguration of the Kennedy administration, questions of parity in farm 
policy were paramount at the highest levels of American government.  Advised by 
Willard Cochrane, in 1960s John F. Kennedy spoke the language of the price-cost 
squeeze on the campaign trail.  “Here is a concept which strikes to the heart of the 
farmer's problem,” Kennedy explained, in a pithy and enduring explanation of the 
paradigm.   “It does not concern itself directly or solely with prices - with what the 
farmer receives - but with his net income, his return, the only figure which is meaningful 
in determining his standard of living, particularly in this age of the cost-price squeeze. 
For the farmer is the only man in our economy who has to buy everything he buys at 
retail - sell everything he sells at wholesale - and pay the freight both ways.”89  If inter-
war parity had been about capturing tariff revenues and the advantages of collective 
bargaining for agriculture, post-World War II parity was re-construed into exactly the 
frame for farm policy that Brannan had deplored:  interest group politics.  
 The question became not simply whether or not farm subsidies and production 
regulations would endure in the absence of the emergencies of Depression and war , but 
the character of farmers’ relationship to those programs.  The price-cost squeeze 
justification had the potential to make farmers clients of the farm agencies that aimed to 
                                                     
89 John F. Kennedy, "Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, National Plowing Contest, Sioux Falls, SD - 
(Advance Release Text)," September 22, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project < http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74149> (October 1, 2012).  See 
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and U of M Agricultural Economist, Dies,” St. Paul Pioneer Press (March 6, 2012)  
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ease those conditions, a position of weakness and dependency that was exactly opposite 
of the arguments for economic democracy and cooperative action that had animated 
farm program supporters in the 1930s. As Benson’s successor in the office of Secretary of 
Agriculture complained:  “In selling agriculture, I think that Benson’s great disservice to 
the country and the Department of Agriculture was in the field of public relations 
because in the process of his struggles to stamp out commodity programs, he slapped a 
label of surplus and subsidy on the back of every American farmer and we haven’t been 
able to scrape it off yet.”90  In this context, the concept of the “self-administered” and 
democratically legitimated farm program was more politically important than ever. 
 
 
                                                     
90 Orville L. Freeman, recorded interview by Charles T. Morrissey, July 22, 1964, p. 27, John F. Kennedy 
Library Oral History Program. 
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Chapter 3:  The Problem of the Agricrats 
 
Dwight Eisenhower delivered the most important address on agriculture policy 
of his first presidential campaign in South Dakota at the National Plowing Contest.  
There, to the assembled crowd and to a broadcast audience, Eisenhower challenged the 
administrative status quo of the U.S. Department of Agriculture after two decades of 
Democratic presidents.  He asserted that the general principles of federal farm programs 
were “sound.”  This was because they were originally designed to include farmer 
participation in policy development.  “But what happened,” in the interim years, he 
asked.  “Do you have a voice that carries weight with the Washington agricultural 
autocrats?  Or should I say ‘agricrats’?  Do they listen to you?  Do they welcome your 
farm organizations’ leaders in their councils?  You know they don’t.”1  Eisenhower 
declared that the “agricrats” had “grown cynical and arrogant” from being too long in 
office, and that the Democratic Party would “make the farmer a political captive” by 
inciting fear that a Republican administration would undermine the federal programs 
on which they had come to depend.  He pledged to sweep the agricrats out of the USDA 
                                                     
1 “Text of the address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Republican Nominee for President, Delivered at the 
National Plowing Contest, Kasson, Minn. And Broadcast over the nationwide network of National 
Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Company from 12:00 to 12:30 P.M., Saturday 
Afternoon, September 6, 1952,” July 12, 1952 to Sept. 14, 1952,  p. 2, Box 1, Speech Series, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower:  Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, KS. 
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and to “transform” farm programs “into genuinely farmer-run operations, with 
maximum responsibility decentralized to states, counties, and districts.”2 
As we have seen, the institutions that enabled farmer administration of 
agriculture programs at the local level arose largely in answer to the dispersed nature of 
American agriculture.  Unlike other rate-setting executive agencies, the USDA’s 
regulatory agencies did not discipline an oligopoly.  Rather, the Department structured 
the production of multiple commodities by millions of farmers in thousands of counties 
across the nation.  In order to do so, administrators turned to established networks in 
farm communities to implement the AAA in the summer of 1933 by creating committees 
of farmers who distributed acreage allotments to neighboring farms and ensured that all 
farmers complied with the new restrictions on production and marketing of subsidized 
commodities.  This system – which contemporary supporters nearly always referred to 
as the “farmer-elected committee system” – was also integral to the implementation of 
economic democracy in farm programs. 
Local offices of the AAA and its successor agencies became key institutions in 
rural counties where regulated commodity crops accounted for the majority of 
agricultural production.  Farmers interacted with the offices in multiple ways.  They 
received production allotments and marketing quotas from their committees, and 
                                                     
2 Eisenhower, 2, 5. 
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worked with agency staff to implement conservation practices. Through the county 
offices, farmers received conservation incentive payments and cost sharing funds, and 
Commodity Credit Corporation loans that supported crop prices.  Agency personnel, 
often hired within the community, visited individual farms to measure fields and 
determined if farmers complied with crop reduction and conservation contracts.  Many 
farmers served on the committees themselves, if not at the county level, then at the 
community level, as each township elected three to five people every year to these 
positions.  A steady stream of public relations work in the form of newsletters, 
newspaper columns, and radio and television appearances kept AAA, Production and 
Marketing Administration, and Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation offices in 
the public eye. 
The importance of this division of the USDA resonated in Washington, as well.  
The leadership of the USDA at the highest levels had strong ties to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration and its successor agencies. The USDA division responsible 
for overseeing allotments in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the PMA, was the largest 
branch of the Department, in terms of personnel and budget. Congressional delegations 
relied on local committees as sources of constituent support, and Senators enjoyed the 
custom of choosing state committee candidates.  The PMA’s reach and influence 
attracted scrutiny of its operations at the local and national level in the early 1950s, as 
the White House and the office of Secretary of Agriculture changed hand from 
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Democrats to Republicans for the first time since the AAA became law.  As Secretary, 
Ezra Taft Benson reorganized the USDA and revised the manner in which local offices 
managed their affairs, and Benson’s changes to the Department sparked a firestorm of 
controversy.   
When we untangle the threads of the ensuing debates, we see two separate but 
related tensions at work in the politics of farm program administration, both of which 
were apparent in Eisenhower’s campaign speech.  First, there was the tension between 
centralization and decentralization in program administration.  Decentralized 
administration was a hallmark of farm support programs.  Proponents of the system 
insisted, just as they had during the 1930s, that farmer participation was essential to 
effective implementation of and support for production regulations.  They cited the 
committee system as a compelling example of grassroots politics and democracy in 
action.  Critics of the committee system in the 1950s argued that as an administrative 
mechanism, the committees had outlived their usefulness.  Professional managers, they 
maintained, were required to keep up with the volume and complexity of farm program 
work, and that committee membership had become static and less than democratic in 
practice.  The Secretary of Agriculture required stronger ties to local offices to ensure 
that policies would be carried out uniformly and effectively across the nation.  To 
accomplish this goal, Benson instituted new rules to govern the committees’ elections 
and actions. 
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Partisan politics formed the second focus of contention.  Centralizers and 
decentralizers generally separated onto opposite sides of the party fence for most of the 
1950s.  Republicans, led by Ezra Taft Benson, favored stronger centralized control by the 
USDA, while Democrats, most vocally Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, staunchly 
defended the autonomy of the committee system.  Republicans had grown frustrated 
and impatient with perceived Democratic control over farm programs at all levels, and 
seized the opportunity presented by a Republican administration to work their way into 
local offices in the South, while Democrats reacted to what they interpreted as a partisan 
power-grab, intended to turn farm programs into a machine for Republican patronage.   
By the early 1960s a new narrative of the committee system emerged.  It held that 
over the course of the 1950s the committee system had grown stale and that the farmers 
who served on them became nothing more than local figure heads.  Benson and his rules 
were to blame.  The Kennedy administration took office and perpetuated this notion, 
while taking credit for revitalizing grassroots democracy in agriculture.  The new 
Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman of Minnesota, launched an exhaustive study of 
the farmer committees in order to determine how to fix what Benson had broken.  But 
Freeman’s researchers drew many of the same conclusions that Benson reached a decade 
prior.  The committees were too independent and too difficult for the office of the 
Secretary to direct. 
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The hundreds of committeemen across the country, once a great asset in 
implementing the centralized control of American agricultural production, had 
themselves come to stand in the way of further administrative centralization, as the 
USDA came to see greater control over production and conservation programs as 
necessary to their success.  The political party in charge defined that success, however.  
Yet, even as the USDA grew convinced that the committees were too troublesome, they 
also conceded that democratized administration, even the watered down version that 
emerged from the Benson years, remained essential to the effectiveness of production 
controls.  Without them, farmers would not support the programs at all.  Troublesome 
the committees may have been, but they were also indispensable. 
County Committee Work 
The local offices of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and its 
successor agencies, the Production and Marketing Administration and the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service, became very important institutions in farm 
communities after 1933.  Their worked touched nearly every farmer in the country, and 
many individuals participated in the administrative duties for which the offices were 
responsible, not only as elected officeholders but as full time and seasonal staff.  These 
offices administered a number of programs for regulation of commodity production and 
the implementation of conservation measures.  They also oversaw the distribution of 
loan funds, including the Commodity Credit Corporation’s no-recourse commodity 
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loans and credit for developing storage facilities on individual farms.  PMA and ASC 
offices were busy and active centers of government with which most farmers 
experienced frequent and meaningful interaction.  But how did these offices actually go 
about these tasks? 
Production and Marketing Administration committees set the acreage allotments 
and marketing quotas on regulated crops grown in their counties.  They enforced 
compliance with allotment regulations and imposed penalties when they encountered 
violations.  This was a time-consuming task that required careful administration and 
familiarity with the regulations specific to several individual crops.  In 1952, the 
Edgecombe County PMA office administered tobacco and peanut allotments on more 
than thirty-six thousand acres, and administered price support loans for nine 
commodities.  Inspectors that year discovered forty-one farms that overplanted their 
allotments on tobacco and peanuts or who harvest these crops without allotments at all, 
for which the committee assessed and collected fines.3  This was the routine, seasonally 
driven work that kept allotment and quota programs functioning. 
Local committees also determined what conservation practices would be eligible 
for implementation assistance in the county.  Allotment and conservation regulations 
                                                     
3 “1952 Annual Report of the Edgecombe County Production and Marketing Administration,” Tarboro, 
N.C., p. 4, in possession of Edgecombe County Cooperative Extension Service, Tarboro, North Carolina 
(copy in author’s possession). 
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had been tightly linked since the 1937 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 
and the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act.  Linking commodity reduction and support 
payments to conservation practices, and drawing those payments from the treasury 
rather than from a dedicated tax on processors, was the work-around devised by 
Congress to circumvent the Supreme Court’s objections to the first AAA.  This brought 
conservation implementation through measures separate from those undertaken under 
the auspices of the Soil Conservation Service under the purview of the AAA offices.4  
The ASC also oversaw the Soil Bank program, instituted in 1956, which took land out of 
commodity production and planted those acres in soil-building cover crops or, more 
often in trees, create a “bank” or “reserve” of replenished land.5  The county committees 
distributed all payments associated with these programs. 
In 1951, the Edgecombe County PMA committee met with representatives of the 
Extension Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Farmer’s Home Administration, 
and the Forest Service.  In this meeting, “fourteen practices were set up on which 
payments could be made to eligible farmers.  These practices covered several phases of 
conservation from increasing soil fertility to erosion control and water conservation.”6  
                                                     
4 Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer and the New Deal, (Ames:  The Iowa State University Press, 
1982), 236-237. 
5 The Soil Bank program was the forerunner to today’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). 
6 “1952 Annual Report of the Edgecombe County Production and Marketing Administration,” Tarboro, 
N.C., p. 4, in possession of Edgecombe County Cooperative Extension Service, Tarboro, North Carolina 
(copy in author’s possession). 
 140 
 
Approved practices in the county included fertilization, winter cover crop planting, 
terracing, pasture building, drainage, and tree planting.7  The county PMA office issued 
$90,000.00 in payments for these practices to 817 farmers in 1952.  
Local PMA and ASC offices employed sizable full time and part time staff to 
carry out this work.  Three- to five-member elected county committees made most of the 
policy decisions and oversaw the office staff of the AAA and PMA offices.  Community 
or township committeemen also kept abreast of program rules and acted as important 
sources of information for their neighbors.  At a rate of three to five committeemen per 
township, the cadre of community committeemen could be quite large, but the 
committees were only part of the ASC apparatus at the county level.  Office workers 
such as secretaries and loan clerks staffed the office year round.  In addition, the 
committees hired many temporary workers, often also local farmers, to assist the 
committee the mammoth task that was measuring individual fields to determine if 
farmers were in compliance with allotments.  In 1954, Edgecombe County hired nearly 
forty people to pre-measure 1,948 allotments before planting and to spot check an 
additional 540 allotments in May and June.8 PMA and ASC workers were a regular and 
visible presence in the farm community, and their work affected every individual 
                                                     
7 7 “1952 Annual Report of the Edgecombe County Production and Marketing Administration,” Tarboro, 
N.C., p. 4-5, in possession of Edgecombe County Cooperative Extension Service, Tarboro, North Carolina 
(copy in author’s possession). 
8 “Edgecombe 1954 ASC Annual Report,” Tarboro, N.C., p. 4, 17-18, in possession of Edgecombe County 
Cooperative Extension Service, Tarboro, North Carolina (copy in author’s possession). 
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farmer.  (See Table 3 for a compilation of the basic administrative work undertaken by 
selected ASC offices in North Carolina in 1960.) 
County committees met regularly to complete these tasks.  The Edgecombe 
County committee met an average of once a week in the 1950s and 1960s.9  The 
proceedings for PMA and ASC meetings were confidential and closed to the public by 
both custom and statue.  The 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act required the USDA to 
keep private much of the information obtained about farmers in the process of 
administering allotments and quotas.10  The USDA also believed that closed meetings 
were appropriate because “it is necessary in many instances for the county committee to 
discuss, with individual farmers, things which are of a rather personal nature.  It would 
hamper operations and cause farmer resentment to have matters they consider personal 
to be aired in public.”11 
ASC offices published general notes and announcements about their activities.  
In October, 1958, the Rocky Mount Evening Telegram described the typical agenda of a 
county committee meeting.12  The committee discussed pending business on ASC 
                                                     
9 “ASC News,” Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), October 20, 1958. 
10 Marvin L. McLain to T. Ashton Thompson, January 23, 1958, Box 3076, Folder “Committees 1, 
Community-County-State, Jan 1 to March 31,” RG 16, NARA. 
11 Marvin L. McLain to T. Ashton Thompson, January 23, 1958, Box 3076, Folder “Committees 1, 
Community-County-State, Jan 1 to March 31,” RG 16, NARA. 
12 Minutes were taken at these meetings, but I have never encountered any such minutes in the archive.  
Other historians have told me that minutes were supposed to be destroyed after a period of years, but I have 
never seen this rule stated in the archive either.  Like the Edgecombe County PMA/ASC annual reports that 
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programs, including the details of program operation and individual applications from 
growers for loans and cost-sharing, or for reconsiderations of their allotments and 
quotas.  At least once a month, they would also discuss the operation of the local office, 
including staffing problems and any ongoing duties of field workers.  County agents 
and district USDA officials from the ASC often attended these monthly meetings.  
Farmers were allowed to attend meetings when they had individual business with the 
committee, but they also regularly visited the ASC office to conduct business.13
                                                     
 
I obtained from the county Extension office, I believe such minutes probably do exist in storage in local 
offices.  Finding them would be a challenge to undertake for manuscript revisions. 
13 “ASC News,” Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), October 20, 1958. 
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Table 3:  Activities of Selected County ASC Offices in North Carolina, 19601 
County Number County 
Committeemen* 
Number 
Community 
Committeemen 
Full Time 
Office 
Staff 
Part Time 
Staff and 
Land 
Measurers 
Number 
of 
Program 
Crops† 
Individual 
Allotments 
Administered^ 
Farms 
Participati
ng in ACP 
Duplin 4 39 10 62 3 2967 40% of 
county 
Edgecombe 4 42 12 25 3 3991 827 
Granville 6 45 6 45 3 3331 986 
Person 5 27 7 26 3 2967 627 
Sampson 4 57 14 18 4 11330 1870 
Wayne 5 60 9 70 4 6070 957 
*Ex-offico member (County Agent) included in this number, alternates not included 
^ The number of allotments does not equal the number of farms in the county. 
† This number includes only crops grown in the county for which allotments and quotas were in effect in 1960.  
These committees also oversaw wheat, corn, wool programs 
                                                     
1 “Duplin County 1960 Annual Report,” Kenansville, N.C.; “Granville County, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation, 1960 Annual Report,” 
Oxford, N.C; “Person County, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation, 1960 Annual Report,” Roxboro, N.C; “Sampson County, Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation, 1960 Annual Report,” Clinton, N.C. ; “Wayne County ASC Highlights, 1960, An Annual Report,” Goldsboro, N.C, Box 
5, Folder “Reports, May, 1961, RG 145, NARA.  “Edgecombe County ASC Annual Report, 1960” Tarboro, N.C., original document possession of 
Edgecombe County Cooperative Extension Service, Tarboro, North Carolina (copy in author’s possession). 
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The work these committees completed was important to individual farmers 
when it was simply the routine of assigning allotments, overseeing conservation efforts, 
and distributing program benefits.  These decisions took on additional significance 
when responding to inevitable conflict, such as when farmers disagreed with their 
allotment and quota assignments or when they broke the rules, or were accused of 
breaking them.1  These cases involved any number of unique circumstances that 
required investigation and application of the rules to individual circumstances.  Most 
such cases are difficult to discover in the archive, due to the confidentiality of committee 
meetings, but some routines are evident from their annual reports.  Local committees 
spot-checked crop plantings to determine if farmers remained within their allotments, 
and when they found over-plantings, they required excess crop be destroyed and 
assessed fines where appropriate.  They also investigated violations of conservation 
contracts, such as a farmer’s failure implement conservation measures for which he had 
been paid.  Committees also made adjustments and allowances when disasters struck, 
preventing the full implementation of conservation measures agreed to or begun in 
                                                     
1 This leaves aside entirely the more difficult to investigate possibility of corruption or incompetence of 
committee members or staff, including colluding with individual farmers to ignore over plantings.  The 
measuring of land to determine allotment areas was less than precise.  See Chapter 4 for discussion of the 
margin of error involved in actual measuring and the administrative response to this problem.  But the 
difficulties of obtaining accurate land measurements using tools with limited precision was only part of the 
problem.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that land measurements were sometimes not taken at all, with 
officials signing off on allotment compliance without fully verifying the area.  This is not addressed at all in 
archival sources I encountered. 
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good faith.  County committees dealt with nearly all such incidents locally, with the 
advice or review of the State Committee when necessary.  When growers disagreed with 
local decisions, they could appeal to the State Committee, which in turn conducted 
audits of county offices.2 
The most dramatic or egregious cases of contract violations or irresolvable 
conflicts with county and state committees sometimes came to the attention of 
congressional representatives.3  Take for instance, one South Carolina land owner who 
appeared before the Aiken County ASC committee in the summer of 1959.  Atenant 
harvested grain from land included in a soil conservation scheme, in violation of the 
landowner’s contract with the ASC.  The landowner denied all knowledge of the 
tenant’s plans to harvest until after the job was complete, but the ASC office assessed 
fines and demanded repayment of conservation funds.  To the committee, the 
landowner wrote, “Gentlemen, I feel that I have been a victim of circumstances and am 
completely innocent of any willful wrong doing as I received no compensation what-so-
                                                     
2 Office of the Administrator, Correspondence and  Administrative Records, 1956-1960 , Box 1, RG 145, 
NARA, contains audits of North Carolina ASC offices from the early 1960s.  Most documents report paper 
work discrepancies. Examples of common problems include:  incorrect forms used, forms initialed by 
unauthorized officials, or officials used an incorrect formula to calculate payments or fees.  Some audits 
included visits to individual farms to verify that conservation practices under contract were actually 
implemented.  Auditors also visited farm retailers to view required paperwork in support of ASC cost 
sharing and loan payments. 
3  I have used these examples, rather than the more routine cases, because the routine cases are almost 
impossible to find in the archive.  There are extensive records (over 2000 record storage boxes) of the ASC 
in the National Archives at College Park, MD, RG 145.7, but they are entirely unprocessed, without even a 
preliminary inventory and no easily discernible organizational scheme.  There could be numerous cases in 
these files, but they are currently inaccessible. 
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ever . . . for grain harvest on this land.”  The dispute made it all the way to Strom 
Thurmond, to whom the landowner turned for help, before he settled satisfactorily with 
the county committee.4   
A more complicated case arose in 1959 when the Hardin family of Iva, South 
Carolina, clashed with their county and state committees over accusations that they 
grazed cattle on land set aside for tree planting under a conservation contract.  The 
county committee, in the absence of its chairman, determined in an investigation that the 
violation had been an accidental incident in which a neighbor’s cattle wandered onto the 
Hardin’s land.  The State Committee, in a separate investigation undertaken at the 
urging of the county committee chair, determined instead that “the violation was 
knowing and willful.”  The Hardins, they implied, rented the land as pasture to their 
neighbor.  The cattle had not simply strayed.  The family received notice to refund the 
conservation payment they received in 1959, plus civil penalties, a total of $5,103.28, or 
“your name will be placed on the Register of Persons Indebted to the United States.”5  
The Hardins were evidentially frightened by this possibility, for the phrase tuned up 
repeatedly when their friends launched a letter-writing campaign to Strom Thurmond.  
                                                     
4 M. J. Toole to J. R. Woodward, October 13, 1959, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, Subject 
Correspondence 1960, STI. 
5 Marvin L. McLain to Strom Thurmond, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, Subject Correspondence 
1960, STI; W. H. Barksdale to J. W. Hardin, Jr., April 7, 1960, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, 
Subject Correspondence 1960, STI. 
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They request help for the family, whom they described as in difficult financial 
circumstances and deserving of leniency.6   An attorney working on their behalf accused 
the county committee chairman of “prejudice against the Hardins.”7  In spite of pressure 
from Thurmond, the ASC office in Washington upheld the state committee’s 
determination, and the Hardins were forced to repay the conservation funds, although 
the committee relented on the civil penalties.8   
From the available record, it is impossible to tell if the Hardins broke the rules or 
if the county ASC chairman really was pursuing a grudge, but making just this kind of 
judgment was the regular task of the AAA, PMA, and ASC farmer committees.  In cases 
both routine and exceptional, the ASC committees at the state and county level held 
considerable influence over the manner in which farmers planned and pursed their farm 
work.  These committees determined how much a farmer could grow and market of the 
staple commodities.  They also set the rules for implementing conservation measures, 
and the penalties for breaking the rules could be stiff.  For these reasons farmers had a 
real stake in the manner in which county and state PMA and ASC offices conducted 
their business.  It was no surprise that in 1953, when the Eisenhower administration 
                                                     
6 J. E. Ridgeway to Strom Thurmond, April 29, 1960; Strom Thurmond to A. S. Hall, April 27, 1960; John 
B. Wilson to Strom Thurmond, April 30, 1960, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, Subject 
Correspondence 1960, STI. 
7 William P. Green to Strom Thurmond, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, Subject Correspondence 
1960, STI. 
8 Strom Thurmond to John B. Wilson, May 9, 1960, Box 1, Folder 5-2, Strom Thurmond, Subject 
Correspondence 1960, STI. 
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introduced changes to the rules that governed how the committees functioned, these 
actions stirred up considerable interest and no small amount of controversy. 
Centrality of Administrative Politics 
Southern farming communities exhibited mixed feelings about Dwight 
Eisenhower’s appointee for Secretary of Agriculture.  Ezra Taft Benson’s roots were in 
the west.  His family was among the first Mormon pioneers of Utah, and Benson himself 
was born in Idaho in 1899.  He obtained his undergraduate education at Brigham Young 
University and a master’s degree in agricultural economics from Iowa State College in 
the late 1920s.  Afterward he and his wife returned to Idaho where they joined his 
brother on the family farm.  Benson did not remain a farmer for long.  After two years he 
took a position as a county agent for the Idaho Extension Service, and soon became the 
first head of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing at the University 
of Idaho.9  In 1933, Benson became the secretary of the Idaho Cooperative Council, 
leading to his appointment in 1939 as the secretary of the National Council of Farm 
Cooperatives.  The council was a Washington-based lobbying group that represented 
the interests of cooperatives large and small including the raisin and dairy giants, Sun-
                                                     
9 Carlisle Bargerdon, “About Ezra Benson,” in Ezra Taft Benson (as told to Carlisle Bargerdon), Farmers 
at the Crossroads, (New York:  The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), ix-x; “Celebration of Leadership,” 
University of Idaho,  
http://www.uidaho.edu/celebrationofleadership/events/A%20Legacy%20of%20Leading (July 11, 2012); 
Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country:  The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy, (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 112. 
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Maid and Land O’Lakes.  Benson’s ties to agricultural cooperatives reflected his 
generally associationalist approach to farm politics, and he was a vocal and staunch 
opponent of the New Deal farm programs, which he denounced as “paternalistic” and 
as antithetical to the “free enterprise” system.10 
 
Figure 6:  Ezra Taft Benson as Secretary of Agriculture11 
                                                     
10 Benson likened New Deal farm programs to communism in his 1960 history of American agriculture 
policy.  See Ezra Taft Benson, Freedom to Farm (Garden City:  Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), 157-
158.  On Benson’s belief in cooperative organization to address market problems and his experiences of the 
1920s, see Freedom to Farm, 69-85.    Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country:  The Road to America’s Wal-
Mart Economy, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2008), 112; Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick 
H. Schapsmeier, “Eisenhower and Ezra Taft Benson:  Farm Policy in the 1950s,” Agricultural History 44 
(Oct 1970): 370-372.  On associationalism and agriculture, see Chapter 1 and  Victoria Saker Woeste, The 
Farmer’s Benevolent Trust:  Law and Agricultural Cooperation in Industrial America (Chapel Hill:  UNC 
Press, 1998); David E. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal: American Farm Policy From Hoover to 
Roosevelt, 1928-1933, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
11 “Ezra Taft Benson, 15th Secretary of Agriculture, January 1953-January 1961,” United States Department 
of Agriculture photo, http://www.flickr.com/photos/usdagov/6302727317/in/photostream/ (Accessed April 
16, 2013).  Used with permission. 
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After Eisenhower’s election, eastern North Carolina newspapers printed 
extensive articles trying to take the measure of the man who would lead the USDA.  The 
Robersonville Weekly Herald mused, “One of the things [farmers] particularly want to 
know is how Secretary Benson feels about price supports.”  They looked to his past 
statements, in which Benson articulated his preference for “flexible” parity over “high, 
mandatory” or “rigid” price supports.  They also looked to his affiliations, not just with 
the cooperatives councils, but with the Mormon church where he was a member of the 
governing body and whose leaders were “reported to be against price-support and relief 
payments of any kind.”12  By existing legislation and Eisenhower’s own campaign 
promises, Benson would be locked into high, mandatory supports for most 
commodities, including tobacco, cotton, and peanuts – the crops of most concern to the 
Herald’s readers – through 1954.  But in 1954, for the 1955 crop season, he would be free 
to propose new plans.13  The vehemently pro-New Deal paper in Robersonville, North 
Carolina, worried that Benson would reduce price supports at the earliest opportunity.   
                                                     
12 “Congress Worried Over Downward Trend in Prices, Secretary Benson Likely to be First to Get White 
House Call,” Weekly Herald (Robersonville, NC), January 7, 1953. 
13 “Congress Worried Over Downward Trend in Prices, Secretary Benson Likely to be First to Get White 
House Call,” Weekly Herald (Robersonville, NC), January 7, 1953; “Text of the address by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Republic Nominee for President, Delivered at the national Plowing Contest, Kasson Minn. 
And Broadcast over the nationwide network of National Broadcasting Company and the American 
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Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, KS.; Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, “Eisenhower 
and Ezra Taft Benson:  Farm Policy in the 1950s,” 369; D. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal. 
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Benson’s initial statements in office fed these fears.  At his first press conference, 
he distributed what one historian has called a “free-market manifesto.”  His “General 
Statement on Agricultural Policy” denounced planed and subsidized economies – a 
characterization he applied to American agriculture under production controls – as 
demoralizing and destructive of individual character and industry.14   Observers who 
feared an end of farm price supports took this as a sign of things to come.  The 
Robersonville Weekly Herald editorialized that “the American famer is being maneuvered 
in the helpless position where he’ll be carrying the load alone in support of a ‘realistic’ 
economy proposed by” Benson, Republicans, and “quite a few reactionary Democrats” 
whom the editors accused of betraying the New Deal.15    The Republican chair of the 
Senate agriculture committee had just recently called the president of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation and the director of the PMA before the committee and lectured them 
on the “unrealistic” nature of the farm programs.16  These Republican law makers voiced 
hopes that Benson would start with a “clean slate” when he took over the USDA.17 
Benson looked back to a product of the Truman era for a model of how to 
achieve that clean slate.  In 1947, Congress convened the Commission on the 
                                                     
14 S. Hamilton, Trucking Country, 112.  On the detrimental effects of farm programs on individual farmer 
efficiency, see Benson, Freedom to Farm, 153. 
15 Editorial, “Lip Service Only,” Weekly Herald (Robersonville, N.C.), March 11, 1953. 
16 Joe Hall for the Associated Press, “Farmers Demand Strong Program,” Wilson Daily Times (Wilson, 
N.C.), January 16, 1953. 
17 Joe Hall for the Associated Press, “Farmers Demand Strong Program,” Wilson Daily Times (Wilson, 
N.C.), January 16, 1953. 
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Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, commonly known as the 
“Hoover Commission,” to examine the operations of Executive Branch departments and 
independent regulatory commissions.  It was widely anticipated that Truman would 
lose the 1948 election, and the Republicans’ original goals for the commission were to 
identify ways to scale back the New Deal era growth of the administrative state.18  The 
tone of the commission altered when Truman defied expectations and won re-election,19 
and the commission produced recommendations that strengthened or affirmed the New 
Deal order by reinforcing the prerogatives and authority of the managerial presidency. 20  
The inclination to favor managerial authority, known as orthodox administrative 
theory, was a guiding philosophy of the Hoover Commission’s final report.  This theory 
of managerial government holds that effective administration must involve distinct lines 
of authority, clearly defined realms of responsibility, and meritocratic personnel 
                                                     
18 See William E. Pemberton, “Struggle for the New Deal:  Truman and the Hoover Commission,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 16:3, (Summer 1986):  516. 
19 Scholars of political science explain this about-face in the commission’s goals by pointing to Truman’s 
intensified interest in the Commission after his reelection.  Hoover himself, an architect of the final report, 
had been a leading proponent of corporatist government in the 1920s.  But he was also an administrator 
who believed that if a government official was to be held accountable for carrying out public policies, they 
must have sufficient authority to accomplish the task.   Peri E. Arnold, “The First Hoover Commission and 
the Managerial Presidency,” The Journal of Politics, 38:1 (Feb. 1976): 46-70;William E. Pemberton, 
“Struggle for the New Deal:  Truman and the Hoover Commission,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 16:3, 
(Summer 1986):  511-527. 
20 See Peri E. Arnold, “The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency,” The Journal of 
Politics, 38:1 (Feb. 1976):  48. 
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procedures.21  Also integral to this theory is that managers must have authority 
equivalent to their responsibilities.  According to this approach, an administrative 
official such as the Secretary of Agriculture cannot be held responsible for successful 
policy implementation if he has less than full authority to oversee and direct that 
implementation.  Stemming from this understand of executive authority, the Hoover 
Commission preferred a fully top-down approach to administration that could not be 
further from the reality of program administration in the USDA.   
The Hoover Commission recommended strengthening the authority of the 
Secretary and dismantling the farmer committee system.22  The recommended 
reorganization of the department would have created more streamlined hierarchies, 
reduced redundancies, and redistributed some realms of responsibility between the 
USDA and the Department of the Interior.  The Commission found the Department to be 
too segmented, a “loose confederation of independent bureaus and agencies” that 
diffused the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture.23  The Commission also singled 
out the many farmer committees – such as the PMA and Extension committees – as both 
too expensive and disruptive to the USDA’s ability to implement farm programs.  “A 
multitude of county advisory committees of farmers has been created and employed. . . . 
                                                     
21 Peri E. Arnold, “The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency,” The Journal of Politics, 
38:1, (Feb., 1976):  48. 
 
23 The Hoover Commission Report on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, (New 
York:  McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), 237 
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The task force on agricultural activities believes that the local committees should be 
purely advisory on program formulation and operation.  All administrative work 
should be done by departmental or State employees.”24  They recommended the 
dissolution of “redundant” farmer committees and the establishment of one advisory 
council per county “as aids to orderly operations in the field.”  The Commission took 
pains to explain that “these councils should be advisory” only.  They should consider all 
program proposals, but “it is not the sense of this recommendation that they should 
have ‘veto power.’”25   
In 1951 and 1952 Congress held hearings on a bill designed to implement many 
of the Hoover Commission’s recommendations for the USDA.26  While the legislation 
stood little chance of passing a Democratic congress or of securing President Truman’s 
signature, the 1950 hearing proved a dress rehearsal for the more serious challenge to 
the status quo at the USDA after Eisenhower’s election.  The cast of characters was 
nearly the same, and the arguments for and against the farmer committee system 
foreshadowed the more vehement assertions later in the decade.  On one side stood 
Senate agriculture committee Republicans, led by Vermont Senator George Aiken, the 
                                                     
24 The Hoover Commission Report, 245. 
25 The Hoover Commission Report, 246. 
26 “Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture,” Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in 
Executive Department, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session on S. 1149, August 28, 29, 
September 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 18, 1951; “Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture,” Hearings 
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American Farm Bureau, and some more conservative Democrats in favor of 
implementing the Hoover Commission’s recommendations.  On the other side, North 
Carolina representative and chair of the House agriculture Committee Harold D. 
Cooley, the National Farmers Union, most southern Democrats, and the Truman 
administration’s leadership of the USDA, including Secretary of Agriculture Charles 
Brannan, who asserted that the Commission’s recommendations for the committees was 
based on “a great deal of misunderstanding.”27 
When Ezra Taft Benson became Secretary of Agriculture, he significantly 
reorganized the USDA to the extent that he could do so without Congressional 
approval.  He evoked the Hoover Commission’s findings as the justification for his 
actions.  “Our plan to reorganize the Department was based on a detailed, non-political 
study completed long before I became Secretary, on the recommendations of a 
Committee on Government Organization set up by President Truman.” 28  The Hoover 
Commission was in no sense “non-political,” though it was bi-partisan.  The fact that it 
was conducted under the Truman administration was justification enough for Benson.  
                                                     
27 “Reorganization of the Department of Agriculture,” Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture, 
House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, March 26, 27, 28 and April 3, 1952, 5.  See also 
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Inc.), 103. 
 156 
 
He needed this political cover because his reorganization of the USDA primarily 
targeted the division of the Department that oversaw the acreage allotment programs by 
dismantling and renaming the Production and Marketing Administration.  All of the 
USDA’s authority to regulate agricultural production rested in the PMA.  The PMA was 
also a conduit for USDA leadership.  By 1952, two undersecretaries of agriculture had 
started their administrative careers as AAA and PMA county committeemen.29 At the 
end of his term, Benson looked back on the PMA and levied this scathing assessment:  
“The production and Marketing Administrations had become in a sense almost bigger 
than the Department itself.  The tail was wagging the dog.  I wanted to cut it down to 
size.”30    Benson mouthpiece Carlisle Bargerdon portrayed the Secretary as the new 
sheriff in town who defied the entrenched interests at the USDA at his own political 
expense to reign in the PMA agricrats.31   
Benson redistributed some functions of the PMA and renamed the division that 
continued to oversee linked production and conservation regulations the Commodity 
Stabilization Service.  The local offices that had previous been known as the PMA offices 
                                                     
29 “Administration of Farm Programs by Farmer Committees,” p. 41. 
30 Benson, Cross Fire, 52. 
31 Carlisle Bargeron, “About Ezra Benson,” Benson, Farmers at the Crossroads, xiv.  For Benson’s 
description of the process of reorganizing the PMA, see Benson, Cross Fire, 52-53. 
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became the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation offices (ASC).32  The 1953 annual 
report for the Edgecombe County, North Carolina ASC office asserted that “with the 
change in name . . . very little change in duties of this agency was made.”  The office 
continued to oversee allotments, quotas, and price supports and to administer the 
Agricultural Conservation Programs (ACP).   The farmers committees remained intact as 
did those of the Extension service, Farmers Home Administration, and the Soil 
Conservation Districts.   
If the administrative duties of county offices did not change with the transition 
from the Production and Marketing Administration to the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation service, there was a shift in power between the local committees and the 
USDA career staff.  The USDA imposed term limits on farmer committee members at all 
levels:  state, county, and community.  Benson also altered the manner in which 
committeemen were elected.  Previously, the county PMA office administered its own 
elections.  Benson created election boards independent of the county committee, but 
comprised of the administrative directors of other local farm agencies, such as the FHA 
and SCS and the county officers of the Farm Bureau and the Grange.  Committeemen 
                                                     
32 For an official genealogy of the AAA to today’s Farm Service Agency including the transition from 
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also became subject to term limits and capped the number hours per year for which they 
could be paid for committee work.  
The most important and controversial rule change related to the management of 
local ASC office.  The new rules required each county committee to hire an office 
manager.  Benson attempted to present this new requirement in the best possible light.  
He and his staff argued that the managers were a necessary addition to assist with the 
practical difficulties associated with operating a large and growing agency.33 No longer 
would committees be burdened by bureaucratic work that took members away from 
their farms and discouraged some from seeking office.  Instead, Benson explained, “the 
State and County committees will in effect serve as a ‘board of directors’ to determine 
policy, but they will not be asked to spend their time on routine administrative 
matters.”34   Committees would continue the work of assigning quotas and allotments.  
They would still determine what conservation practices would be supported in the 
county, and apply the rules to individual cases as needed. 
Other administrative work, such as supervising office staff and land measures, 
would fall to the manager.  The manager would also advise the county committee on 
policy changes and maintain communication with the State Committee.  This last duty 
                                                     
33Announced new regulations March 26, 1953.  “Administration of Farm Programs by Farmer 
Committees,” p. 101; Testimony of Earl M. Hughes, Administrator of the Agricultural Conservation and 
Stabilization Service, “Administration of Farm Programs by Farmer Committees,” p. 8-10.  
34 “Administration of Farm Programs by Farmer Committees,” p 103.  
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was crucial for, as a political scientist who studied the farmer committees in the early 
1950s (and who was in sympathy with Benson’s proposals) asked:  “Is it feasible to 
decentralize administrative control over a program which, by its nature requires 
national uniformity?”35  Strengthening the ties between county and state committees 
though the manager would help achieve this uniformity. 
As an entirely appointed body, the state committee reported directly to the ASC 
director and the Secretary of Agriculture in Washington.  They were accountable to the 
USDA for the effectiveness with which they administered policy by overseeing the work 
of the county committees.  The state committees had always functioned this way, since 
the early days of the AAA. The USDA favored highly recommended candidates of the 
same party as the sitting president who were successful commercial farmers, and 
appointees attained the positions often with the strong support of at least one senator 
from their state, who used their the committees for patronage appointments.  The state 
committee served as a resource to advise the county committees and to act as an 
appellate body to challenge local decisions.   
The formal establishment of the county office manager took advantage of this 
existing institutional design to tighten the links between the state and county 
committees. Many counties had hired office managers of their own accord well before 
                                                     
35 Reed L. Frischknecht, “The Democratization of Administration:  The Farmer Committee System,” The 
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the 1953 mandate,36 but those managers had been purely local employees accountable 
only to the county committee.  By creating a formal position for a manger with standard 
duties and lines of authority separate from the elected committees, county managerial 
positions strengthened the USDA’s control over the day to day operations of county 
ASC offices.  Opponents to the new requirement for an office manager and the formal 
incorporation of that office into the USDA hierarchy charged that the secretary had 
circumvented the elected committees and the will of the farmers by instating appointed 
administrators.  The Secretary could not affect the outcomes of local elections, but he 
could undermine the committees’ independence and reduce the farmers’ elected 
representatives in the USDA to little more than yes-men of the new county office 
managers and the appointed State Committees.37    
Local USDA employees – such as the staff members of the ASC county offices, 
including office managers, were not part of the civil service.38  They received pay and 
benefits on a scale analogous to civil service structures, but the USDA kept managers 
outside of the civil service in order to signal the elected committees’ continued 
                                                     
36 Marvin L. McLain to Morgan M. Moulder, 3-13-1958, Box 3076, Folder "Committees 1, Community-
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independence in the administration of their offices.  As Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture Marvin McLain explained to a senator in 1958, “Because of the manner in 
which their funds are derived and expended, and the way in which their personnel are 
elected and selected, ASC county committees have long been considered 
“instrumentalities of the United States’ as distinguished from regular federal offices.”39   
In theory, the committees therefore had authority over their managers, whom they could 
hire and fire at will, “without cause.” In reality, however, office manager hires and 
dismissals required the approval of the State Committee, and the State Committee. 40  
It was not clear what kind of real authority this arrangement allowed the elected 
committees to retain.  An Iowa farmer and long-time committee member insinuated that 
men such as him would not continue to serve in the new structure, and that farm 
programs would suffer from the loss of their experience and leadership. “Now when 
you eliminate experienced committeemen what will happen,” he asked his 
congressman.  “I have stated that as a figurehead I will not permitt [sic] my re-
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election.”41  Others objected to the imposition of term limits.  A Sampson County, North 
Carolina, high school teacher of vocational agriculture, C. Marion Butler, wrote to his 
congressman in 1954 that “I feel that the present regulations and the way the 
Committeemen have been elected has proved satisfactory and that the farmer should 
have the privilege to elect who he wished to serve as Community and County 
Committeemen, regardless of number of years he has already served as a 
committeeman.  Some of our best ASC Committeemen, men who get the job done, have 
been with the Program for a number of years.”42  Butler and others argued that term 
limits contributed to shift of experience and expertise away from the elected farmer 
committeemen.  Less seasoned committees would rely heavily on the expertise of the 
managers.  Ironically, by 1960 Butler would become the Sampson County ASC county 
manager.43 
To opponents of the managerial system, this looked like an attack on the 
economic democracy.  Benson recalled that upon restructuring the committee system, 
“immediately I was accused by the Democrats of crippling a mechanism though which 
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American farmers gave expression to their desires.”44  The sticking point for many 
Benson opponents was that the restructuring of the PMA and the local committees came 
by administrative fiat, bypassing both the committees and Congress.  The National 
Farmers Union pressed Congress for a response that would limit the Secretary’s ability 
to alter the committee structure.  Such action, the NFU argued, would provide the 
committees with “prestige” and “give them something that they could rely on, 
something that could not be done away with because somebody in the Department [of 
Agriculture] decided that he should issue a directive and the program would go in the 
other direction.”45  R.M. Evans, the first chair of the Iowa State committee and later the 
national AAA administrator, warned the Senate that “to allow this [committee] set-up to 
be liquidated will start America on the road to a new type of government.  It is just that 
serious.”46   
Partisan politics fueled this controversy.  Benson believed that local committees 
had become Democratic party strongholds who used their influence to support 
Democratic congressmen.47 While local committeemen ran for office independently, the 
partisan composition of most committees generally reflected that of their 
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constituencies.48  In the South, where Democrats reigned over local politics despite 
losing the presidency, Republicans chafed at their continued marginalization on local 
committees and staff positions.  “Are the democrats so intrenched [sic] in office,” 
complained the Stokes County, NC, Republican Executive Committee chairman in 1954, 
“that they hold a permanent mortgage on all . . . offices in the Agriculture 
Department?”49  Managerial positions, filled with the approval of appointed state 
committees, local Republicans realized, could provide the party an advantageous perch 
in the ASC’s administrative staff. The Missouri Republican State Committee vice chair 
instructed a county party chairperson that farm program employees “should be 
Republicans if we can lend our energy to see to it that they are.”50 
The connections between the committees and Congress meant that congressional 
Democrats on the agricultural committees took notice of the changes taking place in the 
ASC.  This scrutiny reached a peak in the mid-1950s as the new rules took full effect.  
The sitting state committees of 1953 had been almost entirely replaced by 1956 with new 
appointees, many of whom lacked experience on the county committees.  As these new 
committees exerted their control over the implementation of the other Benson policies, 
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conflicts and scandals, large and small, erupted in many states, including North 
Carolina, Minnesota, and Missouri.  In response, Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey 
introduced new legislation in 1955 to restore the administrative functions of the 
committees, and held a series of related hearing in Washington, D.C., and Jefferson City, 
Missouri.  The hearings provided the opportunity to investigate the Benson 
restructuring and a brewing crisis in Missouri involving the dismissal of several county 
committees by the new state committee.51   
From his position as chair of the hearings, Humphrey assailed Benson and his 
policies.  He described his feelings as a “full scale burn” of anger over the altered 
committee rules and the resulting conflicts in his home state of Minnesota.52  Humphrey 
accused the USDA of exploiting the system for patronage at the expense of grassroots 
democracy and charged Eisenhower with violating his campaign promises.  Far from 
ousting the agricrats and returning the farm program to the farmers, the Eisenhower 
administration had reduced the farmer-elected committees to “geldings” without any 
meaningful authority.53 The subcommittee’s report would extend the metaphor, 
asserting that “if followed to its logical end, this pattern could administratively sterilize 
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the elected farmer committee system, and permit the rise of a bureaucracy and 
patronage system reaching into every rural community of America.”54 
Humphrey also expressed skepticism of the managerial system of local 
government in use across the country. Like the institution of a professional civil service, 
the managerial system had been a Progressive Era innovation meant to encourage local 
government by professionals and experts who could apply specialized knowledge to 
their tasks and achieve effectiveness, efficiency, and honest dealings from inefficient and 
corrupt local governments.  In practice local government by managers could also be 
used to subvert democratic politics by minimizing the role of elected officials and 
placing decisions in the hands of appointed officials.55  Humphrey stated during the 
hearings on the committee system his suspicion of the managerial system in general, and 
his concern that managers’ lack of independence in the revamped ASC system would 
substitute appointed authority for that of democratically elected officials.  “I studied my 
public administration, but I was never convinced of the managerial form unless he 
happened to be an unusually good manager.  . . .  If you have one of these county 
managers or city managers and you have the council in your hand, you [the manager] 
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can manipulate [the council] pretty well.  When you are in a position of power, you 
don’t have to worry too much about those people.  I have been opposed to that.  That is 
one of the reasons I felt we ought to try to keep this system as close to the people as we 
can.”56  Humphrey worried committee memberships would become “honorary” 
positions, with the real authority transferred to the managers, and by extension, the 
Secretary of Agriculture.57  
The Senate agriculture committee called the chairman of the Missouri State ASC 
Committee, Murray Colbert, to testify in order to determine the scope of county 
managers’ duties and the lines of authority. As Humphrey quizzed the chairman, the 
fine distinctions between the scope of the county committees’ policy making authority 
and that of the USDA in general became apparent.  Also apparent was the dual role of 
the county manager, on one hand the administrative office of the county committee’s 
official functions, and on the other the agent of the Secretary of Agriculture in each 
county, there to enforce the department-level policies.  Colbert explained the duties of 
the manager in light of the committeemen’s reduced hours.  “The county manager does 
the work that is outlined by the Secretary of Agriculture so far as administrative 
purposes are concerned.  . . .  The county committee [is] . . .  employed when actually 
needed, and their services are limited to so many days a year.  During the time they are 
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working, the office manager is directly responsible for the administration of that office, 
but he does not and should not on any occasion set policies.”  The manager, then, was 
there to oversee office staff and conduct the administrative paperwork each local ASC 
office generated. These procedures were determined in Washington, not subject to the 
discretion of managers or committeemen.  Humphrey summarized Colbert’s 
explanation: “In other words what you are testifying to is that policies are made at the 
departmental level.”  Colbert conceded this was correct.  When Humphrey took the 
point further to ask, “you are saying that the policies are no longer made at the county 
level,” Colbert responded that “local policies are still made at the county level,” and also 
carried out by the manager.58   
Humphrey and Colbert drew different conclusions from this exchange.  For 
Colbert, the key point was that managers were not to make independent decisions about 
allotment assignments, initiate enforcement actions, approve loan applications or funds 
distributions, or determined what conservation practices would be followed locally.  
Therefore, they did not usurp county committeemen’s local policy prerogatives.  But 
Humphrey drew a different lesson, one he found troubling.  “So, in your view,” he 
posited to Colbert, “the office manager is an agent of the Secretary of Agriculture” and 
“not an agent of the county committee?”  Colbert agreed that managers were agents of 
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the Secretary, but worked under the local direction of the committees.  The managers 
represented the direct authority of the administrative staff of the USDA, as distinctly 
separate from the elected committee.59 
Humphrey and other opponents of the Benson reorganization balked at this 
centralization of farm program administration and policy making, through the direct 
intervention of the Secretary of Agriculture’s agent. They asserted that farmers’ 
voluntary compliance with regulations, and thus the effectiveness of all farm programs, 
depended on grassroots administration by qualified, experienced committeemen.  
Describing the leadership role of the committees, Norris Dodd, who rose through the 
Oregon committee system to eventually become an Undersecretary of Agriculture in the 
mid-1940s, described the committees as the “lifeguard of agriculture in this country” 
and argued passionately against term limits.  He believed they would rob the 
committees of culminated expertise and of the trust farmers held in experienced and 
recognized local leaders.  Drawing on his experience, Dodd envisaged that this loss 
would damage the effectiveness of farm programs and reduce voluntary compliance.  
“Many things that the committees were able to do could never have been accomplished 
otherwise,” Dodd asserted, “because you had to have the confidence of your neighbors 
and of the farmers in that particular area in order to talk them into doing a thing that we 
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thought was important to do, but which might not be the best thing for the farmer from 
the standpoint of his pocketbook.”  This was especially true, Dodd explained, during the 
war years when labor was short and farm produce was diverted to military uses.  It 
remained a relevant concern in the post-war period when farmers had to comply with 
policies, such as reduced allotments, that might also be contrary to their individual 
interests.60   
Dodd’s testimony put forward the argument, advanced by the committees’ 
champions, that farmers were their own best regulators, and that furthermore, farm 
regulation was only practically possible and politically legitimate if conducted by the 
farmers themselves. In this framing, “the farmer elected committees” had become 
synonymous with “the farmers.”  Everyone evoked the power of the grassroots.  
Proponents of the administrative status quo argued that the committees – elected by the 
farmers and unhindered by term limits and the unnecessary supervision of the 
managers – were the best example of grassroots policy development and administration 
in the United States.  Benson, on the other hand, charged that the committees had lost 
their bearings and become dominated by self-interested career committeemen. In a 
speech to the National Farm Institute in Des Moines, Iowa, he declared his distaste for 
“ready-made” farm programs handed down from Washington.  He instead declared 
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that “programs should be built with the assistance of farmers and those who are 
working with them.  Let’s build strong – from the ‘grass roots’ – the type of programs 
which farmers want – the kind that will not bring serious regrets and disappointments 
later.”61 
Despite such rhetoric, Benson failed to successfully challenge the equivalency 
between the farmer elected committees and “the farmers,” and thus undermined his 
efforts at refashioning farm programs and their administrative structures.  Instead, his 
strongest justifications rested on considerations of administrative efficiency, and any 
arguments that altering the committee system could create opportunities for previously 
unengaged farmers were weak and only timidly advanced. These arguments also 
referred only to the small community of farmers deemed to capable and acceptable 
leaders, but who may not have participated in the committees because of the 
entrenchment of long-time members.  Benson made no overtures toward inclusion of the 
truly excluded:  black farmers, women, other racial and ethnic minorities, and tenants 
and share croppers. That the reforms would result in some concentration of authority 
under the State Committees and office managers was undeniable, but Benson and the 
Eisenhower administration were utterly unsuccessful at persuading Congress and the 
farming public that this would prove beneficial for American farmers.   
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Benson underestimated the power wielded by the committees within their 
communities and the extent to which locals, Democrats and Republicans alike, would 
fight to protect and exercise that power.  The campaigning Eisenhower had been bold in 
his denunciation of the Washington agricrats, but the Benson’s reforms struck most 
directly entrenched committeemen.  Congressional Democrats and committees 
supporters were highly successful at using the rhetoric of agrarian localism to recast the 
debate over the reorganization as one about grassroots democracy and the excesses of 
party politics.  In so doing they avoided entirely engaging with critiques of the power of 
local elites, whom we might call the “little agricrats.”   
Kennedy Era Reassessments 
 
Benson spent his term as Secretary of Agriculture politically embattled and 
unpopular with American farmers – even Republican farmers.  Immediately after taking 
office in 1960, the new Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, appointed a study 
committee to look into the state of the farmer committees.  Popular wisdom said that 
they had become aimless, without purpose, ineffective, and mired in partisan politics.  
Benson’s rule changes were to blame.  This was certainly the line emanating from the 
USDA’s public relations offices during the Kennedy administration.  In the 1962 USDA 
Annual report that declared that the Freeman-lead department had “restored” the 
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committees “to full authority.”62   One newspaper declared that the “farmer committee 
system is emerging from dormancy.”63   
E.Y. Floyd read this article with alarm. He had been the AAA administrator in 
North Carolina in the 1930s and during World War II, and feared that Freeman’s USDA 
would make good on this promise.  Floyd wrote fellow North Carolinian and ASC chief 
administrator Horace Godfrey with his concerns.  Floyd and Godfrey had been 
colleagues when Godfrey was the ASC administrator in North Carolina in the 1950s.  
Floyd’s letter to Godfrey asked him to be cautions in scaling back the job of the county 
managers and ramping back up the duties of the committeemen.  Floyd acknowledged 
Godfrey’s long experience at the ASC, but cautioned, “This is one phase of the program 
you did not experience.  You were serving in World War II at that time.”  Floyd painted 
a bleak picture of the administrative process of the 1930s and 1940s when he had been in 
charge of the AAA in North Carolina.  “I had experience, as you know, [with the 
program] from no committeemen, to a committee system, to a complete committee 
system which did not permit the Administrator’s Office to sign a letter of information to 
committees.  An attempt was made that they would not be permitted to contact farmers 
                                                     
62 USDA, After a Hundred Years:  The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1962, (Washington, D.C.:  US 
Government Printing Office, 1962), 560.  See also “Review of the Farmer Committee System:  Report of 
the Study Committee,” Washington, D.C., November 28, 1962, p. 45, Box 3742, Folder “Committees 1,” 
RG 17, NARA. 
63 “Farmer Committee System Emerging from Dormancy,” News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), March 13, 
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or give instructions to county workers.”  Over this final (and likely exaggerated) 
indignity, Floyd resigned, though he believed that his replacement had mostly escaped 
these strictures in practice.  By the time Godfrey entered the ASC, the manager system 
was in place, and Floyd found it the best way to manage the county offices.  To scale 
back the managers’ duties would be a return to the bad old days, and he urged Godfrey 
to meet with him when next he traveled to Raleigh.  “I just wanted you to think 
seriously about this thing and give some of us an opportunity to talk to you who have 
gone through a similar experience and it did not work.”64 
Floyd need not have worried.  For all the anti-Benson rhetoric, the Kennedy-era 
USDA made surprisingly little change to his policies.  The USDA launched a new study,  
whose purpose was to discover the causes of the purported malaise that had infected the 
farmer committee system.  After interviewing hundreds of committeemen and office 
personnel across the country declared that “the farmer committee method of 
administering farm programs is sound.”65  The study committee raised concerns about 
the system, but they were not focused on Benson’s rules.  Rather, they closely echoed the 
criticisms that the Hoover Commission in 1948. The problem, as they saw it was this:  
“The Committee recognized that the Secretary of Agriculture is made responsible by the 
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Congress for the administration of federally authorized farm programs.  The elected 
farmer committees are not directly answerable to the Secretary.  How to achieve efficient 
program operation with the double thrust of local democratic action and the clear 
delineation of the Secretary’s granted authority and administrative obligation to control 
was the major problem before the committee.”66  They worried not that the committees 
had lost their way, but that they were still too independent and too difficult for the 
Secretary of Agriculture to control.  Seeking a solution to this problem, the same 
problem bemoaned by Benson, and the Hoover Commission before him, the study 
committee seriously considered dismantling the farmer committees or scaling them back 
to much more narrowly defined duties.67  In the end, they discarded both possibilities, 
and recommended keeping the committees in place with only the most minor 
adjustments to election and work rules, and suggested bringing the office managers into 
the civil service, making further solidifying their positions of administrative authority in 
the counties.68   
One key development did emerge from the Freeman-era reassessment of the 
Committee system.  In a move that sparked some controversy, the USDA proposed to 
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alter the oath of office that committeemen signed to require their personal support for 
ASC programs, as written.  The oath of office in use throughout the 1950s obligated 
committeemen to fulfill the duties of the office to the best of their ability and to take 
responsibility for any loss or harm to the Department stemming from fraud or 
negligence the part of the committeeman.69  The Freeman study committee had 
discovered committeemen whose personally disagreed with the goals and mechanisms 
of the ASC, and recommended that the USDA take steps to address the problem. “The 
Committee found only a small fraction of committeemen publicly opposed to the 
objectives of the farm programs authorized by law.”  Nevertheless, “Committeemen . . 
.should be expected to give loyal support to honest and efficient administration of 
programs authorizes by law.  If a committeeman finds himself in a fundamental 
disagreement with the farm programs and administrative approach to farm problems, 
and if he engages in public criticism, then he should resign from the committee and 
refuse to serve if renominated.”70   
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In response the USDA proposed an addition to the oath, affirming that the 
committeeman would “support the program he is called upon to administer.”71   The 
Virginia Farm Bureau derided this as an “oath of allegiance.”72  Virginia congressman 
William Tuck chided Freeman, “As one who believes that our American system of 
government is dependent upon the people, I cannot conceive why this is to be done.  
The committeemen are elected, it is my understanding, to represent the farmers in their 
dealings with your department, whereas the provision cited would ignore the wishes of 
the people and make them conform to the overall control of the department.”73  North 
Carolina senator C. Everett Jordan expressed similar worries.  “I am concerned about a 
pledge that would prevent a committeeman from stating his views about any program 
or law which may be in effect at the time he is elected by his fellow farmers to serve as 
their representative . . .”74  The Department quickly abandoned the proposal.75  This ill-
considered proposition demonstrated the Departments’ concern about the 
independence, and potential unruliness, of the county committees.  Unable to do away 
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with the committee system, the USDA proposed other ways to assert the Secretary’s 
authority. 
The reasons Freeman’s USDA did not attempt to dismantle the committee 
system were so were not as lofty as the rhetoric of economic democracy that animated 
proponents of the committee system in the 1930s, or the claims that American 
democracy in the Cold War era required strong, locally-rooted and democratically 
administered intuitions that characterized the debates of the 1950s.  Charles Brannan, 
the Secretary of Agriculture under Truman who had once declared that the Hoover 
Commission’s conclusions about the committee system were entirely wrongheaded, had 
changed his tune in the intervening years.  As a member of Freeman’s study committee, 
he questioned if the democratic justifications for the committee system had ever made 
sense.  “The student of this unique administrative instrumentality will recognize the 
desirable democratic characteristics inherent in the famer elected committees. But he 
may also properly ask if such affirmative advantages balance out the obvious 
disadvantages.  The democratically elected Congress, usually after another very 
laborious democratic process, adopts the programs.”76  Instead, political expediency 
proved most important.  “Over many years, the farmer committee system has become 
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deeply imbedded in American agriculture.  The study committee found no alternative 
system of administration of farm programs which has the support of farmers.”77 
Conclusion 
 
 The administrative politics of the successor agencies of the AAA, the 
Production and Marketing and Administration and the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation service, sheds light on the problems associated with regulatory 
governance and the democratic process.  There are significant advantages to such a 
system, but also important conflicts of interest and losses of program efficiency and 
efficacy.   Democratized administration of farm regulatory programs provides a 
mechanism for using local knowledge and networks that might otherwise be 
inaccessible to administrators more removed from farm communities.  County 
committees were able to apply federal farm regulations to their communities in a 
manner that best fit local circumstances.  They chose conservation measures that suited 
local soil and weather conditions.  Local committeemen were on the ground and able to 
respond to individual disputes and to problems affecting everyone in their community, 
such as weather-related disasters, that required flexibility and discretion in applying the 
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rules to particular circumstances.  Local committees could also investigate accusations of 
fraud or other wrong-doing efficiently and with knowledge of the actors involved and 
the context of the dispute.  
 Additionally, locally driven and participatory administration of farm 
programs created dynamic relationships between farmers and the agency.  Many 
farmers participated in the program as more than clients or beneficiaries of entitlements.  
They became stake holders in the system as a whole, with an interest not only in how 
farm programs benefited or restricted their own individual farming operations, but in 
the strength of the entire program.  When Charles Brannan conceded that the committee 
system was the only politically viable system for regulating American farmer, he was 
not referring to the fraught relationship between the ASC and Congress.  Brannan 
believed that farmers themselves would not submit to such oversight unless they 
themselves directed the implementation of farm programs.   
 This method of program implementation also suffered from 
corresponding draw-backs.  So much local discretion could, successive USDA 
administrations claimed, lead to inconsistency in application.  This was a question of 
fairness across multiple farms and dispersed locales.  It was also a question of overall 
program effectiveness.  The USDA provided parameters within which local offices 
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worked, but officials at the USDA worried that thousands of local adjustments could 
throw the entire program off course. 
 There were also questions about the use of power and it concentration 
among only a few farmers in each community.  When the decisions of local and state 
committees had significant effects on an individual families’ livelihoods, the 
consequences of corruption or the misuse of authority could be serious.   The 
uncertainties surrounding the case of the Hardin family of South Carolina demonstrate 
this problem well.  If they had indeed rented as pastureland a tract that was involved in 
a soil conservation contract, then they did willfully attempt to circumvent the rules and 
accepted conservation payments from the government under false pretenses.  When 
their actions came to light, they were aided by two local committeemen who conducted 
the initial investigation and cleared the Hardins of wrong-doing.  If the grazing was 
truly accidental, as the Hardins maintained, they were victims of the county chairman’s 
dislike.  The chairman, in turn, used the State Committee to carry out a personal agenda.  
Neither scenario was an example of good governance.  Both provide arguments against 
farmer-administered regulation of their own industry.  Greater control over 
implementation by a more centralized authority could mitigate conflicts or abuses of this 
type.  But Benson’s own rules had not prevented the Hardin’s quandary.  Managers 
alone – as Freeman’s committee observed – were not strong enough to fully supervise, 
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let alone usurp, the committee’s work.  Committees acting on their own prerogatives 
seemed the nature of the beast for this kind of administration. 
The USDA’s largest and most politically influential department was strongly 
rooted in local communities, even in local party politics.  Few institutions of the federal 
government had the extensive reach into so many individual’s lives, unmediated by 
state governments, that the PMA and ASC enjoyed.  Even the Extension Service 
depended in part on state and county governments for funding, facilities, and personnel 
approval.  As a result even the centralizers like Benson, who did not celebrate the New 
Deal’s economic democracy, understood that abolishing the committee system was 
practically impossible if American farmers were to accept the ASC’s authority.  But 
defenders of the system in Washington overstated the ASC’s committees’ claim to truly 
grassroots action.  They were, unmistakably, federal instrumentalities, not organic and 
purely local institutions.  Their investment in the idea of the farmer committees 
prevented them from engaging with the committee system’s problems as an exercise of 
democracy or as tools for administration.  In North Carolina, administrators closer to the 
ground struggled with the political and administrative challenges of the 1950s and 
devised their own solutions. 
 
 183 
 
Chapter 4:  “The Challenge” 
The Cooperative Agricultural Extension Service was the hub of the federal farm 
agency wheel in rural American.  This educational agency with roots in the Progressive 
Era had an institutional presence in every farm county in the country.  We have seen 
how Extension service personnel and offices provided the necessary structure and 
administrative support to implement the Agricultural Adjustment Act in early days of 
the New Deal.  Even as the AAA and other federal farm agencies like the Farmers Home 
Administration developed their own administrative structures, they continued to rely 
on the Extension Service’s network of personnel and its relationships within the farm 
community in order to successfully conduct their work.   
Beyond administrative logistics, the Extension approach to agricultural work 
informed the underlying assumptions on which other federal farm agencies based their 
policies and implementation.  The thoroughness with which the Extension service was 
integrated into the work of all local level federal farm agencies provided some Extension 
personnel with a unique and compelling opportunity for leadership among the federal 
farm agencies in their state.  This was particularly true in North Carolina in the 1950s, 
where the state Extension director engaged in an expansive and successful project of 
bureaucratic entrepreneurialism that coordinated the various farm agencies in the state 
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to pursue progressive, commercial farming as the primary mode of agricultural 
production. 
David Weaver led the North Carolina Extension service from 1950 to 1962.  He 
excelled as an administrator and leader among other farm agency officials.  He imbued 
the implementation of farm programs in the state with his brand of progressive farming 
philosophy that made North Carolina a model for farm program implementation nation-
wide.  He organized and streamlined federal program implementation in the state, 
helping agency leadership and local personnel to understand each other’s job and to 
work together toward common goals. During Weaver’s tenure as State Director of the 
Extension Service he identified and addressed the challenges to developing and 
implementing farm programs in the United States where policies and administrative 
structures were fractured and decentralized.  Weaver’s success achieving coordination 
in North Carolina demonstrated the impact of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in such a 
disjointed policy context.   
Weaver’s accomplishments stemmed from his institutional position and his 
personal and profession networks. As the Director of the North Carolina Extension 
Service, he exercised considerable influence over the direction of farm programs in the 
state.  Although the Extension Service’s personnel and projects were ubiquitous in rural 
North Carolina, the agency had no rule-making or enforcement authority.  Weaver 
understood that the Extension Service was vital to the functions of all other federal farm 
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agencies at the local level.  Weaver leveraged Extension resources and his own extensive 
network among farm agency workers, forged as a teacher and long-time Extension 
worker to facilitate communication among disconnected officials.  He was the driving 
force behind the North Carolina Board of Farm Agencies and Organizations, a group of 
farm leaders, agency directors, and state government officials to cooperate in defining 
and implementing share policy goals. 
Weaver’s vision for commercial agriculture and rural development was limited 
as was his realm of entrepreneurial action.  He did not seek to reimagine federal farm 
policies in order to create programs that were better suited to the needs of small or 
struggling famers.  Instead, his goal was to make existing programs work more 
efficiently toward their existing goals, to speed their efforts toward creating a strong, 
concentrated commercial agriculture sector in North Carolina.  Weaver and his 
colleagues hoped to spark an Extension-centered social movement that would entice 
small and part-time farmers into the progressive farming fold.  While successful in 
better-organizing the administrative and political efforts of the various farm programs 
in North Carolina, Weaver’s initiatives did not help the Extension Service or any other 
farm agency to aid farmers and farm workers who did not make the transition into full-
time commercial farming. 
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Centrality of Extension 
The North Carolina Extension Service changed leadership in 1950. Retiring 
director, I.O. Schaub, had steered the course of the Extension Service and the NC State 
College School of Agriculture for over twenty five years. He took office as Director of 
Extension in 1924, and during that time had also served as Dean of the School of 
Agriculture, and Director of Research.  Schaub was well respected within the national 
Extension Service and the general farm organizations, and he was a frequent advisor to 
North Carolina’s congressional delegation on questions of farm legislation.1  Schaub was 
a North Carolina institution unto himself, and even after leaving office, he remained 
vocal about questions of farm policy and economics, a living source of reference for 
politicians, scholars, and Extension officials.2 
David Weaver, Schaub’s successor, was a native of Ohio, but he spent his entire 
career in North Carolina.  After serving as a World War I infantryman and graduating 
from Ohio State, he moved to North Carolina in 1923 to pursue a master’s degree at NC 
State.  Weaver became North Carolina’s first Extension worker in the field of 
agricultural engineering, and the chair of the college’s Department of Agricultural 
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Engineering. Weaver became the assistant state director of the North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service in 1948, and succeeded Schaub as director in 1950.3   
 
Figure 7:  David Weaver, Center, Receiving the Distinguished Service to 
Agriculture Award, Presented by A.C. Edwards, Executive Vice President of the North 
Carolina Farm Bureau, Mrs. Weaver at right. 4 
Reflecting his training as an engineer, Weaver believed in the benefit of 
agricultural modernization and industrialization.  He believed modernized agriculture 
was necessary for the economic development of North Carolina, and the United States in 
general.  A devout Presbyterian with a conservative worldview, he frequently used his 
speeches to relate a tale of mankind’s march of progress from the time when nomadic 
                                                     
3 “David Stathem Weaver, June 19, 1896 – November 12, 1966,” North Carolina Agricultural Hall of Fame 
Inductees, NCDA&CS Public Affairs Division,< http://www.ncagr.gov/paffairs/aghall/weaver.htm> (July 
2, 2012).  
4 “David S. Weaver, Agricultural Extension Service Director,” 1958, Item number 000735, Special 
Collections Research Center, North Carolina State University Libraries, Raleigh, North Carolina.  Used 
with permission. 
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tribes first settled into agriculturally based-villages, advancing inevitability to the 
modernist vision of industrialized agriculture advocated by Extension in the 1950s.5  In 
the Jeffersonian tradition, he linked the strength of the American farm sector to the 
strength of American democracy and he believed that a healthy American farm sector 
was of crucial importance in the Cold War context.  Weaver theorized that surplus 
agricultural production in the United States could be used to promote peace and 
democracy abroad.  “One of the ways in which we can win people to our democratic 
way of life to is to show that this way of life has produced more for everyone than any 
other system developed by mankind in its centuries of history.”6  He suggested that 
trading agricultural commodities for other strategic resources and sharing surplus 
commodities as part of a program of humanitarian aid would help accomplish this 
task. 7 
Weaver espoused the Extension orthodoxy of the 1950s, that of the positive 
power of education, mechanization, and commercial agriculture to shape farming 
operations and improving rural social life.  He strongly believed in the unique position 
farmers occupied in American society as individual economic and social actors and as a 
                                                     
5 David S. Weaver, “Agricultural Prosperity Depends on the Development of Local Leadership,” Box 3, 
Folder 1, Professional Speeches 1952-1956,” David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, 
NCSU. 
6 David Weaver to Ann Prichard, Jan 19, 1956, Box 14, Folder “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
7 David Weaver to Ann Prichard, Jan 19, 1956, Box 14, Folder “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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meritorious interest group.  In 1952, Weaver made the case for federal support for 
agriculture, and for farmers as a deserving special interest group, in an address to the 
Carteret County Farm Bureau annual meeting.  On a local radio broadcast, the county 
Extension agent summarized Weaver’s remarks.  According to the agent, Weaver had 
explained that “Agriculture was the first group to apply what is referred to as the 
pressure system in Congress to obtain favorable laws.  Since we are in the minority 
group today, we must meet, plan our own programs on a County, State, and National 
basis.  We must, through united effort fight hard to get laws passed to protect our 
interest, in order that our small segment might obtain our rightful share of the national 
income.”8  Weaver believed that farmers had to work together in order to achieve any 
advantage in the market place, having “passed the benefits of advancing technology on 
to his customers.”9  The answer, Weaver believed was parity-based farm supports and a 
well-organized farm sector.  “No longer can the individual farm family make very much 
progress by itself – it must learn to work with other farm families for the benefit of the 
group.  Group action always requires leadership, and it is to leadership that we must 
                                                     
8R. M. Williams,  “Radio Broadcast – R. M. Williams, County Farm Agent, Tuesday, Nov. 11, 1952,” Box 
8, Folder “Co. Agents, 1952,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director 
Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
9 David S. Weaver, “Agricultural Prosperity Depends on the Development of Local Leadership,” Box 3, 
Folder “1, Professional Speeches 1952-1956,” David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, 
NCSU. 
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look for agricultural prosperity.”10  That leadership should come from within the farm 
community, and also from within the Extension Service itself.11   
 Weaver directed an agency with a large local footprint and a multiplicity 
of duties.  In addition to the research, education, and demonstration functions that 
formed the heart of its mission, the Extension service worked closely with all other 
federal and state farm agencies in the county and state level.  The county agents in the 
south served as ex officio members of the PMA/ASC committees, and Extension officials 
worked closely with the committees and office staff to publicize upcoming committee 
elections and policy referenda and encourage voter turnout.12  The Soil Conservation 
Service worked with the PMA/ASC to implement conservation measures through their 
programs and with the Extension Service to demonstrate their methods and instruct 
farmers in conducting them.  All of these federal entities had some local presence in 
farm counties.  Add to this mix the state departments of agriculture and the land grant 
colleges, as well as federal grading and inspection services and research stations, and 
                                                     
10 David S. Weaver, “Agricultural Prosperity Depends on the Development of Local Leadership,” Box 3, 
Folder “1, Professional Speeches 1952-1956,” David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, 
NCSU. 
11 David S. Weaver, “Agricultural Prosperity Depends on the Development of Local Leadership,” Box 3, 
Folder “1, Professional Speeches 1952-1956,” David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, 
NCSU. 
12 M.L. Wilson to David Weaver, June 26, 1952, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU; "The Wheat 
Referendum . . .," (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Agriculture, July, 1953), Box 8, Folder “Co. 
Agents, 1953,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, 
NCSU; David S. Weaver to All County Agents, July 23, 1953, North Carolina Cooperative Extension 
Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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farm agency workers were thick on the ground in rural America.  All of these 
entities relied upon Extension Service knowledge or resources in some way.   
This central position among farm agencies provided the Extension Service, and 
its leaders, with a greater degree of power over farm program implementation than the 
ostensibly educative organization had been designed to possess – more, even, than the 
Extension Service claimed for itself when describing its functions to outsiders.  The 
agency became a de facto regulator.  The Extension Service set no rules and had no 
enforcement powers, but county and home demonstration agents were the eyes and ears 
of other federal agencies on the ground.  We have already seen how Extension agents 
helped with voter turnout and education.  In addition, agents’ judgments about an 
individual farmers’ commitment to progressive farming carried weight with the 
PMA/ASC when assigning allotments and quotas, and with the FHA, which deployed 
Extension agents to observe supervised credit customers.  Figure 8 is an organizational 
chart from the early 1940s, demonstrating only the organizational structure of the 
Agricultural Adjustment program.  It illustrates the centrality of the Extension service’s 
work to the AAA, including the advisory and administrative work provided by the state 
Extension office and the local duties of the County Agent, along with the various 
committees and Extension and Agricultural Adjustment commodity specialists.  
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Organizational charts of other local programs with local offices would show similar 
linkages. 
s  
Figure 8: Organization of Agricultural Adjustment in North Carolina circa. 
1940s12 
he cooperation between the FHA and the Extension service serves as a telling 
example of the FHA’s informal regulatory power and the degree to which other farm 
agencies relied upon the Extension Service to aid in policy development and to complete 
FHA work on the ground.  In 1949, the State Director of the North Carolina FHA, J.B. 
                                                     
1 “Organization – Agricultural Adjustment Program in North Carolina,” n.d. Box 1, Folder 10, UA102.005, 
Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina State University Libraries, Raleigh, North Carolina.  
Used with permission. 
 
 193 
 
Slack, reached out to I.O. Schaub, requesting the Extension expertise on FHA policy 
matters. Slack wished to know if Extension officials concurred with the long-range 
income projections that the FHA used when considering loan applications.  They relied 
on estimates of future commodity prices and sought Extension assurances that the 
forecasts they were using were “reasonable.”  Second, Slack wanted advice from Schaub 
on how the FHA could better serve low-income farmers in North Carolina.  Third, and 
with great emphasis, Slack wanted suggestions for how to improve cooperation among 
all federal agencies in the state.  He requested that the Extension Service “point out to us 
any instances of lack of cooperation and coordination of the representatives of this 
Agency with other agricultural agencies, and suggestions as to how better coordination 
and cooperation can be brought about between this and other agricultural agencies in 
this State.”  Slack especially wished to improve relationships between FHA and 
Extension personnel.3 
Good relationships between local Extension and FHA officials were essential to 
the FHA.  The agency had a county committee system similar to that of the PMA/ASC, 
but in the 1950s it still lacked an extensive staff of administrative personnel.  This made 
it difficult for the FHA to practice supervised credit.  The agency monitored the activities 
of borrowers to ensure that they managed their farms and homes in a manner likely to 
                                                     
3 J. B. Slack to I.O. Schaub, February 3, 1949, Box 10, Folder “Farmers Home Administration,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  
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enable them to repay their loans.  FHA relied on Extension Agents to educate these 
borrowers on progressive farming and scientific homemaking and to keep the FHA 
informed of their progress.  “In order to render more and better service to farm families 
who are using the loan facilities of the Farmers Home Administration,” a 1954 document 
circulated among North Carolina’s Extension and Home Demonstration agents 
informed agents, “it has been mutually agreed that the Farmers Home Administration 
and Federal Extension Service will work closely together for the purpose of rendering 
maximum assistance to such families in producing and conserving food . . ., protecting 
their health, improving their homes, educating their children, and participating in 
community activities.”4  
Officials laid out three specific goals for the cooperation between FHA and the 
Extension Service.  The first was that FHA families would have access to all Extension 
programs.  Women were the particular targets of this policy, for the agreement stressed 
that “special effort will be made to see that the homemakers of Farmers Home 
Administration Borrowers participate fully in homemakers’ clubs and other Extension 
activities.”  The second objective was to intervene in many aspects of home making and 
child-rearing.  Extension service officials were to “work closely with officials of the 
                                                     
4 David S. Weaver to All County Farm and Home Agents, “Joint Statement of Policy Between Federal 
Extension Service and Farmers Home Administration,” March 10, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, 
Jan-June, 1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-
2010, NCSU. 
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Farmers Home Administration in family living matters, such as protecting and 
improving health conditions, production and conservation of food, family living 
budgets, home improvement, child care and other related matters.”  Finally, Extension 
officials and the FHA would work together to assist struggling families within the 
bounds of these agencies’ locally available resources.5  David Weaver found nothing 
extraordinary in these instructions, for he assured his county agents that “I believe we 
are already working together on a fine basis in North Carolina, and trust that we will 
continue to do so.”6   
 In practical terms, all of this cooperation between agencies could bring 
difficulties as well as advantages, especially when offices competed for scarce resources.  
Joint meetings of various farm agencies required intricate determinations of which 
personnel could attend, how they would be compensated and by whom, whose car they 
would drive, and who would pay for meals. Discussions about the use and abuse of 
local agency franking privileges in disseminating information and conducting shared 
business filled reams of correspondence.  County offices jealously guarded their 
resources and their policy making territory, even if they were glad for assistance in 
                                                     
5 David S. Weaver to All County Farm and Home Agents, “Joint Statement of Policy Between Federal 
Extension Service and Farmers Home Administration,” March 10, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, 
Jan-June, 1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-
2010, NCSU. 
6 David S. Weaver to All County Farm and Home Agents, “Joint Statement of Policy Between Federal 
Extension Service and Farmers Home Administration,” March 10, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, 
Jan-June, 1954,” NCSU University. 
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implementation.  They could not conduct their work without mutual support.  Each 
agency relied on the others’ information, personnel, and relationships to accomplish its 
individual duties.7  David Weaver believed that this cooperation was poorly managed, 
and that farm agencies were too competitive, and understood each other’s work too 
little, for effective implementation of the farm program as a unified whole. He wrote to 
Undersecretary of Agriculture, True Morse, that “the farmer is not particularly 
interested in which agency serves him, but he is distinctly interested in being adequately 
served. There is too much work for all of us to do to be wasting time arguing who is to 
do it or who is to get credit for it.”8 
Inter-agency discord could arise from misinformation as much as competition.  A 
May, 1950, meeting of personnel of the P.M.A., Soil Conservation Service, and the 
Forestry Service was the scene of one such incident.  In the context of a discussion about 
“a long-rang agricultural program,” someone repeated incorrect information that the 
Haywood County, North Carolina, Extension office did not have community 
development program, unlike many of its neighbors.  Haywood’s representative at this 
                                                     
7 “Some Facts about Cotton for 1954,” Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, July 1- Dec. 31, 1953,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU; David S. 
Weaver to All County Agents, November 25, 1953, “Circular Letters, July 1- Dec. 31, 1953,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU; “Loans for 
Soil and Water Conservation,” Box 8, Folder “Co. Agents, 1954,” “Circular Letters, July 1- Dec. 31, 
1953,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
8 David S. Weaver to True Morse, April 24, 1957, Box 2975, Folder “General Correspondence, 1906-76, 
Meetings 4-4 Under Secretary June 1-June 31, 1957,” RG 16, NARA. 
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meeting vehemently corrected this information, and reported the discussion to the 
Extension officials of Haywood County.  They reacted with alarm.  The County Agent 
and Home Demonstration agent co-authored a letter to the official believed to be the 
source of the bad information, and sent copies to I.O. Schaub.  They employed a tone 
unusually emphatic for Extension correspondence.  “Here is the point we would like to 
get across:  It seems to us it is hard enough for Extension workers to keep their own 
program going, without having other agencies coming in to tell us that we don’t have a 
good program underway.”  They requested that the official correct his statement with 
any representatives of other agencies to whom he might have spoken.  “We would 
appreciate this very much, for it is a little embarrassing when people from Raleigh come 
up and say that they have been informed that we don’t even have an agricultural 
program, with the idea in mind of helping us set up one.”  They ended the letter with a 
polite invitation and subtle reminder to be better informed about local Extension 
programs before discussing them.  “Come to see us some time.”9 
This was exactly the kind of conflict that Weaver believed was undermining the 
success of federal farm programs in North Carolina.  “It seems to me that some of the 
confusion and lack of coordination on the part of the many agricultural agencies was 
somewhat understandable in the early days following the formation of these agencies.  It 
                                                     
9 W.A. Corpening and Mary Cromwell to F.S. Sloan, May 15, 1950, Box 6, Folder “C, 1948-1950,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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is indeed gratifying to know, however, that in the majority of these cases and places, the 
intervening years have seen the removal of a lot of this confusion.  There are a few spots, 
however, particularly where personal wrongs were involved to the extent that it seemed 
impossible to ‘forgive and forget’[,] that further coordination and cooperation is 
necessary.”10  Weaver consistently sought to address the disjointed nature of the farm 
agencies and what he felt was a misplaced sense of competition or territoriality between 
them.  In his view, while individual agencies had different realms of responsibility 
emanating from Washington and from state capitals, on the local level, only coordinated 
action could achieve the goals of modern, progressive agriculture he and other like-
minded policy makers hoped to achieve.  This lack of cross-agency coordination 
provided an opportunity for organizational innovation. 
Entrepreneurial Solutions 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurship is a skill and a practice of innovative 
administrators in autonomous public agencies whose work expands the duties and 
authority of a department by developing with new programs or experimenting with 
new ways to implement, expand, or organize existing programs.  These innovations 
arise when individual bureaucrats’ respond to a public need or an internal 
                                                     
10 David Weaver to Clarence Poe, November 3, 1950, Box 14, Folder “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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administrative challenge.  Bureaucratic entrepreneurs often hail from the “middle 
management” of government institutions.  They are the department and bureau heads 
with long careers in their agency, who possess both the knowledge and the reputation to 
effect changes in their institution, even (or especially) when those changes are not 
necessarily the preference of their superiors at the upper level of an agency or of 
Congress.  Successful bureaucratic entrepreneurs are most often found in autonomous 
agencies and departments, and who can tap extensive and varied networks in order to 
build political support for their innovations.11 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurship thrived in the Progressive Era in the United 
States, especially in the USDA.12  In the USDA’s Bureau of Chemistry, chief chemist 
Harvey Wiley was a crusader against the adulteration of food and drugs, and his efforts 
were instrumental in the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  This act 
expanded the authority of the Bureau of Chemistry to test and verify the safety and 
accuracy of product labels.  The contemporaneous leaders of the Plant Science and 
Forestry Service branches of the USDA were also successful bureaucratic entrepreneurs.  
                                                     
11 Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:  Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2001), 30.  Carpenter 
defines bureaucratic entrepreneurship as “the process by which agency leaders experiment with new 
programs and introduce innovations to existing programs and gradually convinced diverse coalitions or 
organized interest, the media, and politicians of the value of their ideas and their bureaus.”  The process 
consists of incremental program development and the and the building of “network-based” coalitions. 
12 Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy; Clayton Coppin, “James Wilson and Harvey Wiley:  
The Dilemma of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship,” Agricultural History, 64:2 (Spring 1990): 167-181. 
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The Extension Service was itself a product of this kind of innovation.  Seaman Knapp 
began to stage public demonstrations in order to instruct farmers on the methods and 
technological advances emanating from land grant colleges and experiment stations.  
The demonstration method championed by Knapp prevailed over competing 
alternatives, and garnered the support of Southern farm interests in particular, to 
become the model for USDA farmer education.  The first USDA county agents were 
appointed in 1906, and these agents established Boys’ Corn Clubs and Girls’  Tomato 
Clubs, forerunners of 4-H,  that taught scientific farming and home making skills to farm 
children.  The 1914 Smith-Lever Act formalized this system and provided funds and an 
organizational structure for the newly-created Cooperative Agricultural Extension 
Service.13 
The USDA emerged from the New Deal and Second World War as a complex 
and extensive regulatory agency for American agriculture, but with an almost 
incomprehensible internal structure, shaped by political compromises that at translated 
poorly into institutional logics.  The programs that survived the political turmoil and 
wartime repurposing emerged into the post-war world with similar commitment to 
progressive commercial farming and economic liberalism in the agricultural economy. 
Their implementing structures were in chaos, dependent on each other’s resources but 
                                                     
13 Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 242-251. 
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largely unknown to each other in the details of their work.  Congress and the Truman 
administration battled over the long-term direction that federal farm programs would 
take, those who implemented existing programs faced persistent administrative 
problems. This situation called for a different kind of bureaucratic entrepreneurship 
than that which revolutionized the USDA in the Progressive Era. 
Scholars of public administration observe two kinds of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship, “heroic” or “individual” entrepreneurship and “systemic” 
entrepreneurship.  Individual bureaucratic entrepreneurs, such as Wiley, emerge most 
often in new organizations or when established institutions take on new duties or new 
activities.  These individuals may seek to increase the power of the organization vis-à-vis 
other established public institutions, and related functions already established with the 
organization are relatively low in complexity.  Systemic entrepreneurship emerges from 
a different institutional context.  These organizations are well-established and mature, 
and their functions are often very complex.  Rather than forming entirely new 
organizational structures, as Knapp did in forming the Extension Service, systemic 
entrepreneurs seek to change the way existing organizations function, pursuing 
“incremental, process-based innovations.”  In such cases, the entrepreneur must have 
sufficient “influence and credibility,” within the organization and with outside official in 
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order be trusted to follow his or her entrepreneurial instincts and to bring colleagues on 
board.14  
The latter conditions described the USDA of the early 1950s well, and David 
Weaver was a skillful systemic bureaucratic entrepreneur.  North Carolina had nearly 
the smallest average farm size in the South in 1950. Weaver blamed North Carolina’s 
failure to develop a strong and concentrated commercial farming sector on disorganized 
and poorly coordinated program implementation across the many farm agencies that 
operated in the state.  Dedicated to addressing this problem, Weaver spearheaded the 
founding of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and Agencies (NCBFOA).  
The impetus for forming the NCBFOA seems to have emerged from a special gathering 
of state farm agency leaders in early 1951.  The meeting took place at the urging from 
Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan in order to evaluate the degree and quality of 
cooperation among federal farm agencies in the individual states.  Weaver believed this 
to be “the first time that the supervisors of all agencies have gotten together in one 
meeting for a discussion of mutual problems” in North Carolina.15  Weaver and other 
meeting goers saw potential value in continuing their dialog.  The supervisors 
                                                     
14 Luc Bernier and Taȉeb Hafsi, “The Changing Nature of Public Entrepreneurship,” Public Administration 
Review, 67:3 (May-Jun. 2007):  495-497. 
15 David Weaver to M.L. Wilson, March 19, 1951, folder Wilson, M.L., Box 19, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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adjourned the meeting with a plan to convene again, holding gatherings across the state 
and to assess the cooperation of agencies at the county level.16    
State-level administrators of the federal agencies, representatives from the NC 
Department of Agriculture, and the state leaders of the general farm organizations soon 
formed the NCBFOA to coordinate these efforts.  Their mission was to promote a greater 
awareness and understanding of state and federal farm programs by rural people.  “To 
this end,” the charter declared, “the Board will use its efforts to coordinate the work of 
all agricultural agencies and farm organizations to make the overall farm program in the 
State as complete [and] effective as possible.”17 Further, Weaver explained to M.L. 
Wilson, then the national Director of Extension, that the Board’s flagship program aimed 
to increase farm incomes and the security of North Carolina’s farmers, improve 
educational opportunities, promote “finer spiritual values” and stronger community 
life, and promote the “dignity and contentment of rural living.”18 
                                                     
16 David Weaver to M.L. Wilson, March 19, 1951, folder Wilson, M.L., Box 19, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
17 North Carolina Board of Farm Agencies and Organizations, “Charter,” Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the 
Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and Agencies, 1956-1959,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  The board 
consisted of the heads of :  NC Farm Bureau, State Grange, NC Experiment Station, NC Extension Service, 
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18 David S. Weaver, “The Challenge – Teamwork Approach to Agricultural Problems in North Carolina,”, 
p. 1, Box 1, Folder 6 “Professional Speeches 1952-1956,” David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-
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 Weaver’s influence contributed significantly to the NCBOFA’s embrace of an 
ambitious agenda.  To M.L. Wilson, he explained that his network of connections 
throughout all farm agencies in the state allowed him to advocate strongly for the 
development of the NCBFOA and to achieve the buy-in from district and county level 
officials necessary to implement his vision.  His connections stemmed from his own 
education at NC State College and from his years as a faculty member and Extension 
official.  “From the comments which I have had from our own agents and from the 
county representatives of other agencies with whom I have had a long continued 
friendship, starting with their student days here, has indicated a very healthy attitude” 
toward the Board’s work.  Weaver expressed his pride in having taught “the majority of 
the county agents, assistants, vocational agriculture teachers and technical workers in 
several other agencies.”  These relationships had “been of great assistance in establishing 
confidence in our work here.”19  Furthermore, Weaver avoided taking parting in the 
political turmoil that characterized the USDA throughout the 1950s.  He expressed his 
agreement with the parity principle, but avoided taking sides on the percent of parity 
                                                     
19 David Weaver to M.L. Wilson, March 19, 1951, Folder “Wilson, M.L.,” Box 19, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  Weaver claims to have 
“taken the lead here in North Carolina in attempting to weld the work of the agricultural agencies into one 
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question and does not seem to have made any official statement about the 
reorganization of the PMA.20 
David Weaver combined the ideology of an Extension true believer, the 
resources of a skilled and well-connected bureaucrat, and the political un-impeachability 
necessary to lead North Carolina’s farm agency personnel – from all government 
organization, state and federal – in a coordinated effort to implement a broad policy 
vision for agricultural modernization in the state.  His official position in the NCBFOA 
in the 1950s demonstrates his influence.  During the 1950s, he declined to serve as chair, 
but he found himself the “perennial choice” for the post of vice-chair, providing 
consistent direction from near the top of the organization, while others rotated in and 
out of the chairmanship.21  The strength of Weaver’s personality, his reputation, and his 
consistent leadership would keep the Board active throughout the 1950s.22 
The efforts of the Board point to the difficulties administering multiple farm 
programs.  Weaver believed that federal farm programs were most effective when 
                                                     
20 I have not found anything in the archive to indicate Weaver’s party affiliation.  Weaver appears to have 
been very serious about keeping his political opinions (in regard to party politics) entirely private. 
21 David Weaver to R. W. Shoffner and C.B. Ratchford, 1-14-1957, p. 2, Box 19, Folder D. S. Weaver, 
1956-1958, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, 
NCSU;  David S. Weaver to Horace D. Godfrey, March 7, 1957, Box 19, Folder “D.S. Weaver 1956-
1958,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  
Weaver’s primary reason for declining to serve as chair was that he believed it conflicted with his duties as 
Extension Director to implement the Challenge Program, discussed below. 
22 The Board lasted until 1974 at least, but based on archival meeting minutes, the board was most active 
while Weaver was involved.  Weaver retired as Extension director in 1961 and died in 1966. 
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understood as a single entity, a “total farm program,” and administered as such.  Acting 
on this belief, the Board planned to undertake an extensive program for inter-agency 
cooperation at the state and county level in North Carolina.  The Board immediately 
launched a state-wide initiative that became known as “The Challenge.”  Announcing 
that “North Carolina Accepts the Challenge Through a United Agricultural Program,” 
the NCBOFA organized the state into “Challenge” districts to coordinate the actions of 
county officials and to direct local-level efforts at community improvement and farm 
income development.  Weaver explained that the NCBFOA used The Challenge to 
“weld the work of the agricultural agencies into one united farm program” wherein all 
agricultural workers worked toward common goals.” Disjointed program 
administration was not unique to North Carolina, but the state’s response was. Federal 
Extension director, M.L. Wilson, lauded the NCBFOA’s goals. In 1952 he went before a 
potentially hostile House Appropriations committee armed with a copy of “North 
Carolina Accepts the Challenge Through a United Agricultural Program,” the mission 
statement of The Challenge.  “I desired to show it to the Committee in case they raised a 
question or gave me an opportunity to show how State agencies can work together in a 
cooperative manner for the benefit of all,” he wrote to Weaver.23  
                                                     
23 M.L. Wilson to David Weaver, February 29, 1952, Box 19, Folder, “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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Where the referendum and committee systems emphasized democratic – if 
imperfectly so – solutions to the problems of agricultural organization and program 
administration, the NCBOFA was, at one level, a bureaucratic attempt to extract some 
unified and manageable agenda from the institutional chaos that was the USDA.  
Weaver believed strongly in the symbolism of the referendum, but he did not look to 
citizen-administrators to straighten out the mess that was North Carolina’s farm 
programs.  Instead, he worked to build and strengthen networks among his professional 
peers.  Quarterly, the NCBFOA met for dinner in Raleigh.  Regular board members, 
along with NCDA officials, representatives from the Governor’s office (and at least one, 
the governor himself), and a shifting cast of other lower level North Carolina officials, 
visiting officials from other states, journalists, businessmen, and bankers all frequented 
these meetings.  Here they discussed policy questions and highlighted the actions and 
accomplishments of individual agencies.  They also discussed the generally accepted 
outlines of North Carolina’s farm problem:  the prevalence of small farms and the low 
incomes that such farms earned, the need for greater agricultural diversity in the state, 
and the general need to increase the state’s competitive position relative to other farm 
states.24 
                                                     
24 See 1950s minutes of the NCBOFA, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the 
Director Records, 1914-2010, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of 
Farm Organizations and Agencies, 1956-1959,” NCSU. 
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The 1951 meeting of state level supervisors concluded that while “on the state 
level we have had very fine relationships in the past,” but unfortunately “this same 
excellent coordination was not evidenced in all of our counties.”25 In order to facilitate 
improved county-level coordination, the NCBOFA created Challenge committees, a 
structure that mirrored that of the PMA committee system and Extension Advisory 
committee system at the county and state level.  Farmers were to form community 
councils for cooperative action to address specific local problems, while all paid 
agricultural workers (including the PMA committeemen) and other individuals such as 
bankers, farm supply and equipment retailers, and farm organizations formed the 
County Agricultural Councils, one step above the community councils.  The County 
Steering committee, comprised of a single representative of all federal agencies in the 
county, the chairs of the community councils, and the farm and home extension agents 
served as the link between the community level organizations and the NCBFOA.26   
Bureaucratic coordination was an important goal of the Challenge, but Weaver 
and other organizers never intended for the program to be restricted only to internal 
institutional concerns.  They did not consider the harmonization of program work to 
ease bureaucratic entanglements and conflicts to be the only goal.  This coordination was 
                                                     
25 David Weaver to M.L. Wilson, March 19, 1951, Folder “Wilson, M.L.,” Box 19, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
26 “Suggested Operating Report of the Challenge Program,” Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, July - Dec, 
1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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instead as a means toward the modernization of North Carolina’s farming sector. 
Weaver dreamed of a grassroots movement for rural modernization and standard-of-
living improvement guided and nurtured by the Challenge.  He hoped that the 
community councils and aggressive promotion of Challenge initiatives by county farm 
agency officials and the local press would make “The Challenge” a household phrase.   
A favorite tool of The Challenge, contests and competition, employed 
participatory methods to encourage farmers to adopt more progressive farming 
methods.  The Extension Service, in partnership with local newspapers, bankers, and 
chambers of commerce, sponsored production and community improvement contests 
that rewarded participants for record setting yields and the adoption of new 
technologies.  The North Carolina State Fair featured Challenge exhibits form individual 
communities and clubs, and   communities won recognition for collective yield and 
quality gains.27  Local papers such as the Wilson Daily Times sponsored contests in which 
individual farms competed for the most improvement in their income and in the 
condition of their home, and in which communities competed for the best improvement 
of community resources.  In 1953, seventy-seven of the state’s one hundred counties 
competed for the title of “County of the Year in Rural Progress,” in which the top five 
scoring counties received a combined $3,500.00 in awards.  In 1957, The News and 
                                                     
27 Governor’s Office, “The 89th North Carolina State Fair,”  (Raleigh, N.C.:  State of  North Carolina, June 
14, 1956) p. 10.  
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Observer sponsored a farm income contest in which farmers competed to raise their 
incomes in 1957 from their incomes in 1956.  They received points for engaging in new 
enterprises, for increasing their income in established enterprises, and for improving 
their farm and home facilities.  The winners were to be recognized in a special edition of 
the News and Observer and at an award ceremony hosted by the NCBFOA.28 Such 
contests were held annually for the duration of The Challenge, and through this 
mechanism the NCBFOA hoped that the program would “enter into the family and 
personal life of all the people.”  Efforts to win these contests “could be the basis of 
discussion at every dining table in the county.”29   
 
                                                     
28 “Minutes of Meeting of North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and Agencies,” January 27, 1958, 
p. 1, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and 
Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU. 
29 David Weaver, “The Challenge – Teamwork Approach to Agricultural Problems in North Carolina,” p. 
3, David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 6, NCSU.  For a brief 
discussion of The Challenge, see Peter Benson, Tobacco Capitalism:  Growers, Migrant Workers, and the 
Changing Face of Global Industry, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2012):  89.  Benson incorrectly 
states that The Challenge began in 1954 and that it was organized by the “North Carolina state 
government.”  While the NCDA was part of the founding group of the NCBFOA, and the governor’s office 
participated in some meetings, the organization consisted of private organizations and federal agencies as 
well, and it was not primarily an initiative of NC state agencies. 
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Figure 9:  "Making Good tobacco Better," 1953, Exhibit of the type sponsored 
and encouraged by the Challenge Program30 
The Extension Service regarded contests as important teaching tools in which 
prizes and recognition were useful in sparking interest in new methods and convincing 
farmers to put them into use for the first time. Therefore the professional organization of 
Extension Agents admonished its members to “observe caution in promotion contests, 
that emphasis be placed on the education feature of the project involved and not on the 
award. . . . The real value of the contest is lost when the participant enters with the sole 
idea of winning.  Dishonesty may be encouraged and other bad results follow unless the 
                                                     
30 “View of Display titled “Making Good Tobacco Better:  Tobacco the Golden Weed – What it Means for 
N.C.,” 1953, item number 0007574, Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina State University 
Libraries, Raleigh, North Carolina.  Used with permission. 
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educational value of a contest is emphasized above the award that may be received.”31   
Contests were short-term initiatives to jump-start participation and to encourage 
farmers to adopt new practices and to see the results of those practices on their own 
farms.  In this manner the contest was simply another manifestation of the 
demonstration method.   
Nevertheless, contests were not only teaching tools. They also served the 
purpose of regulating farm behavior.  “Naming and shaming” is a recognized tool of 
government-based and independent regulators, who often use their ability to negatively 
impact a company’s reputation by publicizing violations in order to coax firms into 
compliance.   Naming and shaming might be a group’s only tool, where standards are 
voluntary or the oversight organization’s standing is uncertain.  Extension contests 
operated as the opposite of naming and shaming by showering successful contest 
entrants with approbation and recognition, thus supporting and burnishing their 
reputations.  These reputational gains could result in continued assistance and attention 
from Extension staff and other farm agencies and favorable treatment from creditors 
when applying for new loans.  Winning contests also came with immediate awards, 
often of cash, but sometimes other prizes as well whose value was both real and 
                                                     
31 North Carolina County Agents’ Association, “Ethics for Extension Workers,” p. 2, Box 8, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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symbolic.32 Unable to actually make rules and enforce compliance, the Extension Service 
promoted progressive commercial farming through its relationship with other 
regulatory and credit issuing agencies.  They also used contests, rooted in Extension’s 
demonstration method, to provide monetary and reputational incentives for farmer to 
adopt Extension-sanctioned methods.   
Challenge Met? 
In 1954, the leaders of the NCBOFA began evaluating the progress of The 
Challenge.  They found that they had achieved some success in coordinating the work of 
the different farm agencies in the state.  The “appraisal of the Challenge program to 
date” found that working relations among agency and organization leaders had 
improved since the early 1950s, that lower level agency workers were better informed 
about research, and that those workers had achieved a better “understand[ing] of the 
                                                     
32   There is an academic an popular literature on “naming and shaming” that examines the deterrent or 
disciplinary effectiveness of calling public attention to irresponsible actors or egregious offenders of 
regulations or ethical norms.  This strategy is used in a variety of contexts, including: public naming of 
human rights violators by other governments or non-governmental organizations or mandated public 
disclosure of campaign finance or other lobbying payments or receipts the context of electoral politics. 
Naming and shaming in a regulatory strategy that is often associated with third-party observers (such an a 
environmental NGO that calls attention to violations of pollution laws by corporate firms), or with self-
regulation by industry or trade groups.  Naming and shaming relies on the assumption that regulated firms 
place sufficient value in their reputations and that they would protect those reputations by avoiding 
behaviors that would lead to public naming and shaming.  It also assumes that transparency and public 
scrutiny (“sunlight”) will induce actors to behave more scrupulously than they would if their actions 
occurred in secret.  See for example:  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones:  Naming and 
Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62, no. 4, (October 2008): 
689–716; Ray, Pawson, “Evidence and Policy and Naming and Shaming,” Policy Studies 23, no. 3/4 
(2002): 211–230; The Economist, Intelligence Unit, “Naming and Shaming:  The Fight Against 
Corruption,” The Economist, October 2010: 66. 
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problems and potentials of agriculture and rural life in their respective areas.”33  The 
NCFBOA believed that the greatest results of The Challenge could be seen in the growth 
of farm size and overall production in the state. “A very fine feeling of progressive 
cooperation has been established, which was undoubtedly been a factor in North 
Carolina’s rather unique position of making actual progress in agricultural income when 
the reverse has been true in most of the nation.”34  Average farm income was on the rise 
in North Carolina and so too was the size of the state’s farms.  While many factors 
contributed to the growth of average farm size in the state, the progressive 
agriculturalists of the NCFBOA believed this to be an example of the success of better 
coordinated program implementation. 
A more systematic review of The Challenge in 1957 yielded a more complicated 
picture.  The NCFBOA did not speak with one mind about the purposes of The 
Challenge or its progress toward its goals when the initiative underwent its five year 
review in 1957.  A special committee, comprised of Weaver, along with, Gwyn Price, 
NCBOFA chairman, A.G. Bullard of the Vocational Agricultural Education program, 
and Horace Isenhour of the FHA conducted a study on the “Programs, Organization 
                                                     
33 Challenge Advisory Committee, “Suggested Operating Report of the Challenge Program,” p. 1, Box 6, 
Folder “Circular Letters, July – Dec, 1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the 
Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
34 Gwyn B. Price to The Chairman and Secretary of All County Agricultural Workers’ Councils, Jan. 15, 
1957, Box 6, Folder, “Agr. Ext. Circular Letters, Jan. - June, 1957,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension 
Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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and Management of the Agricultural Extension Service,” in which the committee 
evaluated the impact of The Challenge on the workings of the Extension Service 
specifically.  The committee’s report was critical, and was hotly debated in the 
September, 1957 meeting of the NCBFOA.  Most controversial was the committee’s 
assessment that “though carefully sought for” they “found no evidence that Extension 
Service Programs have in any way [been] re-directed or made effective by the Challenge 
mechanism.”35  A second special committee, appointed to evaluate the findings of the 
review committee, disagreed.  In their assessment, the Extension Service had “speeded 
up progress toward recognized goals.”  This evaluation of the Extension Service under 
the Challenge illuminates the degree to which progressive farming goals informed the 
design and implementation of The Challenge.  The initiative was not intended to change 
the structures or the goals of the farm agencies, only to make them work more efficiently 
toward the already established goal of promoting commercial agriculture in the state. 
A second critique by the NCBFOA committee on Extension work illuminated 
more subtle but still significant weakness of The Challenge.  Both the study committee, 
and the committee on the report agreed that “there is a wide difference of opinion on 
what the Challenge is.  There is also misunderstanding concerning the relation of each 
                                                     
35 “Minutes of the Meeting of North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and Agricultural Agencies,” p. 
2, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and 
Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU 
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agency and organization to the Challenge.”  This seemed particularly true at the county 
level, and the NCBFOA recommended more training for  personnel.  This assessment 
was disappointing to Weaver, who believed that “unification at the top level was not 
enough.  Many of the agencies had district and county level personnel.  One of the 
challenges of the ‘Challenge’ appears to be the welding together of all interests at all 
levels to carry out the program.”36  But five years into the program, The Challenge had 
been most successful in creating a coalition of elites – state-level federal agency 
directors, state government officials, college administrators, and the press – but the rank 
and file agency workers remained puzzled about how The Challenge was supposed to 
affect their day to day work. 
The NCBOFA and the Challenge proved most effective when responding to 
specific problems of program implementation.  One such response, in 1957, 
demonstrated the capacity of the Board to engender a multi-agency response to a 
complex administrative problem in the ASC.  The ASC, like the PMA and AAA before it, 
employed temporary workers each spring and early summer to measure the area of 
regulated crops planted by individual farmers to determine if plantings complied with 
the restrictions of their allotments.  In response to widespread concerns about the 
accuracy of these measurements, the Board appointed a committee of its members from 
                                                     
36 David S. Weaver, “The Challenge – Teamwork Approach to Agricultural Problems in North Carolina,” 
[draft] Box 1, Folder 6, David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, NCSU. 
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the ASC and other agencies to study the problem.  Professional surveyors and ASC 
employees measured the same fields, the surveyors “in accordance with standard civil 
engineering practices” and the ASC employees in their usual manner.  Such 
measurements were not simple determinations of the area within a set of boundaries.  
Unplanted spaces inside the area (such as truck rows in tobacco), along with irregularly 
shaped or uncultivable areas, complicated the measurers’ task.37 
The ASC confronted obstacles to conducting these measurements annually.  
High turnover meant that inexperienced and newly trained personnel were asked to 
perform measurements of hundreds of acres across multiple farms with accuracy within 
1/100 of an acre, while operating within budget. 38  The study found that ASC 
measurements were indeed inaccurate, and that without contracting with professional 
surveyors for all allotment measurements, the stipulated 1/100 of an acre accuracy 
requirement was unrealistic.  The committee recommended small changes in method 
and tools would help, but the costs of meeting the regulations, for the agencies, was just 
too high.  In general the study found that ASC land measurements erred on the side of 
                                                     
37 “Presentation Made to the Board of Farm Organizations and Agricultural Agencies,” October 28, 1957, 
p. 1, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and 
Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU 
38 “Presentation Made to the Board of Farm Organizations and Agricultural Agencies,” October 28, 1957, 
p. 1, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and 
Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU 
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the farmer, allowing slightly too large plantings rather than unnecessarily causing 
farmers to reduce their plantings.39  The multi-agency board made policy 
recommendations that would somewhat improve the ASC’s enforcement of allotment 
regulations while easing the concerns of those who worried that mistakes were 
detrimental to farmers.  The NCBFOA also supported the ASC’s request for more funds 
from the USDA to implement the Board’s recommendations.40 
These problems solving efforts at the level of bureaucratic middle-management 
were NCBOFA’s and The Challenge’s real success.  The NCBOFA’s members were those 
who were best able to affect administrative change, and to work together, supporting 
each other in their efforts to achieve support and compliance from below and to exercise 
the discretion granted from above to implement their vision for progressive agriculture 
in the state.  This coalition also allowed agencies, such as the ASC, to legitimate their 
implementation methods against the charges of detractors and to lobby superiors for a 
greater share of available resources.  Weaver’s success as a bureaucratic entrepreneur 
was in leveraging his own network of professional contacts to build this coalition.  From 
                                                     
39 “Presentation Made to the Board of Farm Organizations and Agricultural Agencies,” October 28, 1957, 
pp. 2-4, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations 
and Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU 
40 “Presentation Made to the Board of Farm Organizations and Agricultural Agencies,” October 28, 1957, 
p. 4, Box 14, Binder “Minutes of the Meeting [sic] of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and 
Agencies, 1956-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU 
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his position as vice-chair, he exercised consistent leadership, while articulating an 
expansive vision for an organization whose work was actually most concerned with the 
banal details of bureaucratic practice. 
Weaver’s entrepreneurialism was limited to the specific realm of administrative 
politics.  In other areas he proved conservative and generally willing to comply with the 
status quo. The segregated nature of the Extension Service and land grant college system 
– enormous inefficiency in the delivery of services if ever the was one – went 
unquestioned by Weaver.  He struck a tone of resigned weariness when faced with the 
daily absurdities that accompanied segregation, and which conspired to make 
administration of his department more difficult.  For example, senior Negro Agents, 
based at North Carolina A&T, could not park their cars on the NC State College campus 
when they were required to attend meetings.  Parking tickets and towing on campus so 
plagued these African-American agents that Weaver wrote to the college parking 
authority asking for exceptions to the segregated parking rules on meeting days to 
reduce the time his office spent addressing parking violations.41  If he ever questioned 
the fundamental premise of the segregated Extensions Service, that critique does not 
survive in the archive.  Weaver did not blaze new trails for administrative or social 
reform.  He emphatically believed in the work of the Extension Service and the other 
                                                     
41 cite 
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federal farm agencies as already defined and he hoped to make that work more 
effective.   
Conclusion 
While David Weaver dreamed of a “total farm program” and sought to bring it 
about in North Carolina, the reality of federal farm programs was one of disjuncture and 
decentralization.  Not only were farm regulatory duties splintered and distributed 
within the USDA to various internal agencies, farm programs that regulated production 
levels and subsidized prices, issued credit, and facilitated conservation took place 
through separate legislative acts and under the auspices of multiple USDA agencies.42 
Weaver believed the small average size of North Carolina’s farms relative to other 
Southern state was evidence of the failure of farm agencies to successfully administer 
farm programs and promote progressive agriculture in a coordinated fashion.  He saw a 
need for leadership and moved to fill it.43  The NCBFOA provided a consistent vision of 
government-supported progressive agriculture in North Carolina when leadership was 
lacking from Washington. 
                                                     
42 This does not even consider the other regulatory duties of the USDA not directly related to on-farm 
operations, such as meat inspection and fertilizer standards. 
43 David S. Weaver to All-District and Farm Home Agents, July 22, 1953, Folder Circular Letters, July 1 – 
Dec. 31, 1953, Box 6, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU. 
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The participants of the Challenge worked to facilitate farm growth in North 
Carolina and advance the progression of commercial agriculture in the state through 
better coordinated program administration across agencies.  In providing direction and 
leadership for farm agencies and coordinating the actions of farm program directors, 
The Challenge and the NCBFOA were most successful.  The meeting minutes and 
various materials of the NCBFOA demonstrate the commitment of North Carolina’s 
agricultural agency leaders to better understanding each other’s work and coordinating 
their actions on the state level.   
Weaver was a skilled and successful entrepreneurial bureaucrat.  He drew upon 
an extensive network and his own unimpeachable reputation to coordinate farm 
program implementation in North Carolina during a time when the upper levels of the 
USDA were engaged in bitter partisan conflicts over the purposes and mechanism of 
those programs.  Ezra Taft Benson’s USDA was too ambivalent about the ultimate goals 
of farm policies in engage in any kind of unifying leadership of the various agencies.  
Weaver and his colleagues filled the vacuum locally by forming a cross-agency coalition 
of farm policy makers, program directors, and farm organizations. 
Whether or not they were successful depends on how one measures success.  In 
achieving administrative cooperation at the managerial level of the farm bureaucracy, 
the NCBFOA was very successful.  In implementing Weaver’s more expansive vision for 
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grassroots mobilization toward progressive agriculture in the state, the Challenge was 
doomed to fail. He hoped that farm yield and community improvement contests would 
germinate the growth of a widespread shift to more efficient farming (and the 
corresponding increased farm incomes) by enticing small farms to pursue full time 
commercial farming.  These farms would then become full-fledged progressive farms, 
participants in the farm programs and clients of the Farm State.  Weaver spoke of a 
social movement, but it was a curious kind of social movement he had in mind.  It was 
to be lead from the top by the Extension Service and would bring citizens fully into the 
fold of government farm programs by changing their behavior to conform to the 
progressive farming model these programs promoted.  Weaver’s vision did not involve 
these otherwise marginal groups reshaping the Farm State to better meet their needs.   
This was a very different kind of movement than the anti-poverty movements 
that would take hold in the 1960s and 1970s when African-American women organized 
themselves to achieve better service delivery from welfare intuitions by making them 
more responsive to their particular needs in context.44  Extension always fancied itself a 
movement, but it was limited in its scope.  Progressive agriculture ideology so pervaded 
                                                     
44 Lisa Levenstein, A Movement Without Marches:  African American Women and the Politics of Poverty in 
Postwar Philadelphia, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  See also on the War on 
Poverty:  Lisa Gayle Hazirjian and Annelise Orleck, eds. The War on Poverty:  A New Grassroots History, 
1964-1980. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011);  Robert Korstad and James Leloudis, To Right 
These Wrongs:  The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America, 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Annelise, Orleck, Storming Caesars Palace:  
How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty, (Boston:  Beacon Press, 2005). 
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and shaped Extension goals – and consequently those of other farm agencies.  Many 
farmers would never fit the progressive farming mold.  As long as progressive farming 
was the only acceptable mode of production within the Farm State, and then the harsh 
reality was that farm programs, even if well implemented, would boost farm incomes 
only by reducing the number of farmers who competed for their share. 
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Chapter 5:  Progressive Family Farming 
Policy makers and farmers influenced by progressive farming ideology in the 
1950s saw no contradiction between family farming and industrialized agriculture.  
Independent, mechanized, efficient farming operations owned and managed by family 
units, were, for agricultural leaders of the Carolinas, the ultimate goal of progressive 
farm policy.  In the progressive farming vision for rural communities, the “family farm” 
was the ideal social and productive unit, and farm policies and programs were intended 
to secure and stabilize their income, a significant challenge in the context of rising 
consumer prices and the constant fight to stave off surplus production.  Farm policy 
makers pursued a strategy of encouraging progressive farming as a response to the 
problems of the farm economy.  This philosophy very narrowly defined what a 
commercial farm should be like:  white, educated, community leaders who embraced 
technology and consumer goods.  Farm agencies and agents focused their efforts on 
these families.  Those families that either could not or did not meet these expectations 
received less help from federal farm agencies, which followed policies intended to 
encourage such farmers to leave agriculture rather than succeeded on a smaller scale. 
Progressive farmers who made the grade in the early post war years took part in 
a new approach to commercial agricultural production.  The land-owning farmer 
became a manager.  For many, this included some degree of entrepreneurialism.  
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Commercial farmers expanded the family enterprise into processing, packing, and 
marketing of farm produce by building gins, warehouses, and packing houses, and 
sometimes operating stores or other small businesses unrelated to the farm.  Ambitious 
farmers diversified their commodities and invested in specialized equipment.  
Successful progressive family farms also employed many people as tenants and as wage 
hands.  For these progressive farming families, the emphasis was on the implementation 
of family management, not the minimization of hired labor. 
Many farming families were excluded, some by circumstance and some by 
definition, from the ranks of the successful progressive farms.  The uniform whiteness of 
farm organization leaders, farm agency committee members, and award recipients 
demonstrated the ideal racial profile of these farmers.  The nuclear family with defined 
gender roles in the marriage and a protected period of childhood for children became 
more important as farming families attained middle class lifestyles and practiced middle 
class consumerism.  While policy makers imagined the ideal successful farm family to be 
a white, nuclear, and middle class unit who owned their land and engaged in 
agriculture full-time, reality was more complex.  Tenants, share croppers, part-time 
farmers who held factory jobs, African-American and female land owners, and farmers 
who favored older, less mechanized production methods all found themselves outside 
the progressive farming circle. 
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When farm policy content and implementation took this restrictive idea of 
progressive farming as its point of reference and goal, the resulting programs were 
poorly suited to aid individuals and families that did not fit the mold.  Over the course 
of the 1950s, policy makers defended their decision to focus their efforts in aid and 
education on commercial farmers.  “In-between” and very small farms received less 
benefit from federal programs such as the Extension Service, allotment polices actively 
worked to encourage such farmers to become full-fledged commercial farmers or to 
leave agriculture entirely.  Many such farms lacked the resources to become full-time 
commercial farmers, and some preferred their lives “in-between.”  In a progressive 
farming economy shaped and supported by federal programs and plagued by 
unrelenting over-production, there was room for only one kind of farmer.  Making this 
vision a reality was a policy goal of the 1950s farm agencies. 
The Master Farm Families 
Progressive farming, as an approach to commercial farming in the United States 
was not a new philosophy among farm policy makers, farm organizations in the post 
war period.  The term gained popularity in the early twentieth century and was 
popularized in large part by the farm magazine bearing the title Progressive Farmer.1   
                                                     
1 The Progressive Farmer thrived under the leadership of Clarence Poe, and during his long tenure it 
achieved regional dominance as the most widely circulated farm magazine in the south. Poe has been the 
subject of much study by agricultural and southern historians over time. They examined the effect of the 
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The magazine promoted the use of scientific farming methods and encouraged 
engagement with the Extension service.   In the 1920s, farm magazines across the county, 
working in partnership with their local Extension officials, began to recognize farming 
families who exemplified progressive farming in practice with the title of “Master Farm 
Family.”  This award originated with a mid-western farm magazine in 1926 and was 
picked up by several other farm publications, including The Progressive Farmer, in 1927.2 
Clarence Poe, the influential Progressive Farmer editor, promoted the award in its 
early years and worked to develop its prestige.  In 1928, he asserted that the purpose of 
the award was to recognize the efforts of truly excellent farmers, to provide 
encouragement for their hard work, and to demonstrate the value of modernization and 
efficiency in farm operations.  Poe further stressed the role of leadership and the need to 
reward those who met this challenge.  “Because there has been until now little or no 
public notice of the men who made good is undoubtedly one reason why the farm has 
                                                     
 
agricultural press on political debates and farm development, Poe’s personal and political connections, and 
Poe’s stance as a white supremacist.  Jack Temple Kirby, “Clarence Poe's Vision of a Segregated 'Great 
Rural Civilization,” South Atlantic Quarterly 68 (Winter 1969): 27-38; Joseph A. Coté, “Clarence 
Hamilton Poe: The Farmer’s Voice, 1899-1964,” Agricultural History 53, no. 1 (January 1, 1979): 30–41;  
C. G. Scruggs and Smith W. Moseley. “The Role of Agricultural Journalism in Building the Rural South,” 
Agricultural History 53, no. 1 (January 1, 1979): 22–29.  
2 Master Farm Family award history documents compiled in the 1950s trace the first award to the magazine 
The Prairie Farmer and its editor Clifford V. Gregory in 1925.  “Part A, The Master Farm Family Award 
Program from 1925 to 1957,” p. 1, Box 13, Folder “Master Farm Family, 1954-1957,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
 228 
 
lost a great deal of its potential leadership.  The state, the county, and the community 
have not recognized the services of the good farmer.  The approval and commendation 
of one’s fellows constitutes a great incentive to effort – and this incentive agriculture has 
lacked.”3  These “men who made good” did so in close contact with federal agricultural 
officials.  “The Master Farm Movement also vindicates the work of agricultural leaders, 
the extension service, farm papers, etc.  In all the states this has been of one of the 
outstanding demonstrations.  Farmers who have proved themselves worthy of the 
highest honors have been men who have been in close touch with the county agents, 
agricultural teachers, and other rural leaders.”4  Given these prerequisites for mastery, 
the Progressive Farmer relied heavily on the judgment of Extension officials to identify 
candidates for Master Farm Family award. 
Extension officials nominated candidates in their districts,5 and while it was 
generally understood that an agent would not nominate an unqualified family, 
nominees underwent close scrutiny from visiting agents and magazine personnel in 
order to choose the winners.  Nominees filled out highly detailed applications that 
                                                     
3 “Dr. Clarence Poe, Senior Editor and Board Chairman of the Progressive Farmer, Stresses Benefits,” p. 2, 
Box 13, Folder “Master Farm Family, 1954-1957,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office 
of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
4 “Dr. Clarence Poe, Senior Editor and Board Chairman of the Progressive Farmer, Stresses Benefits,” Box 
13, Folder “Master Farm Family, 1954-1957,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the 
Director Records, 1914-2010. 
5 To prevent diluting the prestige of the MFF title, it was not awarded annually in every state.  The award 
was issued in an individual state only once every three years or so. 
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detailed their farm accounting practices and disclosed profits and losses on all aspects of 
their farming operation. Judges expected that successful candidates would achieve 
yields and profits well beyond the average farmer in their region and demonstrate good 
management of the income and profits.  In addition to their financial well-being, Master 
Farm Family candidates were judged on the condition of farm buildings and fences, the 
layout of their fields, their use of modern technologies, and their conservation efforts.  
Furthermore, aspiring Master Farmers needed a proven track record of community 
involvement.  The average Master Farmer’s resume included membership in the local 
Farm Bureau (often serving a term as county chairman), and participation in the AAA, 
Soil Conservation Service, or Extension committees in the county.  They joined 
commodity specific associations (such as cotton grower or dairymen’s associations), held 
offices in their churches, and joined other civic or fraternal organizations.  They often 
held elected office on county boards of commissioners or the local school board.6  The 
Master Farm Family score books solicited equally detailed information about the 
pursuits of wives and children with similarly high expectations. 
Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s commercial farmers and agricultural 
leaders came to recognize the successful progressive famer as a businessman.  The 
Progressive Farmer described South Carolina farmer Hugh McGee as “a business farmer.”  
                                                     
6 See for example:  “George R. McMillian, Master Farm Family Record, 1950,” Box 110, Folder 8, 
Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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A photo showed him “at his desk, [where] he makes plans, carries on important 
business, and then checks up on results.”7  For farmers like McGee, “farm management” 
was the primary focus of their work.  They continued to perform farm labor, but 
management was their primary duty.8  This occupational skill contributed greatly to the 
Master Farm Families’ success and set them apart as the best farmers in their 
                                                     
7 William C. LaRue, “Meet the McGee Master Farm Family,” The Progressive Farmer, September 1950, p. 
24, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
8 Historians of Mid-west and Great Plains agriculture have examined the development of farm management 
as a profession.  Land grant colleges educated young men in the sciences of horticulture and agronomy, as 
well as in agricultural economics and engineering.  Many such students graduated and pursued careers in 
the Extension Service or the growing agricultural firms mass producing agricultural supplies including 
seed, fertilizers, and mechanical equipment. Some land grant college agriculture program graduates took 
their skills back to the farm and became owner-operators of their own farms or took on managerial posts on 
large farms, often with absentee owners.  The bonanza wheat farms in the Dakotas and Minnesota provided 
an early example of professionalized farm management positions.  Investors with little to no farm 
experience or agricultural knowledge sought educated and experienced farm managers to oversee their 
thousands of acres of wheat and the fleets of tractors and mechanical harvesters they purchased to tend the 
land. 
The established system of sharecropping and tenancy, that divided the farm land of the Carolinas 
into small plots, and the ability of tobacco, especially, to support small operations kept farm sizes in the 
Carolinas small in the early twentieth century.  Farm management was a task rather than a job description. 
The period of the 1930s through the 1960s was one of transition in the Carolinas.  A labor system of 
tenancy and sharecropping resembling the plantation system shifted to one of wage labor – gradually 
redefining relationships between landowners and farm workers.  A manager is not the same as a paternalist 
planter.  As farms became more concentrated, more mechanized, and more dependent on wage labor, the 
task of farm owners also changed.  For those small farms on which owners often took on the majority of the 
necessary work – along with their families – farm work became more automated, more technology driven, 
and required a stronger grasp of the financial and technological justifications for particular methods of 
production. For land owners more accustomed to supervising tenants and share croppers, such oversight 
became focused on coordinating actions among tenants, creating greater harmony and in production plans 
and methods, sharing equipment, and resources, and, increasingly, consolidating holdings and reducing the 
number of tenants.  All of these tasks, on large farms and small, more closely resembled the work of 
contemporary industrial managerial counterparts than that of farmers of earlier decades.   
See:  Deborah Kay Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Harold Woodman, New South – New Law:  The Legal Foundations of 
Credit and Labor Relations in the Postbellum Agricultural South, (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995);  Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community and the 
Foundations of Agribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995). 
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communities.  Farm management, as a distinct category of farm work, garnered new 
recognition in the late 1940s and early 1950s and became a designated category of 
Extension specialization, alongside individual commodities and other discrete research 
areas.   It was one career option for graduates of the College of Agriculture at NC State.  
In late 1953, John W. Clark, then president of Randolph Mills in Franklinton, North 
Carolina, wrote to David Weaver seeking a recommendation of an NC State graduate 
who could take on the job of assistant manager at Clark’s farm near Scotland Neck.  
Clark already employed a manager (also a NC State alumnus), but he planned to expand 
his operation to include a 1000-head cattle herd, the management of which would be a 
full time job in its own right.  Clark wanted a recent graduate to fill the post who 
exhibited potential to become manager of the entire farm.  He hoped to lure a qualified 
person by providing the new hire with a “six-room modern home,” no mere tenant 
house.  Weaver felt confident that this combination of opportunity and compensation 
“should attract an aggressive young man to take on such an assignment as his life 
work.”9 
                                                     
9 David Weaver to John Clark, December 29, 1953, Box 19, Folder “D.S. Weaver, 1953-1955,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  
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Figure 10:  Hugh McGee, as pictured in the Progressive Farmer, in recognition 
of the Master Farm Family Award10 
Farm managers also developed their own professional organizations in the in 
this period.  In 1949, North Carolinians who attended the annual meeting of the 
American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers returned to found a North 
Carolina chapter.11  The next year, North Carolina hosted the American Society annual 
meeting, and the state chapter developed into an active society that hosted tours and 
educational programs for its members and awarded scholarships for aspiring farm 
                                                     
10 William C. LaRue, “Meet the McGee Master Farm Family,” The Progressive Farmer, September 1950, 
p. 19, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI.  
Photo Used with permission. The Progressive Farmer, Copyright 1950; Copyright 2013 Telvent/DTN 
LLC.  All rights reserved.   
11 “The North Carolina Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers,” 1984, p. 11, Box 3, Folder 8, 
North Carolina Agricultural Organizations Records, 1887-1986, NCSU. 
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managers to attend the School of Agriculture at North Carolina State College.12  Local 
farm managers associations were also active in the era, such as the Edgecombe County 
Farm Manager’s Association that in the March, 1953 meeting hosted the Extension Farm 
Management Specialist from NC State College.13 
The increased importance of “farm management” to Southern farming 
operations and to progressive farming advocates became apparent in the late 1940s in 
the scrutiny tenancy arrangements received from the North Carolina Extension Service.  
The economic conditions of the Depression had driven some tenants from the land, and 
the commodity production restrictions and cash payments instituted by the AAA 
contributed to a further reduction in the ranks of tenant farmers and share croppers.  But 
in North and South Carolina, tenancy and share cropping remained important sources 
of farm labor.  When Extension officials turned their attention to the details of these 
arrangements, it was, to some degree, a response to concerns about the low standard of 
living and exploitative work conditions these laborers faced. Primarily, however, this 
attention resulted from concerns over the inefficiency of very small farming units and an 
                                                     
12 “The North Carolina Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers,” 1984, p. 12, Box 3, Folder 8, 
North Carolina Agricultural Organizations Records, 1887-1986, NCSU. 
13 “Farm Managers Plan Meeting,” Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, NC), March19, 1953.   The 
Edgecombe County, NC, Farm Manager’s Association counted among its members, in 1953, serving and 
future ASC county committeemen, county commissioners, and other young farmers who would become 
prominent in commodity organizations and the Farm Bureau. 
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expectation that better management of tenant holdings would increase their 
productivity and reduce instability in the labor market  
In 1941,14 Edgecombe County Extension agents launched the “Farm and Home 
Improvement Program.”  The initiative suffered from terrible timing, stalling out after 
the United States entered World War II and farm agencies directed their efforts to war-
time food production.  But at the conclusion of the war, the program began again as a 
master’s degree project, conducted by an N.C. State agricultural economics student with 
the enthusiastic support of the Extension service.  The Farm and Home Improvement 
Program did not seek to eliminate tenancy, but to develop land owner’s managerial 
skills and consolidate his control over the planning and implementation of progressive 
farming methods across multiple tenant holdings.  Extension agents recruited resident 
landlords who employed between five and ten tenant families and who were willing to 
allow significant Extension involvement on their farm planning and operations.15  
Extension agents met with the landlord and his wife, and together they drew up a plan 
for the entire farm.  They examined the farm as a single unit rather than considering 
                                                     
14 This Extension project culminated in a master’s thesis in the department of Agricultural Economics.  
William Lindsay Turner, “A Study of the Farm and Home Improvement Program, Edgecombe County, 
1946-1949,” (master’s thesis, NCSU, 1950).   This program had a brief run in 1940-41 but was cut short by 
World War II.  The program started over again in 1946. 
15 The program required all tenants to be of the same race.  “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement 
Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) in Edgecombe County,” p. 1, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, 
M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-
2010, NCSU. 
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tenant’s or share cropper’s holding individually.  This was a key step to stream-lining 
and “improving” the management of the entire farm, emphasizing efficiency and 
resource use by the land owners.  In this meeting, Extension agents and land owners 
identified aspects of landlord and tenant relationships that should be formalized in 
written agreements to facilitate this effort.16   
 
Figure 11: "White Tenant farm works off shares, North Carolina," photo by 
Dorothea Lange17 
                                                     
16 The South Carolina Extension service had conducted a tenant and share cropper program in the mid-
1930s that was similar in many respects, but most heavily focused on improving the standard of living for 
tenant farming families and less concerned with whole farm management.  “Work of the South Carolina 
Extension Service with Tenants and Share croppers, 1936,” pp. 10-15, Box 23, Folder 696, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Field Operations, 1918-1985, STI. 
17 Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection, LC-USF34-009645-E DLC 
(b&w film nitrate neg.) http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?fsaall:54:./temp/~ammem_itj2:: (April 10, 
2013).  Used with permission. 
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After the plan was developed, and the details of landlord and labor agreements 
determined, Extension agents and the landowners invited tenants to a meeting in which 
they received a presentation on the Farm and Home Improvement program.  “Using 
movies and slides to illustrate the discussion,” agents explained the goals of the 
program to improve landlord and tenant relations and presented the plan for the farm. 
At the end of the meeting, the leaders “asked whether[the tenants] would like to 
participate in such a program.  If they agree to participate the program is started on that 
farm.”18  This top-down approach characterized the farm’s progression through the 
program.  The heaviest obligations skewed toward the tenants, while the authority to 
make decisions about farm management rested with the landlords.   
For a period of five years, the program supported the managerial efforts of 
landlords and strongly encouraged tenants to recognize managerial authority while 
educating them on the ways of progressive farming.  Landlords and Extension officials 
maintained detailed plans that addressed all aspects of production and the farm’s 
business arrangements.  Tenants and landlords agreed to follow these plans.19  Extension 
                                                     
18 “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) in 
Edgecombe County,” Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension 
Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
19 While containing many elements of a lease, Extension officials took care to note that such plans were not 
to be construed as formal leases because of the obligations landlords would incur in such a contracts.  
Rather the plans would be guidelines for landlord-tenant relationship, mutually agreed upon but not legally 
binding.  “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) 
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agents provided support in the form of education and frequent visits to the farm, 
including regular visits with tenant families, for which the landowner was always 
present.    Women formed home demonstration clubs, and the men participated in 
demonstration field work as a condition of the plan. Officials pressed tenant family 
children to join 4-H clubs. After five years of successful participation, the landowners 
and tenants “graduated,” to carry out what they learned unsupervised.20 
Extension officials declared the program a success.  By 1950, incomes were up on 
participating farms, even in the face of reduced tobacco allotments and weather-related 
decreases in local peanut yields.  Officials judged housing, sanitation, and nutrition 
conditions improved for tenant families, and observed the beneficial effects of soil 
conservation programs.  Most important to Extension officials, mobility among tenants 
decreased sharply in Edgecombe County while it rose in neighboring counties.  The 
study authors observed that among tenants and landlords “there is less friction, a 
greater respect for the landlord’s property on the part of the tenant, and a great 
                                                     
 
in Edgecombe County,” p. 1, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
20 “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) in 
Edgecombe County,” p. 2, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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appreciation of the needs of the tenant on the part of the landlord.”21  Tenants responded 
to surveys indicating that improvement in their living conditions – repaired and 
upgraded homes and assistance in food production and preservation – were the most 
valuable aspects of the Farm and Home Improvement Program. Progressive farming 
best practices and care for the landlord’s property ranked lower on this lists.22   
Landlords enjoyed higher property values, increased incomes, and decreased 
maintenance and repair bills.23  Extension officials judged the success of the program by 
its benefits for land owners.  Increased incomes, enhanced management skills, and 
greater acquiescence to that management by laborers indicated improvement in farm 
conditions. The chairman of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Agriculture called it “an illustration of a very constructive program,” 
and complimented the Extension service on their work.24  That farms with several 
tenants were now under unified management, and operated as single large farms in 
                                                     
21 “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) in 
Edgecombe County,” Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension 
Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  
22 William Lindsay Turner, “A Study of the Farm and Home Improvement Program, Edgecombe County, 
1946-1949,” 87.  The study involved 22 white tenants and 49 black tenants.  Fifty eight tenants total 
answered surveys about their experience.  Black tenants overwhelming listed “home improvement” (30 
families) and “home food production” (38) as the “parts of the Farm and Home Improvement Programs 
[that] have been of most benefit.”  Only 5 listed “recommended farm practices and 12 “better cooperation 
for landlord and other tenant families.”  Among white tenants, 10 listed “home improvement,” 8 “home 
food planning,” and only 3 included “recommended farm practices.”   
23 “Report on the Farm and Home Improvement Program (Landlord-Tenant Relationship Program) in 
Edgecombe County,” p. 3, Box 19, Folder “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
24 M.L. Wilson to David Weaver, February 29, 1952, Box 19, Folder, “Wilson, M.L., 1948-1952,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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many respects, meant that such farms were much closer to the progressive farming ideal 
of active, unified management in 1950 than they had been before the war, even if they 
continued to employ tenant labor.  
The division of land owners and tenants into managers and workers was also 
reinforced in progressive farming literature.  This emphasis on management and a basic 
understanding of farm programs for would-be progressive farmers corresponded with 
the devaluation of managerial skills that workers and tenants gained through their own 
experience.  Take for example the way the Progressive Farmer interpreted events in one 
Master Farmer’s experience. George McMillion fell seriously ill during World War II 
while his five oldest sons were serving in the military.  The Progressive Farmer reported 
that in response to the family’s need, “neighbors and tenants came to their rescue.  
Tenants who had worked for years under the wise management of ‘Mr. Mack’ suddenly 
asserted their hidden talents for management, responsibility, and leadership to get the 
job done.”25  Such talents were almost certainly not “hidden” prior to McMillion’s 
illness, but exercised informally.  The Progressive Farmer’s narrative, intended to 
demonstrate the loyalty the McMillions had earned from their tenants and neighbors, 
also revealed a fundamental assumption about farm management in this period:  it was 
                                                     
25 William C. LaRue, “Eight Sons, a Fine Wife, and Fine Neighbors Help a Fine Man,” The Progressive 
Farmer (December, 1950):  86, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, STI. 
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a job for a landowner or a professional.  Tenants could be valued employees who were, 
in McMillion’s words, “willing to work and do right.”  A good manager could learn 
from them, but such workers undertook real management tasks only when necessary, as 
a result of loyalty or extraordinary initiative, not as a regular part of their work as 
laborers.26  Farm managers were landowners, or their sons, such as William Wooten.  
This 1947 Master Farmer began his career as the “supervisor of [his] father’s farm.”27  
Commercial farmers acquired their formal managerial skills through experience 
and education.  For children and adolescents, school and community based 4-H and 
Future Farmers of America clubs provided early training in record keeping, home 
making, and scientific farm production methods.  These programs emphasized 
mechanization and technology, and close consultation with Extension agents.  Young 
famers, most of whom did not attend college, still often needed additional information 
and instruction on how to access farm programs and obtain credit.  If such farmers 
exhibited potential for progressive farming success and sough to follow that path, their 
                                                     
26 William C. LaRue, “Eight Sons, a Fine Wife, and Fine Neighbors Help a Fine Man,” The Progressive 
Farmer (December, 1950):  86, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, STI. 
27 “The Master Farm Family Record, Mr. and Mrs. William M. Wooten,” n.d. [ca. 1947], p. 2, Box 110, 
Folder 7, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI.  For the classic 
historical account of the development of managerial capitalism in the United States, see Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand:  The Managerial Revolution in American Business, (Cambridge, MA:  
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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Extension agents, land grant colleges, and bankers associations stepped in to help fill the 
void.  
Throughout the 1950s, the College of Agriculture at North Carolina State College 
staged week-long schools for young, white farmers, sponsored by the North Carolina 
Banker’s association, known as the “Short Course in Modern Farming” or the “Banker’s 
Short Course.”  Representatives from branch banks and community banks sponsored 
individual students at the short course.28  Between 1953 and 1959, 819 young farmers 
went through the program.29  One or two men from each county in their late teens or 
early twenties spent a week in February on the NC State campus getting a whirlwind 
tour of the College of Agriculture and state offices of the various federal farm agencies.  
They also received training to develop their business administration skills.30 
Instruction received at the short course went a step beyond what these young 
learned in their 4-H clubs and vocational agriculture classes in high school.  One 
alumnus of the 1955 short course found this aspect of the especially enlightening:  “I had 
studied some of this information . . ., both in the FFA and the 4-H Club, in high school, 
and at times during my study of these subjects it was a mystery to me where the 
                                                     
28 “North Carolina Bankers Association, Key County Bankers for 1956-1957,” Box 3, Folder 5, North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
29 “Attendance at Short Course in Modern Farming,” Box 3, Folder 11, North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
30 “Program, Short Course in Modern Farming, N.C. State College, February 2-13, 1959” and “”Farm 
Planning Worksheet, Short Course in Modern Farming,” n.d. [1950s] Box 3, Folder 11, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
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information that the teacher was passing on to us came from.”31  The short course filled a 
growing gap between the College of Agriculture’s mission and the goals of its student 
body.  Graduates of the College of Agriculture went to graduate school, to careers in 
state and federal agencies or to large agribusiness firms.32  Young men who intended to 
be farmers did not pursue four year degrees at the College of Agriculture.   The week-
long short course on N.C. State’s campus helped fill the knowledge gap and provided 
attendees with, as one student enthused, “a real college experience and the opportunity 
to make new friends.”33   
The modern farming short course attempted to help young farmers get their 
bearings in the complicated world of federal farm programs.  The course provided 
practical instruction on the scope, authority, and goals of agencies such as the ASCS, the 
FHA, and the Extension service.34  A student from Surry County put it simply:  “[The 
course] gave me a clearer picture of how the agricultural agencies in this state are 
supposed to work.   It also pointed out to me the possibility of help that I can obtain 
                                                     
31 “Student Reactions to the 1955 Short Course in Modern Farming,” p. 2, Box 3, Folder 5, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
32 Maurice J. Pickler, “A Farmer’s Needs in Training and Service,” Planning for the School of Agriculture, 
A Symposium, North Carolina State College, December 10-11, 1957, pp. 76-79, Box 3, Unlabeled Folder, 
North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
33 “Student Reactions to the 1955 Short Course in Modern Farming,” p. 3, Box 3, Folder 5, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU.  NCSU would 
address this problem structurally in the 1960s with the creation of the Ag Institute, which issued 2-year 
degrees in practical agriculture intended for working famers rather than the research-focused 4-year degree. 
34 Aside:  urban poor has to fight to have access to this info; farmers get a short course and sponsorship by 
bankers 
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from agencies that are located in my county.”35  Banker’s Short Course students also 
learned that their ability to get credit in the future would depend on their adoption of 
progressive farming methods.  One 1955 attendee from Craven County understood this 
to be of benefit to himself and to the bankers:  “I came home with the idea that there can 
be no prosperity and progress in any state unless there is a stable and profitable 
agriculture industry which supports a progressive rural people.  The adoption of 
recommended and approved practices of the Agricultural Extension Service results in a 
more profitable crop and livestock production as well as increased farm income.  
Therefore, when I apply to the banker for credit to finance my farming operation, he 
desires to know what kind of practice I plan to use.”36  The message students received 
was clear.  In order to be successful commercial farmers, they would have to become 
managers who understood how to access federal farm supports.  A degree of farm 
program savvy was also necessary if they were to gain access to commercial credit.   
 Progressive farming also involved diversification, both in crop choice and 
business activities.  No award recipient focused exclusively on a single cash crop.37  In 
the 1950s, Master Farm Families often also pursued business ventures, opening stores 
                                                     
35 “Student Reactions to the 1955 Short Course in Modern Farming,” p. 1, Box 3, Folder 5, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
36 “Student Reactions to the 1955 Short Course in Modern Farming,” p. 3, Box 3, Folder 5, North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
37 Dairy farmers are somewhat an exception.  Most focused primarily on dairy, and grew other crops 
generally for feed or pasture land.   
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and other small businesses.  Most commonly, these families invested in the processing 
and marketing of their crops by operating cotton gins and packing houses in which they 
conducted the initial processing of their own crops and those of their neighbors’.  It was 
here that the Master Farm Family award’s expectations of progressive farming are most 
readily apparent.  Winners of the award were uniformly commercially focused with two 
or more cash crops and a significant interest in marketing as well as production. 
The Lowder family of Sumter, South Carolina, was one such farm.  Clayton 
Lowder operated the farm with his wife and their three children, but the Lowders did 
not start out their married life as farmers.  They purchased their farm after fire destroyed 
a restaurant that they owned and operated.  The Lowders used their savings to purchase 
a store, a cotton gin, a farm house and land.38  Five years later, the family ran a cotton 
gin, and a packing house for sweet potatoes, which they sold in their store.  Together, 
these enterprises added nearly $18,000.00 to their income in 1952, over and above other 
farm receipts.  They employed ten wage hands and five share croppers, some of whom 
had been on the farm for longer than the Lowders themselves, having worked for the 
previous owners.39  The Lowders were an exception from the pattern of most Master 
Farm Families, having only been involved in agriculture for five years, rather than for 
                                                     
38 “The Master Farm Family Record, Clayton Lowder,” 1950, p. 21, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
39 “The Master Farm Family Record, Clayton Lowder,” 1950, p. 18-19, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI 
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decades or generations.  The Extension officials who nominated the family felt that their 
determination and commitment to progressive farming allowed them to reach the level 
of a Master Farm Family so quickly and that they made a good example for others.40 
The McMillian family of Marion County South incorporated the principles of 
agribusiness in their farming operation by steadily increasing their acreage and rates of 
production.  Eight sons, all adults in 1953, each received college educations or some 
other vocational training and put their specialized skills to work on the family farm by 
taking responsibility for particular aspects of the operation.  One son oversaw cotton 
cultivation, another the cattle, and others were similarly specialized in their focus, all 
“coordinated under Mr. McMillian’s wise management,” according to the Progressive 
Farmer.41  As the county agent who nominated the McMillians for the award noted that 
“the whole big family works together as a unit, all members coordinating their efforts in 
well-organized fashion.”42 In this manner, the family built “one of the most modern 
cotton gins in the state” at a cost of $70,000.00, along with the requisite storage facilities, 
                                                     
40 “The Master Farm Family Record, Clayton Lowder,” 1950, p. 9, 16, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI 
41 William C. LaRue, “Eight Sons, a Fine Wife, and Fine Neighbors Help a Fine Man,” The Progressive 
Farmer (December, 1950):  19, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, STI. 
42 William C. LaRue, “Eight Sons, a Fine Wife, and Fine Neighbors Help a Fine Man,” The Progressive 
Farmer (December, 1950):  19, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, STI. 
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and also invested in the community freezer locker and a dry cleaning business.43  The 
E.R. Taylor family of Greenville, S.C., was another such family.  They raised peaches and 
beef cattle, and the center of their enterprise was the peach packing house, where they 
packed and shipped their own peaches and those of other farms.  Earl Taylor followed 
his interests in marketing into the public arena as chairman of the marketing 
subcommittee of the Greenville County Agricultural Committee.44   
All of South Carolina’s nearly twenty Master Farm Families of the 1950s 
practiced agribusiness principles of expansion, mechanization, marketing, and 
management without any loss of their identification as family farms.  This was because 
progressive farming advocates valued management skills over labor.  Family farming 
depended on some combination of ownership and management with the participation 
of more than one generation. It did not mean the absence of hired labor or a single-
minded focus on crop production alone.  Success at progressive commercial farming 
required a degree of entrepreneurism and a willingness to expand acreage and vertically 
integrate where appropriate, leading these families to invest in packing houses and 
cotton gins, feed and seed stores and other retail ventures, and to hire additional labor.  
                                                     
43 William C. LaRue, “Eight Sons, a Fine Wife, and Fine Neighbors Help a Fine Man,” The Progressive 
Farmer (December, 1950):  86, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, STI. 
44 William C. Lure, “Good Production + Good Marketing = Most Profit,” The Progressive Farmer, 
Carolina-Virginia Edition n.d. [1950], p. 19, Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI.  These committee was related to the Extension Service.  It 
should not be confused with the ASC committees. 
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Such expansion was necessary to support growing families and provide livings for adult 
children who wished to stay on the farm.  It was both a business and a family strategy 
for responding to the agricultural treadmill.  Success meant improved standards of 
living that progressive farming advocates had so relentlessly pursued since the 1920s. 
Progressive Farming and Domesticity 
The ideologies of progressive farming and domesticity were intertwined, and the 
Master Farm Families participated fully in the consumer market of the 1950s.  Thanks in 
large part to the New Deal, countryside had been electrified, and farmers put labor 
saving equipment and appliances to work in all aspects of farm and homemaking 
possible.  Farmers benefited from the rising prices of agricultural commodities in the 
1940s, and when manufacturers returned to consumer goods production after the war, 
rural families of means took advantage of the abundance, just like their urban 
counterparts.  This new rural affluence affected the lives of women and children on 
commercial farms.  These family members had always had the attention of the Extension 
service, which shifted how it approached the organization and education of these 
groups.  Federal policy makers understood homemaking to be an integral piece of the 
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progressive farming puzzle, and placed the wife in the role of chief consumer and 
steward of the home’s resources.45   
Progressive farming advocates stressed the necessity of strong management 
skills for wives, though they imagined that her use of those skills extended little further 
from the house than the lawn and flower garden just outside.  Progressive Farmer features 
on the Master Farm Families always included an article entitled “Meet the Master 
Farmer’s Wife” that focused exclusively on the wife and the home.   Mrs. George 
McMillion’s feature pictured the mother of ten seated at her easel, paint brush in hand.  
A second showed her at the head of a dining table packed with family, a third inspecting 
the contents of her freezer alongside her home demonstration agent.  Sallie Hill, the 
author of all of the 1950s “Meet the Master Farmer’s Wife” articles, gave much 
consideration to the chore of providing daily meals for McMillion’s large family and 
                                                     
45 Historians and cultural anthropologists have extensively studied the changing roles of women on 
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wondered, “’How does she get it all done?’ . . .  Good home management I soon 
discovered was the answer.”46   
Sallie Hill’s articles exalted “good home management” while highlighting the 
most refined of domestic accomplishments:  fancy baking, needle work, flower 
arrangement, and the fine arts.  The point of these photographs was not to obscure the 
homemaking tasks that McMillion undertook.  Instead, they asked the reader to marvel 
at the management skills that allowed her to pursue feminine hobbies and enjoy the 
company and admiration of her family. She ran a tight ship and reaped the rewards in 
leisure and individual pursuits.  Describing these women, Hill employed a tone that 
managed to be both prescriptive and gossipy, all for the benefit of other rural women 
who might aspire to achieve the status of the Master Farm Family lifestyle – not a life of 
ease, but of efficiency, purpose, productivity, and community leadership. 
Hill’s articles showed successful farmers’ wives enjoy the rewards of progressive 
agriculture by stocking their homes with appliances.  The kitchen inventories of 1950s 
South Carolina Master Farm Families included the major brand names and most up-to-
date technologies of their time:  Singer sewing machines, G.E. washing machines, 
                                                     
46 Sallie Hill, "Meet the Master Farmer's Wife -- Mrs. George R. McMillian, Marion County, SC," 
Progressive Farmer, December, 1950, p. 82, Box 110, Folder 8, Records of the Cooperative Extension 
Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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Frigidaire refrigerators, and Mixmaster electric churns were common.47  Master Farmers’ 
wives showed off washing machine in their Progressive Farmer photographs and shared 
recipes for cookies and cakes (always their husbands’ “favorites”) that involved 
expensive kitchen equipment.  They vacuumed their formal living rooms in their  
 
Figure 12:  Sudie Oswald as pictured in the Progressive Farmer in recognition 
of the Master Farm Family Award48 
                                                     
47 All Master Farm Family nominations list these sorts of appliances, but see for example:  “The Master 
Farm Family Record, Frank W. Atkinson,” April 15, 1950; “The Master Farm Family Record, Mr. and 
Mrs. C.F. Swafford;”  April 15, 1950; ““The Master Farm Family Record, Evan T. Salisbury, May 2, 
1950,” Box 110, Folder 8, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
48 Sallie Hill, "Meet the Master Farmer's Wife:  Mrs. Dunbar Oswald, Allendale County, S.C.," The 
Progressive Farmer, June, 1951, p. 79, Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, Box 110, 
Folder 8, STI.  Photo Used with permission. The Progressive Farmer, Copyright 1951; Copyright 2013 
Telvent/DTN LLC.  All rights reserved.   
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Sunday best. When quoted in the Progressive Farmer they “confessed” that their yards 
and homes were their “hobby” or their true passion, not actually work at all.49  While 
their husbands were featured for their professional expertise in agricultural and 
business matters, women were left to show off their success as consumers and their skill 
at decorative pursuits. These women were domestic managers, not drudges.  The 
women in these narratives they were also absolutely not farmers. 
Sally Hill’s articles, with their formulaic structures, adherence to gendered 
notions of work and consumption, and their intent to convert less “successful” farming 
families to the ways of modern farming tell only a small part of the story of home and 
work lives of women on these progressive farms.  Cooperative Extension officials and 
magazine staff collected extensive information on families nominated for the Master 
Farm Family award that illuminates the great extent to which farm women were 
involved in the management of their farms as well as their homes.  This evidence 
demonstrates the fallacy of contemporary prescriptive notions that the home was 
separate from the farm and that successful modern farming excluded women from the 
daily operations of the farm as both a consequence and a reward of that success.  While 
the Progressive Farmer writers ignored this complicated reality in favor of a simpler 
                                                     
49 Sallie Hill, "Meet a Master Farmer's Wife -- Mrs. J Tatum Zeigler, Orangeburg County, SC," The 
Progressive Farmer, p. 96, May 1951, Box 110, Folder 8, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
 252 
 
narrative, the questionnaires and judging forms employed in the Master Farm Family 
nomination process tells a different story.50 
The women on South Carolina’s master farms were generally college educated, 
mostly at institutions such as Winthrop College, a liberal arts school in the hills of 
western South Carolina.  Some had professional training as teachers and nurses.  Like 
their husbands, they boasted impressive lists of community and political activities.  They 
were members of their county chapters of the Farm Bureau or the Grange, auxiliary 
members of the American Legion and sometimes members of Daughters of the 
Confederacy.  They were Sunday school teachers, missionary society presidents, and 
PTA and garden club members.  They sat on county Extension committees, led their 
Home Demonstration Clubs and their children’s 4-H chapters.51  As such, they were 
leaders in their community’s social, civic, and religious organizations in their own right, 
even as their activities complemented those of their husbands. 
                                                     
50 These nomination booklets are fascinating for both the nature of the questions they asked and the way 
that the families who filled them out managed to circumvent the forms’ structure when they wished to tell a 
different story.  Some questions were explicitly gendered, such as when asking for biographical details of 
individual family members, the fields were labeled “farmer” and “wife.”  The designers did not image that 
“wife” could also be “farmer.”  For other questions the gendering is more subtle. The grouping of questions 
regarding crops together and separate from distinct categories measuring the efforts at energy conservation 
in home making tasks implied gendered divisions of labor and responsibility. Nevertheless, women did not 
keep their answers confined to the questions that were supposed to be the domain of the wife.  
51 See these applications for selected examples:  “The Master Farm Family Record, Evans T. Salisbury,” 
May 2, 1950,  Box 110, Folder 8; “The Master Farm Family Record, Clayton Lowder,” n.d. [1950], Box 
110, Folder 8; “The Master Farm Family Record, George B. Patrick,” 1953, Box 110, Folder 9;  “The 
Master Farm Family Record, Mr. & Mrs. James B. Guess, Jr.,” 1953, Box 110, Folder 9, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, STI.  On the educations and economic status of commercial 
farm wives in South Carolina prior to World War II, see Melissa Walker, All We Knew Was to Farm, 229-
235. 
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At home they shouldered the responsibility of kitchen gardens of an acre or 
more.  Master Farm Family candidates opened their pantries, freezers, and smoke 
houses to Extension officials and magazines representatives to demonstrate their 
stockpiles of canned goods and frozen and cured meat, usually all produced on the 
farm. They shared their monthly grocery bills and discussed their systems of home book 
keeping.  Some women boasted that they did all of this without paid help in the house, 
but most of these women likely did have the assistance of employees.52  The use of hired 
help in the home was absent from the Master Farm Family nomination booklets.  Those 
who mentioned domestic help, or the lack of it, did so unprompted.   
To completely fulfill the demands of model family status, farm wives had to 
possess some technological knowledge as well as homemaking skills.  They 
demonstrated their knowledge of horticulture by reporting the planting, fertilizing, and 
pest control routines they used in their flower and vegetable gardens.53 It was not 
sufficient to simply possess an electric range, automatic dishwasher, or vacuum cleaner.  
A wife in a Master Farm Family must know how to use them in the most energy efficient 
manner.  Their choice of furnishings, room use, and landscaping were not simply 
                                                     
52 The Master Farm Family applications asked specifically about wage, tenant, and family labor on the 
farm, but there were no questions about household help.  
53 Sallie Hill, "Meet the Master Farmer's Wife -- Mrs. W. Hugh McGee, Anderson County, S.C," The 
Progressive Farmer, September 1950, Box 110, Folder 8, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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matters of practicality and taste; they were scientific problems with correct solutions 
determined by home economics.  While availed of modern appliances, the Master Farm 
Family wives strived for and maintained standards of homemaking efficiency, 
attractiveness, and cleanliness never before imagined on a daily basis in rural homes.  
Maintaining those standards was not, as answers to the Master Farm Family 
questionnaire shows, a task separate from the efficient and profitable operation of a 
progressive farm.  Instead, the wives’ good management of their homes was integral to 
the management of their farms.  Of course, farm women’s embrace of modern house- 
keeping was important to progressive farming advocates, regardless of the family’s 
affluence or land tenure status. Tenant farm wives had been required to join home 
demonstration clubs North Carolina’s tenancy improvement scheme, and homemakers’ 
work was essential to when a family applied for an FHA loan.54  At its best, the Master 
Farm provided “sufficient income . . . for family living in keeping with a desirable 
quality of living . . . the farm and home, as a unit, must serve as a good demonstration of 
successful farm and house planning and operation, and indicate the use of up-to-date 
teachings of the Land Grant College and other reliable sources of information.”55  For the 
Master Farm Family wife, her home and garden represented the combination of 
                                                     
54 See chapter 4. 
55 “Requirements for a Master Farm Family,” Box 110, Folder 7, Records of the Cooperative Extension 
Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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consumer activity, business savvy, and commercial agricultural achievement, to which 
her efforts were invaluable. 
The questionnaires also demonstrate that the wives of master farmers were 
integrated in the operations of the farm.  Mrs. Manly McClure, whose farm originated 
with land and resources she brought to the marriage, discussed the improvement of 
their farm land and the expansion of their holdings as a shared achievement in which 
she participated fully.  “In 1924, we moved back to my old home as renters.   Years later 
by degrees we begun [sic] to buy a few acres close around and finally ended up with 910 
acres.  These run down eroded acres, have been correctly terraced, and with the rotation 
of crops, diversified farming, and excellent cooperation by extension and soil 
conservation service these straw fields and gullies are now some of our best fields.”56  
After describing her farm’s other achievements, including both the enlargement of their 
cattle herd and the improvement of their house, first constructed by her father, McClure 
concluded that “hard-work and persistence will add up to a little if you stick with it long 
enough.”57  She took pride in and credit for all of these accomplishments, just as she also 
took pride in the household appliances that were the Progressive Farmer’s exclusive 
                                                     
56 “Master Farm Family Record, Mr. and Mrs. Manly McClure,” 1953, unnumbered insert between pages 9 
and 10, Series 32, Box 110, Folder 9, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, STI. 
57 “Master Farm Family Record, Mr. and Mrs. Manly McClure,” 1953, unnumbered insert between pages 9 
and 10, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
 256 
 
interest when it featured the McClure farm in its December, 1953 issue.58  On this Master 
Farm, the farmer’s wife was a full business partner.59  McClure was not alone. Mrs. Earle 
R. Taylor told the Progressive Farmer that her home appliances freed her from time-
consuming house work and allowed her to take on more responsibility in the peach 
packing house.60  John and Mattie Gaston took pains to point out that their farm was a 
“husband-wife partnership” and that they intended to include their only child, Martha, 
when she reached adulthood.61   
In spite of wives’ significant involvement in farm operations, not all Master Farm 
Families were so sure of their daughters’ futures on the farm. When asked how they 
included their children in farm planning, Clifford and Helen Smith said that they made 
decisions about the farm together as a couple.  While they “discussed [plans] before the 
children, their ideas sought and evaluated [and] considered,” the children were “too 
small to have much voice in making plans.”  As for their future inclusion, the Smiths 
stated that there were “no boys in [the] family,” and that the daughters were “not of 
                                                     
58 Sallie Hill, "Meet the Master Farmer's Wife -- Mrs. Manley McClure, Anderson County, SC," Box 110, 
Folder 9, Progressive Farmer, Dec 1953, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 
1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
59 “Master Farm Family Record, Mr. and Mrs. Manly McClure,” 1953, unnumbered insert between pages 9 
and 10, Box 110, Folder 9, Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, 
Series 32, STI. 
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Progressive Farmer, October 1950 Records of the Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-
1987, Series 32, Box 110, Folder 8, STI, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina. 
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Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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age.”62  While two of the three daughters were quite young, the oldest was in tenth 
grade.  At this age, many such families were already planning for sons to form 
partnerships with their fathers after graduation.  Instead, Sylvia Smith had plans to 
attend Winthrop College to pursue her interest in journalism.63 
 Young Sylvia’s ambitions differed little from the daughters of other 
Master Farm Families in the 1950s.  The community involvement, extra-curricular 
activities, and college educations made possible by their parents’ prosperity took them 
away from the farm at greater rates than their brothers.  The family of George and Ester 
Patrick, a 1953 Master Farm Family from Orangeburg County, South Carolina had two 
daughters.  Both women were college educated and had been 4-H members with 
extensive lists of accomplishments and leadership positions among their peers.  They 
married urban professionals and were no longer involved in farming.  The oldest son, 
with an equally impressive resume and a degree in voice from the University of South 
Carolina had returned to “farming in partnership with [his] father.”  His younger 
brother, a high school senior, intended to do the same.64  The Patrick sons, like the sons 
of other progressive farming families, would have been groomed for the job from 
                                                     
62 “Master Farm Family Record, Clifford T. Smith,” 1953, p. 6, Box 110, Folder 9, Records of the 
Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
63 “Master Farm Family Record, Clifford T. Smith,” 1953, p. 5, Box 110, Folder 9, Records of the 
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childhood, in the club projects and short courses available through the Extension service 
and land grant colleges, as well as experience helping on the farm.65  H.C. and Helen 
Coward hoped that their sons’ 4-H projects would keep them interested in the 
partnerships they planned to offer them when they were older.66  Tom Salisbury had a 
similar experience.   At age twenty-three in 1950, he had three and half years of 
agricultural college education and farmed in partnership with his father.67   
Master Farm Family sons worked in order to learn and to earn personal savings 
and income, not because their families depended on their labor.  Many of their children 
received cash allowances for their work and put the profits and prizes from 4-H projects 
into personal savings.68  The Salisbury family shared an interest in sports, maintained a 
basketball court in their yard, and took annual vacations to the mountains.69  The 
Lowder sons played on baseball and football teams and were YMCA members, and 
most other adolescent sons of Master Farm Families also found time for competitive 
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sports.70  These families employed wage laborers and tenants, whose work, along with 
adult family members, meant that childhood on successful progressive farms, for boys 
and girls alike, was for school and extra-curricular activities, punctuated with chores 
and projects.  Like their mothers, they no longer engaged in drudgery.  Instead they 
were training for progressive farm management and middle-class living. 
Farming at the Margins 
 Developing and maintaining this rural middle-class was the ultimate goal 
of progressive farming advocates and policy makers.  They portrayed the process as one 
of social improvement in which rural communities were strengthened by rising incomes, 
better managed tenancy arrangements, and the improved quality of life for rural women 
and children.    The narrative of progresses obscured the loses of smaller farms.  It failed 
to recognize the ways in which farm programs underserved or actively discriminated 
against the portion of the farming population that could not attain ideal progressive 
farming white, middle class success. 
The Master Farm Families accounted for very few of the farming families in the 
Carolinas.  The vast majority of these farms were smaller, less prosperous, and, 
according to policy makers at least, less efficient.  The lower value the USDA and the 
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U.S. generally government placed on these farms was plainly evident in the 
implementation of the draft during World War II.  According to an assistant secretary of 
agriculture in 1950, farm workers on larger commercial farmers were drafted at lower 
rates than those from smaller farms.  “Deferment policies . . . were administered for a 
part of the war period on the basis of war unit criteria with respect of farm size.  This 
operated in the direction of more deferment of farm workers of military age on the more 
productive and large size farms.  Conversely, males of military age and inadequate-
sized farms failed to meet the deferment criteria in greater proportions.”71  Small farms 
would contend with a host of policies and implementation strategies that continued to 
cast their efforts as inadequate. 
North Carolina was dotted with many very small farms in the 1950s.  While 
North Carolina’s average farm size increased to approximately eighty-four acres by 
1956, the national average reached two hundred forty-one acres and continued to grow 
at a faster rate than North Carolina’s farms.  Further, the state saw an increase in the 
number of part time farmers, those who received a significant portion of their income 
from off-farm sources.72  In 1954, 56 percent of North Carolina farms reported some off-
                                                     
71 K.T. Hutchinson to Lindley Beckworth, January 24, 1950, Box 1843, Folder “1950 Employment - Farm 
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72 David Weaver, “The Overall Extension Program and Significant Changes and Trends in Agriculture,” 
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farm income and on twenty-seven percent of farms, off-farm income surpassed the value 
of farm products sold.73 
North Carolina’s pattern of industrialization also contributed to the abundance 
of part-time farms in the state.  Extension officials saw the characteristics of the textile 
industry as a significant contributing factor.  In the unstable textile industry, factories sat 
idle for days or weeks at time, which made it not only possible, but desirable and even 
necessary for textile workers to supplement their incomes with farm production.74 
Patterns of decentralized industrial development allowed mostly white rural workers to 
earn cash wages while maintaining their connections to rural communities and continue 
to participate in farm work.    
Policy makers and farm program administrators of the 1950s saw North 
Carolina’s abundance of small, low-income farms as detrimental to the state’s economy 
and its competitive position for farm production and industrial development relative to 
other farm states.  Policy makers believed part-time farms to be inefficient producers 
who struggled with high production costs, low returns, and poor quality produce.  At 
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best the prevalence of part-time farms was a temporary condition, and at worst they 
were a reflection of North Carolina’s lagging progress in farm modernization.  North 
Carolina’s director of Extension, David Weaver, believed that “this part-time farming is 
excellent in many respects, particularly as it serves as a transition device from true 
commercial farming to complete off-farm employment.  It is inevitable that this change 
will take place sooner or later.”  Part-time farming must only be a transitional phase, 
Weaver believed, because it was not “conducive to the best conservation practices,” nor 
to the mechanization that would promote efficient and profitable commercial farming.75   
An ASC tobacco division chief recommended part-time farming as a transitional 
strategy for a small farmer in Wayne County, NC.  Paul Parks wrote the Secretary of 
Agriculture to explain that shrinking allotments and rising land values were driving him 
out of business.  “I own a small farm, about 21 acres [of ] cleared land,” Parks wrote.  “I 
had 5.1 [acres of] tobacco when I bought the farm.  Now I have a tobacco allotment of 
2.89 [acres].  I just cannot make a living on it now.”  Unable to rent additional tobacco 
land to increase his productive capacity, he turned to his local committee.  “I have tried 
the get the committees in my county to raise my allotment, they said there is nothing 
they can do,” Parks explained. The head of the ASCS tobacco division upheld the 
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committee’s ruling and suggested that Parks find some off-farm work to increase his 
income. 76 
In the endeavor to increase farm sizes, allotments proved troublesome for policy 
makers and very small farmers.  To some extent allotments, especially the very small 
allotments that some flue-cured tobacco farmers possessed, both necessitated and 
supported part time farming.  Allotments guaranteed access to the regulated market, but 
for many that access was too limited to provide adequate income.  Therefore, tiny 
allotments created these part-time famers.  In response, David Weaver proposed policy 
revisions that would allow for the transfer to allotments from very small farms to the 
larger commercial farms in their area.  He saw this transfer as necessary to a 
community’s economic development, as it would facilitate the further efficient 
production of commodities while freeing up the smallest farmers for other 
opportunities.  “As an important part of these area redevelopment programs, the 
government should make possible the transfer of small production allotment and should 
establish criteria for encouraging their consolidation on efficient family farms.”77   
                                                     
76 Joe. R. Williamson to Paul Y. Parks, May 6, 1960, Box 9, Folder  “May 1960,”  RG 145, NARA.  Parks 
was not the only disappointed established or aspiring tobacco farmer in Wayne County that year.  The 
committee administered 3064 tobacco allotments, amounting to more than fourteen thousand acres.  But in 
1960, the committee granted no allotment expansions and rejected seven applications – all that they 
received – from individuals wishing to start growing tobacco. See, “Wayne County ASC Highlights” p. 20, 
Box 5, Folder “Reports, May 1961,” RG145, NARA. 
77 David S. Weaver, “The Challenge – Teamwork Approach to Agricultural Problems in North Carolina” 
[draft], p. 19, Box 1, Folder 6, David Stathem Weaver Papers, 1982, 1917-1968, Series 1, NCSU. 
 264 
 
While allotments allowed small famers to hang onto their place in the market, 
their grip grew tenuous as the allotments shrank every year.  Farmers sent pleas for 
allotment increases to their county committees, their Congressional delegations, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, and even the President.  A Virginia farmer explained his plight 
to Dwight Eisenhower in August, 1960.  “We are writing now to ask if you will please 
help to get more tobacco allotment. . . . We have not even a half acre.”  The McKinneys 
lived in Jetersville, Virginia, where, they told the president, there were no jobs other 
than farming.  So desperate were the McKinney’s circumstances that they had been 
required to mortgage their home to bury their son the year before, and now faced 
foreclosure.  An acre and a half or two acres of tobacco would greatly improve their 
situation, they explained to Eisenhower.78  A Clinton, North Carolina, farmer wrote to 
Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman in 1963 after learning that allotments would be 
reduced in 1964.  “I understand that we are in for another cut in tobacco.  I only have 86 
one hundredths [of an acre allotment.]  If it is cut much more I will be completely out of 
tobacco.  There is lots more in the same shape I am in.  The little farmers will soon be 
completely out of tobacco and their homes.  The larger will have it all, the ones that are 
able to buy up people’s tobacco allotments.”79   
                                                     
78 Mr. and Mrs. T. W. McKinnly to Dwight D. Eisenhower, Aug. 21, 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15-1, 
Aug 1960,” RG145, NARA. 
79 Unknown to Orville Freeman, November 14, 1963, Box 13, RG 145.7, NARA. 
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With allotments shrinking and small farmers finding it difficult to amass large 
enough allotments and marketing quotas to make a sufficient living, applications by 
new farmers to receive allotments for the first time often met rejection.  Frustrated 
applicants critiqued the gatekeeping function of the county committees and the 
allotments they administered, arguing that the entire system was unfair and served only 
to protect larger commercial farms.  Mrs. Frank Day, of Elkfork, Kentucky, writing to the 
Secretary of Agriculture on her husband’s behalf, expressed outrage at the system and 
those who benefited at her expense. Her husband, a World War I veteran, had failed to 
meet the requirements for a new grower tobacco allotment.  Day found it infuriating that 
in spite of her husband’s military service, “now he doesn’t have Freedom [to let] him 
have a base on his farm when so many other men around is getting rich with such big 
bases because they was fortunate enough to have money to buy up farms with base.”80  
Her husband fought for freedom, but, Day confided in the Secretary, he saw little of that 
freedom in the allotment system.  He maintained that “if Russia has any laws any 
rottener than this one he’d like to see it.”81 
                                                     
80 Mrs. Frank Day to Ezra Taft Benson, Sept. 2 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15-1, Sep 1960,” RG 145, 
NARA.  Recall from chapter 1 that “base” is the established production history of a plot of land, in 
reference to which committees made yearly determinations about allotments. 
81 Mrs. Frank Day to Ezra Taft Benson, Sept. 2 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15-1, Sep 1960,” RG 145, 
NARA. 
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 Nearly all famers who wrote to Washington officials seeking modest, 
even tiny, increases in their tobacco and cotton allotments reasoned that, among all the 
millions of acres of their given commodity grown in the country, the few additional 
acres they requested would pose little administrative problem or contribute to the 
surplus conditions allotments were supposed to combat.  Surely, they asserted, some 
allowance could be made for the small additions.   Yet the very modesty of these 
applicants’ ambitions proved detrimental to their claims.  The ASC and the Extension 
Service actively pursued a policy of consolidating small farms and encouraging these 
families to find other work. Any further enabling of struggling small-scale producers to 
persevere was antithetical to their goals.   
Families without the means to acquire more land, and the allotments that went 
with it, in such constrained circumstances that even a little more production would 
mean a great deal, were exactly the famers that policy makers sought to exclude.  Small 
famers understood that the continued growth of neighboring full-time commercial 
farms, and the further deterioration of their own circumstances, was not simply a 
function of the market that favored efficiency and economies of scale.  Policies that 
favored larger progressive farms actively worked to drive the small scale producer out 
of business.  Tobacco division chief Joe Williams was unusually explicit on this point in 
a 1960 letter in which he reasoned with a rejected new allotment applicant that, “You 
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will probably understand that regular tobacco producers wish to keep the requirements 
rather strict because the tobacco allotments for their own farms have been considerably 
reduced, partly due to the extra production on new farms.”82  Seldom were USDA 
officials so candid about the gate-keeping aspects of commodity allotment programs. 
For tenant farmers, shrinking allotments meant that they were pushed from the 
land in a process resembling a game of musical chairs.  As landowners had fewer 
allotment acres to rent, tenants competed for a smaller pool of available land.  Those 
who lost their leases because their allotments were gone often left their homes seeking 
other farms to rent. Some years the specific provisions of a given commodity program 
remained in flux through the winter, leaving landlords and tenants alike uncertain about 
their arrangements for the coming year. I.O. Schaub described the problem to North 
Carolina Senator Frank Porter Graham when development of the specifics of the 1950 
cotton program was delayed.  It was certain that allotments would be smaller than in 
1949, but by how much remained unclear.  The situation would, he explained,  
affect a larger number [of people] since there will be many tenants displaced 
from the larger farms; and it remains to be seen as to just what these people can 
do.  Reports from some of our field men today indicate that in our main cotton 
counties there is a greater movement of tenants than for many years.  The first of 
January is moving day, and at the moment there is much confusion.  Reports 
indicate that the better tenants will in the main get placed without too much 
                                                     
82 Joe R. Williams to Mrs. Frank Day, Sept. 23, 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15-1, Sep 1960,” RG 145, 
NARA. 
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difficulty.  Poorer grade tenants will undoubtedly have quite a problem in 
getting placed on a farm. 
 
Schaub saw little chance that these displaced tenants would find non-farm employment 
locally, and anticipated they would seek public assistance instead.83  This pattern 
continued until tenancy all but disappeared by the 1960s. 
As small farmers endured the process of being slowly squeezed from the farm 
economy, they found little help from the Extension service.  This was especially true for 
part-time farmers, who were more difficult to reach, were in need of different kinds of 
information and aid, and were working toward different goals than full-time 
commercial farmers.84  The methods that Extension workers used to reach the farm 
community, such as week-day community meetings and demonstrations, were ill-suited 
to the needs of individuals who also held factory jobs and therefore had less flexibility in 
their work-day schedules.  David Weaver, while applying to Extension officials in 
Washington for funds to develop programs targeted to part-time farmers, 
acknowledged that “many of our county agents have felt that they had little or no 
responsibility to part-time farmers and, hence, devoted most of their efforts to full-time 
                                                     
83 I.O. Schaub to Frank P. Graham, Jan 3, 1950, Box 10, Folder “G, 1948-1950,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
84 David S. Weaver to C.M. Ferguson, July 28, 1954, Box 19, Folder “D.S. Weaver, 1953-1955,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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farm families.”85  Indeed, county agents focused their efforts on the most prosperous and 
most influential farmers in the community in a system one anthropologist has called 
“practical favoritism.” 86  Wilson County’s extension agent during the 1950s explained 
that he strategically chose to work with the “decision makers” among the farm 
community – land owners and highly respected tenants – who could demonstrate the 
effectiveness of Extension sponsored techniques and sway their neighbors, through 
example and discussion, to attempt the same.87 
In general, Extension officials and farm program administrators blamed the 
difficulties faced by low-income and part time farmers on their own recalcitrance rather 
than on a system of farm support that was unsympathetic, and often totally blind, to 
their needs.  The November, 1951, North Carolina Extension-issued “Statement of the 
Situation and Problems Affecting North Carolina Farms, Homes and Communities in 
1952” outlined the farm situation of the 1940s and early 1950s.  It acknowledged the 
challenges posed by increasing out-migration from the rural areas of the state, the 
                                                     
85 David S. Weaver to C.M. Ferguson, July 28, 1954, Box 19, Folder “D.S. Weaver, 1953-1955,” North 
Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
86 Peter Benson, Tobacco Capitalism:  Growers, Migrant Workers, and the Changing Face of a Global 
Industry, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2012):  91.   
87 Peter Benson, Tobacco Capitalism:  Growers, Migrant Workers, and the Changing Face of a Global 
Industry, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2012):  91.  The literature on problematic methods of the 
Extension Service is extensive.  For examples see Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformation of 
Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures since 1880 (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 1985); Lu Ann Jones, 
Mama Learned Us to Work:  Farm Women in the New South (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina 
Press, 2002); Debra Reid, Reaping a Great Harvest:  African Americans, the Extension Service and Rural 
Reform in Jim Crow Texas (College Station:  Texas A&M University Press, 2007). 
 270 
 
disruptions in family labor caused by the war, and the detrimental effects of inflation on 
farm income in the era.88  But it also placed the blame for poor living conditions and low 
farm incomes squarely on the shoulders of low income farmers, the “majority” of whom 
“[fail] to take full advantage of their opportunities in making the best use of their 
resources,” and who used their income in inefficient ways.89  The report castigated 
farming families who did not produce food crops, large gardens, and livestock for their 
own consumption and for cash sale (failing to “live at home” in the old 1920s and 1930s 
terminology), and who spent their limited cash on grocery goods.  The report gave no 
attention to the reasons for these families’ choices, which included the terms of tenancy 
arrangements or the inability to spare family labor for the work necessary to maintain 
extensive gardens and livestock.90  Instead, officials encouraged discipline and restraint, 
urging families to set priorities and objectives within their reach and adjust their 
production and spending behaviors accordingly.91  
                                                     
88 “Statement of the Situation and Problems Affecting North Carolina Farms, Homes and Communities in 
1952,” pp. 1-4, Box 2, Folder 9, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant 
Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU. 
89 Statement of the Situation and Problems Affecting North Carolina Farms, Homes and Communities in 
1952,” p. 1, Box 2, Folder 9, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant 
Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU.   
90 Statement of the Situation and Problems Affecting North Carolina Farms, Homes and Communities in 
1952,” p. 3, Box 2, Folder 9, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant 
Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU.    
91 Statement of the Situation and Problems Affecting North Carolina Farms, Homes and Communities in 
1952,” p. 5, Box 2, Folder 9, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Assistant 
Director Records, 1907-1978, NCSU.   See also David S. Weaver to Clarence Poe, January 10, 1956,  p. 1, 
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Part-time farmers had two choices in the view of administrators and policy 
makers at NC State and other land grant colleges.  Either they should commit to full-
time, commercial farming or stop farming entirely.  This preference drove the decisions 
that Extensions leaders and land grant college deans made when allocating their 
resources and determining which farmers to assist.  At a 1957 conference of Extension 
officials and deans of the schools of agriculture in the major land grant colleges, 
speakers such ad C. B. Ratchford, voiced frank opinions about small, part time or “in-
between farmers.” The task for his audience was to encourage these families to either 
invest fully in efficient commercial agriculture, or to cease farming, and to support them 
in that choice through education and other aid.  Ratchford asserted that the age of the 
“in-between” farmer was ending. “Those in the in-between group who do not make a 
decision to move in one direction or the other will become essentially welfare cases in 
the future.”92 Continuing his remarks, Ratchford explained these farmers would 
continue to fall behind because their backwardness and unwillingness to adapt revealed 
their own failures of character.  “If the general economic conditions continue good and if 
                                                     
 
Box 14, Folder “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director 
Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
92 C. B. Ratchford, “N.C. Agriculture of the Future:  What it will be Like and How We Can Serve It,” 1957, 
p. 18, Box 3, Unlabeled folder, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director 
Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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our efforts with this group are successful, the number of in-between farmers will be 
sharply reduced.  In fact, all that should be left eventually is a group who are really 
incapable of making much of a contribution in any place in our economy.  At that time, 
we should help get them recognized publicly as the welfare cases that they really are 
and at that time redirect our efforts to commercial farmers and to other groups.”93   
Even as federal allotment policies restricted allotments, preventing very small 
farms from achieving modestly larger scale production, other policies discouraged the 
development of community resources that might have aided these farmers in sharing 
risks and expenses.  Progressive commercial farmers aggressively forged an 
independence from each other, encouraged and financed by readily available credit 
from the government and from private lenders.  Farming communities moved away 
from the culture of shared work and resources that exemplified earlier agrarian reform 
movements and the cooperative ethos of the associationalist period.94  For instance, 
many farms built private crop storage facilities with the help of government financing. 
Agricultural economists of the Depression era identified inadequate storage 
facilities as a key reason why growers sold their crops soon after harvest when the wide 
                                                     
93 C. B. Ratchford, “N.C. Agriculture of the Future:  What it will be Like and How We Can Serve It,” p. 19, 
Box 3, Unlabeled folder, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU. 
94 Historians, especially historians of rural women, have studied the transition from a shared work culture in 
farm communities to more independent and isolated work made possible by mechanization before World 
War II and the manner in which this affected the work of farm women.. See Mary Neth, Preserving the 
Family Farm, and Melissa Walker, All We Knew Was to Farm.  
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spread availability of farm commodities resulted in the lowest market prices of the cycle 
for those goods.  Properly equipped and weather-tight grain bins, silos, and barns 
allowed farmers to hold crops off the market, awaiting the end of the post-harvest glut 
and to grow and store more of their own livestock feed (or to time feed purchases to the 
most advantageous markets).  Such storage was also necessary to qualify for CCC loans.  
A 1954 Extension service pamphlet on grain storage advertised the advantages of 
private storage.  Grain storage would pay for itself, the pamphlet informed readers, by 
allowing farmers to take advantage of higher prices and tax write-offs.95  Developing 
crop drying, storage, and transportation resources amounted to the building of a private 
agricultural infrastructure.96   
The USDA issued loans specifically for crop drying and storage facilities for up 
to eighty percent of the cost of new equipment and buildings through local ASC office.97  
Individual farmers provided the remaining portion, either through privately obtained 
credit or from farm cash resources.  The ASC issued loans for other infrastructural 
purchases such as permanent irrigation systems, and thus financed significant 
                                                     
95 “More Dollars with More Storage,” NC Agricultural Extension Service, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular 
Letters, Jan-June, 1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU. 
96 Robert N. Collender and Steven R. Koenig, “The Role of Federal Credit Programs,” Marvin Duncan and 
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97 1956 loans in NC: 4 years, 4% interest, up to 80% of the construction cost  “More Dollars with More 
Storage,” NC Agricultural Extension Service, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular Letters, Jan-June, 1954,” 
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 274 
 
investments in farm facilities98  While these resources made investment in land and 
private infrastructural improvements possible on farms that could meet the minimal 
down payment obligations, the poorest farmers found even this out of their reach.  
Cooperative facilities might have provided an answer to this problem, but these same 
programs provided strong disincentives to cooperative investment.    
The Farm Credit Administration did include a network of banks that lent solely 
to agricultural cooperatives, but the easily available credit for erecting storage structures 
encouraged individual farms in the Carolinas to invest in their own private facilities.  As 
a result, many communities lacked any cooperative storage or marketing enterprises.  
An Edisto, South Carolina, Master Farmer nominee explained that he was not a member 
of any cooperatives because there were no cooperatives in his county to join.  The 
cooperative ventures that might have helped small farmers compete in the growing 
agribusiness economy that encouraged bigness often never materialized because the 
wealthier farmers in the community, such this Edisto Master Farmer, had no need to 
contribute to their development.  The farmers with the most resources – either in assets 
or creditworthiness – had little incentive for cooperative action when they possessed the 
wherewithal to act individually.  Therefore, while federal credit provided opportunities 
                                                     
98 “More Dollars with More Storage,” NC Agricultural Extension Service, 1954, Box 6, Folder “Circular 
Letters, Jan-June, 1954,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 
1914-2010, NCSU. 
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of land and homeownership that would have been beyond the means of many poorer 
farmers, federal lending policies favored large individual investments that reinforced 
the success of commercial farming enterprises while discouraging development of 
institutions that could have supported smaller farms. 
Black farmers faced even higher obstacles when they turned to their county 
committees and local agency offices for help.  In 1997, two class action law suits brought 
national attention to the history of discrimination these minority farmers encountered in 
farm programs, and the suit specifically complained of unfair treatment and delayed 
service form the county committees of the ASC and FHA.99  While the law suit restricted 
itself to complaints between 1981 and 1996, the plaintiffs and their advocates told of a 
long history of discrimination.100  The opinion of the court, issued in 1999, cited this 
history when authorizing a settlement in which the USDA agreed to compensate the 
claimants.  “For decades . . . the Department of Agriculture and the county 
commissioners discriminated against African American farmers when they denied, 
delayed or otherwise frustrated the applications of those farmers for farm loans and 
other credit and benefit programs . . . These events were the culmination of a string of 
                                                     
99 Tadlock Cowan and Jody Feder, “The Pigford Cases:  USDA Settlement of Discrimination Suits by 
Black Farmers,” Congressional Research Service report RS20430, (March 12, 2013), p. 1. 
100 Tadlock Cowan and Jody Feder, “The Pigford Cases:  USDA Settlement of Discrimination Suits by 
Black Farmers,” Congressional Research Service report RS20430, (March 12, 2013), p. 1; Consent Decree, 
Timothy C. Pigford, et al. v. Dan Glickman, Civil Action 97-1978 (PLF) and Cecil Brewington, et. al. v. 
Dan Glickman, Civil Action 98-1693 (PLF), April 14, 1999, 
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/pigfordmonitor/orders/19990414consent.pdf (accessed April 27, 2013), p. 5. 
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broken promises that had been made to African American famers for well over a 
century.”101  The opinion linked the long-standing discrimination against black farmers 
by USDA programs and their local committees, to a precipitous decline in the number of 
black farmers in the United States since the beginning of the New Deal, from 925,000 in 
1920 to 18,000 in 1992.102 
In the 1950s, farm progress farm policy makers began to articulate and pursue a 
policy that had been the logical conclusion of their approach all along.  In order to raise 
the average income of southern farmers, there would need to be fewer farms in the 
South.  Over the course of the 1950s, average farm income was on the rise in North 
Carolina because so too was the size of the state’s farms. North Carolina had nearly the 
smallest average farm size in the South in 1950, but both Carolinas experienced 
significant concentration of farm land in the ensuing decade and a related decline in 
tenancy.  North Carolina had 33.94% fewer individual farms in 1959 than in 1950 while 
South Carolina lost 43.9% of its farms.  But in the same period, total farm acres under 
cultivation in both states fell by less than one half of one percent.  (See Table 4.)  
                                                     
101 Timothy C. Pigford, et al. v. Dan Glickman, Civil Action 97-1978 (PLF) and Cecil Brewington, et. al. v. 
Dan Glickman, Civil Action 98-1693 (PLF), April 14, 1999, p. 3, 
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http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/pigfordmonitor/orders/19990414op.pdf (April 27, 2013).  For a detailed 
analysis of how post-war discrimination against African-American farmers drove such farmers off the land, 
see Pete Daniel, Dispossession:  Discrimination Against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil 
Rights,” (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
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Table 4:  Farm Concentration in North Carolina and South Carolina, 1950-
1959103 
 1950 1959 
 NC SC National NC SC National 
Number 
of Farms 
288,508 139,364 5,388,437 190,567 78,172 3,710,503 
Acres 
Cultivated 
31,422,080 19,395,2000  31,402,880 19,374,080  
Average 
Farm Size 
(acres) 
67 85.2 240 83.4 117 310 
 
In such an environment, it was little wonder that the politics of parity and the 
price-cost squeeze resonated so well with Carolinas farmers.  But when they looked to 
the consumer for the source of their trouble, they looked to the wrong place.  The farm 
                                                     
103 All figures taken from the 1959 Census of Agriculture.  “North Carolina, State Table 1. – Farms, 
Acreage, and Value:  Censuses of 1920 -1959,” 
<http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/AgCensusImages/1959/01/26/865/Table-01.pdf> (August 29, 2012); 
“South Carolina, State Table 1. – Farms, Acreage, And Value:  Censuses of 1920-1959,” U.S. Census of 
Agriculture:  1959, Vol. 1, Part 27, South Carolina, p. 3,  
<http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/AgCensusImages/1959/01/27/865/Table-01.pdf>  (August 29, 2012);  
national figures:  http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/AgCensusImages/1959/02/05/909/Table-02.pdf 
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ownership, lease, or sharecropping arrangement.  Ray Hurley, “Introduction,” Counties and State Economic 
Areas, North and South Carolina, United States Census of Agriculture:  1950, Vol. 1, Part 16, 
(Washington, D.C.:  Bureau of the Census, 1952), p. XII 
<http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/Historical_Publications/1950/vol1%20North%20South%20C
arolina/41656297v1p16.pdf> (August 29, 2012). 
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programs that stabilized the market also slowly, inexorably, narrowed the farm 
population to a few commercial farmers who fit the progressive farming mold. 
Conclusion 
Progressive farm policy makers were committed to the idea of the family farm, 
however restrictive their notions of such farms happened to be.  They support those 
farms that fit the mold or demonstrated potential to do so.  When David Weaver and 
others spoke of the necessity of the family farmer to the health of American democracy, 
it was these farmers he had in mind, not the supposedly unambitious potential welfare 
clients that were the in-between farmers, the increasingly obsolete tenants, and black 
farmers.  Progressive farming advocates came to embrace, more clearly than ever before, 
the idea that agriculture was compatible with middle class living only in an economy 
with many fewer farms.  Industrialized farming required economies of scale that were 
incompatible with a society of very small farms. 
Committees and agency personnel decided who was and was not a farmer when 
they assigned or denied acreage allotments and marketing quotas.   Small farms, part-
time farmers, and minority owned farms had no place in this calculus.  Policy makers 
used the power of the state to deny or restrict allotments or credit and remove incentives 
for cooperation.  Their problems ranked low on the priority list of the Extension service, 
which explicitly favored commercial farmers and segregated the Extension work force.  
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Rules guided their decision.  But they interpreted and implemented these rules with 
reference to culturally informed notions of what a successful family farm looked like.  
This idea was grounded in the goals of pre-Depression Extension officials and rural 
sociologists who lamented the poverty, illness, and ignorance of farming families and 
especially the drudgery associated with rural womanhood and childhood.  These ideas 
combined with 1950s notions of domesticity and the segregated environment of the 
South to create the default type of the white nuclear family. 
This approach to the family farm meant changed roles in the enterprise for all 
members of the family, and altered labor relations with laborers.  Management became 
the primary focus landowning farmers and the sons who hoped to inherit the enterprise.  
This shift in perception corresponded with the intensification of commercial production 
and the consolidation of land holdings.   The same paradigm shaped women’s work in 
the home.  Good home management of newly abundant resources allowed these women 
to join their husbands in farm management.  Their children continued to perform farm 
labor, but in the context of projects and chores, as education and training for 
management in later, rather than as essential workers to keep farms tended.  Tenant 
farmers lost their autonomy, and eventually their tenancies, to become wage farmer 
labors or were forced out of farming entirely as their landlord consolidated his 
managerial control over rented holdings.   
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 Progressive family agriculture devotes faced a frightening reality as the 
1950s came to an end.  The Carolinas had made progress in increasing farm sizes and 
income, but the region was still unable to compete with farm states such as California, or 
corn-belt and Mississippi delta states that for reasons of climate and topography enjoyed 
larger land holdings and longer growing seasons.  There were real limits to the possible 
achievements of a farm economy based on subsidized commodity production alone.  
The theory of the treadmill dictated that for successful progressive farms to remain so, 
they would have to achieve greater yields and even larger economies of scale.  The same 
process that devoured the marginal farms of the 1950s would over time chip away at the 
progressive farms, too.  Rural communities looked for solutions, turning to commercial 
diversification and marketing-focused, value-added agribusiness in a process that 
would reveal the deepening fault lines between the farming and commercial or 
industrial interests in the Carolinas. 
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Chapter 6: “Farming is Big Business” 
C. Brice Ratchford was a rising star in North Carolina’s farm agencies.  In 1952, 
Ratchford had just completed his second Ph.D., holding doctorates in both economics 
and agricultural economics from Duke University and North Carolina State College. The 
Gastonia native had recently become the Assistant Director of the state’s Agricultural 
Cooperative Extension Service.  Ratchford earned attention in eastern North Carolina 
when he weighed in on a local controversy with important implications for the 
economic future of the region.  A serious proposal to build a regional commercial airport 
nearby promised economic growth and diversification, but also threatened to displace a 
vocal group of farmers from their land.  Ratchford waded into the controversy by posing 
an extreme, though, as we shall see, ambiguous hypothetical.  He posited in an article in 
the Rocky Mount newspaper, the Evening Telegram, that if “you take all farmers out of 
the area . . . Rocky Mount would dry up.”1  Ratchford asked readers to consider the 
importance of each farm dollar spent in town for supplies, household goods, and 
utilities.  Then he asked them to imagine Rocky Mount without that circulating farm 
income and warned the city’s professionals and businessmen that without those farm 
                                                     
1 “Rocky Mount would Dry Up if Farmers taken from Area,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram (March 2, 
1953):  2A.  
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dollars “perhaps three-fourths of the people of Rocky Mount would have to go 
elsewhere.”2   
What could they do to avert such a crisis?  The economist’s answer was 
ambiguous.  “For everyone to prosper we must move forward in agriculture.  . . .  If we 
stand still, we actually slide backward.”3  Moving forward meant different things to 
different people.  On one hand, Ratchford sounded a familiar, reminding businessmen 
and professionals in town that they were not as far removed from the farm they 
imagined themselves.  Their fortunes were closely tied to that of the surrounding farm 
community.  Business could not prosper while farmers struggled.  This caution came 
with a caveat.  Rocky Mount only faced this gloomy future if neighboring farmers 
disappeared “and were not replaced,” either by new farms or some alternate economic 
activity.4  Ratchford’s statements addressed advocates of economic diversifiers and the 
farm community.  He reassured farmers and rural landowners that their work was key 
to the well-being of local municipal economies.  Ratchford also conveyed the developing 
policy 
                                                     
2 “Rocky Mount would Dry Up,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram (March 2, 1953):  2A. 
3 “Rocky Mount would Dry Up,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram (March 2, 1953):  2A.  
4 “Rocky Mount would Dry Up,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram (March 2, 1953):  2A. 
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Figure 13:  C. Brice Ratchford as Assistant Director of the North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service5 
position of his and other farm agencies and organizations that greater concentration of 
farming concerns and a diversified economy would ultimately benefit eastern North 
Carolina.  The Rocky Mount Evening Telegram’s choice of headline, when seen in this 
light, looks less like a celebration of agriculture’s importance to the city and more like a 
warning that Rocky Mount and surrounding areas relied far too heavily on the 
agricultural sector.  Eastern North Carolina was attempting to chart a new course would 
allow them to adjust to the changes taking place in agriculture – larger farmers, greater 
mechanization, fewer laborers – and join the economic prosperity that was beginning to 
                                                     
5 “C. Brice Ratchford,” 1959, item number 0007454, Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina 
State University Libraries, Raleigh, North Carolina.  Photograph used with permission. 
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take off in cities and towns across the South.  Two strategies emerged.  One favored 
economic diversification.  The other worked to build a farm-based agribusiness 
economy. 
The term “agribusiness” first emerged in the 1950s from the United States 
Department of Agriculture and Harvard Business School.  It described a model of 
production and distribution, one that valued efficiency, industrialization, and economies 
of scale over small-scale production and labor-intensive farming methods.6  The 
agribusiness system encompassed the entire supply chain from seeds and equipment, to 
chemicals and fertilizers, to finished products for sale in restaurants and grocery stores.  
It emphasized production, packaging, and processing methods that created value-added 
products to be marketed to the “the housewife,” the archetypal consumer of food and 
grocery goods. An agribusiness was one that grew, manufactured, processed, or 
marketed farm supplies or produce on an industrial scale.  It employed the most up-to-
date technology to reduce labor costs and meet quality standards of grade and 
packaging, was often at least partially vertically integrated, and strove to reach the 
widest market possible.7 
                                                     
6 Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country:  The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy, (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 113. 
7 Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy, (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
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At the farm level, agribusiness was a strategy rather than an identity.  No farm 
family would have described their work as “agribusiness.”   Nevertheless, successful 
commercial farms were in fact engaged in agribusiness when they adopted many of the 
methods of progressive farming.  When famers selected plant varieties and animal 
breeds that produced fibers, leaves, grains, and milk suited to the needs of industrial 
scale processors, they were engaged in the production of the raw materials of 
agribusiness.  Progressive farms produced these commodities using chemicals, 
fertilizers, and equipment manufactured or sold by agribusiness firms.   Farms that 
vertically integrated into ginning, packing, and other processing, storage, and marketing 
activities also engaged in agribusiness.  From the perspective of progressive farming 
boosters and policy makers any distinctions between the family farm and agribusiness 
were meaningless.  The managerial progressive family farm was the foundation of 
agribusiness.  
As a policy objective, agribusiness was a processing and marketing-focused 
approach to the problem of the agricultural treadmill.  Creating larger progressive farms 
focused on commodity production alone would not create enough new jobs in rural 
communities or help successful farms to stave off the inevitable effects of the 
agricultural treadmill.  Agribusiness boosters in the Carolinas believed that larger 
investments in technology and marketing infrastructure were the answer to problems of 
 286 
 
the farm economy.  Even though farm sizes in the Carolinas increased steadily and 
significantly over the course of the 1950s, the region’s farms still operated on a scale, in 
both land acres and annual income, much smaller than average farms in other areas of 
the country.  While Sumter County deemed itself an “agricultural empire,” the entire 
state of South Carolina generated less agricultural income annually than a single county 
in California.  In this environment, farm interests worried that the all of the progress 
they had achieved in modernization and increased production in the decades since the 
Great Depression was inadequate.  The logic of progressive agriculture that deemed the 
very small famers of the region obsolete and backward compared to their larger 
neighbors, if applied on a national scale, made Carolina agriculture in its entirety look 
insignificant.  Boosters turned to agribusiness as a strategy to remain competitive and 
relevant. 
Business interests not tied to agriculture looked for other avenues of economic 
growth in the Carolinas.  They strived to participate in the burgeoning Sunbelt economy.  
In rural communities the redistribution of land, labor, and capital required to shift from 
agricultural production to industrial and commercial pursuits created tensions between 
farm and commercial interests.  How these tensions played out illuminated the 
complicated role of federal policy in rural communities.  The incentives for agricultural 
production warred with the community development and infrastructure funds available 
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to commercial investors from federal programs. This spurred competition between 
farming and commercial interests, but finding a way to work together would be 
essential to the economic success of rural counties.  A new agribusiness coalition 
emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Their theme was “farming is big business.” 
Farm-City Tensions 
The Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce published an economic survey of their 
city in 1948, exhibiting the town’s status as the epitome of a New South city.  The results 
showed a community greatly reliant on tobacco and textile manufacturing.8  The final 
report asserted that Rocky Mount served as the retail center of an approximately forty 
mile radius of rural farm communities and smaller towns, largely because it was a center 
of farm commodity marketing.9  The town hosted one of the largest tobacco markets in 
the country, second only to the market in nearby Wilson.10  The city improved its 
                                                     
8 For an in-depth history of Rocky Mount from the 1920s through the 1960s, see Lisa Gayle Hazirjian, 
“Negotiating Poverty:  Economic Insecurity and the Politics of Working-Class Life in Rocky Mount, North 
Carolina, 1929-1969,”  Ph.D. Diss, Duke University, 2003. 
9 Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, “An Economic Survey of Rocky Mount, North Carolina,”  (Rocky 
Mount:  Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1948): 6, Box 4, County Source File, 1937-1961, 
RG 44, Conservation and Development, State Advertising Division, SANC. 
10 Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, “An Economic Survey of Rocky Mount, North Carolina.” 
For the importance of tobacco warehouses in Rocky Mount, Wilson and Greenville, see Robert R. Korstad, 
Rights Unionism:  Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century South 
(Chapel Hill:  UNC Press, 2003), and Hazirjian, “Negotiating Poverty.” 
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utilities infrastructure during the Depression with the help of New Deal public works 
funds,11 but transportation facilities, beyond the railroad, were lacking. 
In Rocky Mount the conservative coalition of planters and industrialists had 
together captained the city’s low wage tobacco and textile economy in the New South 
era.12  The dependence on tobacco growers and tobacco marketing came through clearly 
in the report.  The city was home to ten tobacco redrying and stemming facilities.13  
During the busy season, these warehouses employed approximately 2600 people, 
making the industry the city’s largest employer, accounting for nearly one third of jobs 
in Rocky Mount, during tobacco season.14  But, as we have seen, there were reasons to 
doubt the future stability of tobacco programs in 1952 and 1953.  President Eisenhower 
and his staunchly conservative, anti-farm subsidy Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft 
Benson, appeared poised to shake the foundations of federal farm programs in the early 
years of their 
                                                     
11 Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, “An Economic Survey of Rocky Mount, North Carolina,”  (Rocky 
Mount:  Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1948): 2, Box 4, County Source File, 1937-1961, 
RG 44, Conservation and Development, State Advertising Division, SANC. 
12 David R. Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers:  Southern City and Region, 1607-1980 (Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1982):  33-35, 194-196; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and 
Southern Society, 1877-1984, (Lexington:  The University of Kentucky Press, 1984): 15. 
13 Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, “An Economic Survey of Rocky Mount, North Carolina,”  (Rocky 
Mount:  Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1948): Appendix D, p. 2, Box 4, County Source 
File, 1937-1961, RG 44, Conservation and Development, State Advertising Division, SANC. 
14 Year-round the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company employed approximately 2500 people. The 
textiles mills accounted for a combined 1736 jobs.  All other listed industries combined, including lumber, 
feed and flour mills; fertilizer plants; and other manufacturers accounted for less than 1600 jobs.  Rocky 
Mount Chamber of Commerce, “An Economic Survey of Rocky Mount, North Carolina,”  (Rocky Mount:  
Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1948): Appendix D, pg. 2, Box 4, County Source File, 1937-
1961, RG 44, Conservation and Development, State Advertising Division, SANC. 
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Figure 14:  Rocky Mount, Tobacco Market Opening Day, 1938.  Farmers gather 
at the cashiers’ windows to receive payment for tobacco sales.  Notice that in addition 
to the prominent cigarette advisements, the local movie theater and department store 
vied for a share of farmers’ newly received income. 15 
administration.16  If the tobacco economy were to destabilize again, or if tobacco farm 
incomes were to fall significantly, there would be detrimental effects on local commerce.  
It was no longer clear to the business community that tobacco was the region’s best 
option.   
                                                     
15 “Opening North Carolina Tobacco Markets, Tobacco Warehouse, Rocky Mount, North Carolina,” 
Raleigh News and Observer Negative Collection, Item number NO_38_8_68, SANC, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/north-carolina-state-archives/8514255914/in/set-72157632876659572/ (April 
30, 2013).   Originally published in the News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), August 26, 1938.   Photo 
reprinted with permission of The News & Observer of Raleigh, North Carolina, and the State Archives of 
North Carolina. 
16 See chapter 3. 
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If eastern North Carolina hoped to court industry, they first had to address their 
infrastructure problem.  The region needed an expanded highway system and natural 
gas availability.17  Members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Rocky Mount city 
alderman identified improved airport facilities as key to the region’s ability to attract 
new industries and keep up with piedmont cities.  The Rocky Mount Evening Telegram 
championed this cause. Major regional and municipal airports in the Carolinas, such as 
the Raleigh-Durham, Greensboro, and Columbia facilities, embarked on expansion 
projects and increased their services in the late 1940s and early 1950s.18   Meanwhile, 
Rocky Mount’s municipal airfield was quickly becoming obsolete.  The 325-acre facility 
on the edge of town, with its short runways and glide angles obstructed by the smoke 
stacks of the Imperial Tobacco Company and the city utilities plant had reached the end 
of its usefulness for commercial flight.  Capital Airlines, the carrier serving the town, 
could not land its new DC-4 aircraft at the Rocky Mount facility. Other trunk and 
regional carriers expressed interest in a Rocky Mount stop-over, but were similarly 
                                                     
17 “C&D Says Area Must Have Airport, Natural Gas to Get New Industry,” Evening Telegram (Rocky 
Mount, N.C.), October  28, 1955: 4A.  The North Carolina Conservation and Development Board identified 
the lack of natural gas as the reason the Southern Nitrogen Company chose Savannah, Georgia, over 
Wilmington, North Carolina, as the site for its new fertilizer plant.  City managers and chambers of 
commerce across the region testified to the NC General Assembly that natural gas availability was essential 
to their continued growth. 
18 http://www.rdu.com/aboutrdu/history.htm; http://www.flyfrompti.com/about/airport-history/; 
http://www.columbiaairport.com/abouttheairport/history.aspx 
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restricted.19  City commercial boosters cited the supply chain and communications needs 
of commercial and industrial firms and argued that up-to-date facilities capable of 
accommodating new aircraft were necessary to attract business to the area.20   
In early 1951, a group of local businessmen formed the Rocky Mount Airport 
Commission.  They met with officials from the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), 
a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce with authority for approving and 
subsidizing civilian airport construction and expansion.21  The commission learned that 
the CAA would contribute half the funds necessary to purchase land and build 
runways, but that the CAA favored the development of regional facilities rather than 
smaller municipal airfields.  In the autumn, the commission responded by meeting with 
the Boards of Aldermen and the Chambers of Commerce from the nearby towns of 
Wilson and Greenville.  The group decided to apply for federal funds using what the 
Telegram termed an “area approach.”  The project quickly gained momentum, and the 
town of Tarboro along with the Boards of Commissioners of the four affected counties 
joined the effort.  
                                                     
19 Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), (March 29, 1953): 1B. 
20 The Telegram asserted that an Eastern Airlines stopover was all but assured with a larger airport.  But in 
the competition-averse regulatory environment of the early decade in which the CAB was no longer guided 
by the “presumption doctrine,” achieving certification of an Eastern Airlines route through Rocky Mount 
might have been more difficult than the Telegram implied.   
21 This CAA in the Department of Commerce should not be confused with another CAA, the original name 
by which the CAB was briefly known. 
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Questions and discontent focused on the likely site for the facility emerged 
almost immediately.  According to the Telegram, the Commission had not yet officially 
chosen a site, nor even formed a committee to do so, but credible rumors circulated that 
a site in southern Edgecombe County would be chosen.  An area of 1000 acres was 
required, an expanse nearly equal to that involved in the recent Raleigh-Durham Airport 
expansion.22  Edgecombe County townships eight, nine, and ten possessed adequate 
undeveloped farm land ideally situated for a facility intended to serve the four counties. 
The evident suitability of the site galvanized its inhabitants’ opposition to the project.  
The telegram blamed “an ‘anonymous source’” for “stir[ing] up the farmers in the 8-9-
and 10 Townships.  This was obviously a sensitive point because a reference to any map 
would indicate that the airport would probably be located somewhere in this area since 
it was “equi-distant” in so far as practicable from the four cities.23” 
The paper identified farmers as the primary interest group erecting road blocks 
to diversification and infrastructure construction in eastern North Carolina.  It portrayed 
them as narrow minded thinkers, lacking vision for the future, and as selfish land-
hoarders.  The Telegram’s editors identified opposition to the airport as typical of farmer 
resistance to all infrastructure improvement projects that affected farmland, including 
                                                     
22 Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March 29, 1953: 1B. 
23 Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March 29, 1953: 1B. 
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highway construction. An editorial called on land owners to recognize that modern life 
required that some farm land be converted to others uses “in the name of progress.”  
The author aimed his sharpest barb at implied arguments that the new airport would be 
a waste of good farmland.  “After all, good tobacco probably would grow on Rocky 
Mount’s Main Street, but it is being used for something considered more worthwhile.”24 
This was utterly incendiary language from the primary news and opinion outlet in a 
quintessential tobacco town. The editors asserted that retail and commerce were not 
simply intertwined with agriculture, but that these activities were superior to tobacco 
cultivation.  Tobacco production and marketing had been the lifeblood of the city, but 
the opportunities for expansion and job creation seemed limited in an environment in 
which total tobacco production was capped by government-issued allotments.  For 
economic growth, these commercial boosters maintained, farm area towns would have 
to look beyond tobacco. 
Furthermore, dependence on tobacco was becoming a sign of “backwardness.”  
Pitt County congressman Sam Worthington declared that the eastern region of North 
Carolina “was always kind of backward,” complaining that “we let the Piedmont get all 
the industry, roads and airports ahead of us.”25  The Telegram brought to its crusade for a 
                                                     
24 “. . . Always Kind of Backward . . .,” The Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March, 18, 1953:  
4A. 
25 “. . . Always Kind of Backward . . .,” The Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C), March 18, 1953:  4A. 
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regional airport a sense of urgency and a fear of the city being excluded from prosperity 
they saw gaining momentum in the Piedmont region.  Rocky Mount chafed at the ability 
of rural land owners to limit the city’s growth and to stand in the way of the federal 
investments that were beginning to make a difference to other southern cities.26  “The 
question before us now is whether Eastern Carolina will get into the main stream of 
American life or remain a quaint, idle, poor farming country – a backwash ‘tobacco 
road’ section.  Without adequate airport facilities, our prospects are dim.”27  With these 
pronouncements of the backwardness of the area’s economy, the Evening Telegram and 
the commission it championed a new division between the interests and goals of the 
commercial and farm communities in which the region’s towns courted new industrial 
development unrelated to agriculture. 28   
To some extent, the paper was correct.  Federal farm programs, with their 
guaranteed price floors, gatekeeping of the marketplace, and readily available credit 
provided the county’s farmers with rich incentives to stay put.  A leading figure from 
                                                     
26 On the importance of federal subsidies and the preferential treatment of the South when building federal 
facilities or granting federal contracts, see Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt:  Federal Policy, 
Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980, (Durham:  Duke University 
Press, 1994). 
27 Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March 29, 1953: 1B. 
28 Fike, IB; “Lost Battles in Good Causes Refuse to Stay Lost,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram, June 17, 
1953): 4A; “For New Airport:  New Beginnings,” Rocky Mount Evening Telegram, August 2, 1955: 4A; 
Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March 29, 1953: 1B. 
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the hamlet of Crisp, who figured at the forefront of the airport opposition, argued that 
the new airport was unnecessary because “we are getting along better than we ever 
have.”  He saw strong commodity supports as the reason for the region’s improved 
economic fortunes, and those programs did work well for landowners. Successful 
progressive farmers had little reason to seek different work or to sell their land for the 
sake of new infrastructure.  But to those who argued that the region had never had it 
better, the Telegram replied, “That’s unquestionably true, but that’s a terribly short-
sighted view.”29   
In this assessment, the paper gave very short shrift to the peculiarities of farm 
programs that complicated farmers’ decisions to sell even part of their land for 
development projects.    Until 1961, allotments were tied to specific plots of land.  If the 
owner sold the land, the allotment transferred to the new owner.30  The USDA did not 
consider the allotments to be the property of land owners.  If a farmer sold a tract of 
farm land, even just a portion of a farm, any associated allotments would be transferred 
to the new owner, and the old land owner’s allotments would be reduced or lost 
entirely.31 This interpretation of the regulations governing allotment assignments caused 
                                                     
29 Edward L. Fike, “’Backward’ Eastern Carolina May Become Backwash Section Without Area Airport,” 
Evening Telegram (Rocky Mount, N.C.), March 29, 1953: 1B. 
30 James T. Ralph to Horace Godfrey, June 8, 1961 5590 
31 Clarence L. Miller to John J. Riley, January 19, 1961, Box 3569, Folder “Acreage Allotments – 
Marketing Quotas Jan 1 – Aug 31, 1961, RG 16, NARA. 
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many farmers to think twice before they sold their land, either to other farmers or for 
non-farm uses.   
In 1960, the ASC and members of the congressional agriculture committees 
received many complaints, especially from North Carolina farmers, about this policy.  A 
Kernersville farmer wished to sell small lots from his land for homebuilding, but was 
concerned that doing so would jeopardize his allotment.  As the prospective buyers had 
no intentions of growing tobacco themselves, keeping his allotment intact seemed little 
to ask, and “it would very greatly aid a lot of people.”32  Others found themselves 
surprised about effects on their allotments after the fact.  Buncombe County farmer A.J. 
Curtis did not know that his tobacco allotment had been reduced after the sale of “wood 
land on which no crops has ever been raised,” until he received notice that the tobacco 
planted on his remaining farmland exceeded his allotment.  Curtis threatened to sue the 
ASC and the person to whom he sold the woodland.33  Farmers near Kinston petitioned 
Congressman Harold Cooley asking for revisions to the rules that would aid small 
farmers in their community when farm land was diverted to industrial uses.  “The 
tobacco farmers are very much upset over what is happening in our community . . . 
Tobacco lost from land for community expansion and industrial development is now 
put into the Federal acreage pool and lost to other counties or states.  We in Lenoir 
                                                     
32 M.E. Fagg to Ralph J. Scott, May 24, 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15 Jun 1960” RG145, NARA. 
33 A.J. Curtis to Blanche Edmonds, June 27, 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15 Jun 1960” RG145, NARA. 
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County want this acreage to stay in Lenoir County and be allocated to hardship cases, 
i.e. to those who the lowest percentage of acres of tobacco relative to their total cleared 
acres.”34   
Whether farmers wished to keep allotments for themselves or to redistribute 
them among the community, existing allotment policies made it very difficult for 
farmers to part with any of their land without cutting significantly into their ability to 
produce their most important crops, even if they otherwise might have wished to sell.  It 
is no accident that North Carolina farmers were among the most vocal in opposing this 
practice.  The state’s large quantity of tobacco acreage made allotment administration in 
North Carolina especially complicated.  Allotments for tobacco were, on average, 
smaller than for any other regulated crop.  They were also determined to the smallest 
unit of measurement of any crop.  Only in tobacco were allotments figured to the 
hundredth of an acre.  With so many farmers reliant on small tobacco acreages, such 
small units were important, and even small acreage losses could be damaging to small 
growers. 35   
When the North Carolina’s chief ASC administrator became the head of the 
Commodity Stabilization Service in 1961, this problem was one of the first he addressed.  
                                                     
34 Rachel D. Davis to Harold Cooley, June 2, 1960, Box 9, Folder “Tobacco 15 Jun 1960” RG145, NARA. 
35 Horace Godfrey to James T. Ralph, June 13, 1961, Box 2, Folder “Commodities – Tobacco, 1961,” RG 
145, NARA. 
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Godfrey’s revisions made it possible to sell a portion of a farm without losing a portion 
of the allotment.  Allotments remained attached to the land, but so long as the acreage 
exceed the allotment it need not be revised downward.  As a result, a land owner could 
sell a portion of his or her farm and could, with approval from the county committee.  
Godfrey pointed to advantages for smaller farmers who could cash in assets and keep 
up their productive capacity or make transfers of land within families without penalty. 36  
The new allotment policy could also free up land for sale for non-farm uses. 
Prior to these adjustments in 1961 allotment policies kept farmland locked into 
farm uses.  Other conservation policies that involved yearly payments or long-term 
contracts committed some land to conservation schemes such as tree plantings or 
drainage fields.  As airport advocates pushed their project through the mid-1950s, they 
encountered the strong disincentives to sell farmland that agriculture policy created.  
Infrastructure subsides and vague hopes of future prosperity could not overcome these 
existing commitments.  The farm community did recognize the need for further 
economic development to expand markets for their produce and to provide jobs for 
displaced farm works.  They offered different solutions to the problem than their urban 
commercial and professional counterparts.  They turned to agribusiness boosterism to 
court farm-based growth and innovation. 
                                                     
36 Horace Godfrey to James T. Ralph, June 13, 1961, Box 2, Folder “Commodities – Tobacco, 1961,” RG 
145, NARA. 
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Agribusiness Boosterism 
Farming and agribusiness developed its own booster strategy in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, designed to combat charges of backwardness.  They insisted that agriculture 
was and could continue to be the foundation of a thriving economy.  A 1960s pamphlet 
of the Association of Southern Agricultural Workers – an organization of farm agency 
employees – illustrated the point.  Artwork showed a man on a tractor plowing his field, 
with the skyline of a city, complete with tall buildings and puffing smoke stacks, in the 
background.  “Southern Agriculture is BIG Business,” was the motto emblazoned on the 
front.  Countering charges of backwardness, the pamphlet author, Association president 
and NC State College of Agriculture dean D. W. Colvard, asserted that agriculture was 
rife with opportunities.  Thanks to research and leadership, he wrote, southern 
agriculture had advanced beyond the “primitive and simple” and that “the roles of 
people, land, technology and capital” had changed.  The result was “greater 
opportunities” for those who embraced modern methods and showed entrepreneurial 
spirit.37 
                                                     
37 D. W. Colvard, “Southern Agriculture is BIG Business,” Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, 
February 1, 1960, p. 2, Box 6, Folder  “Assoc. of Sou. Agr. Workers, 1941-60,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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Figure 15:  “Southern Agriculture is Big Business,” February 1, 196038 
The pamphlet’s artwork and its sales pitch placed farming in the foreground of a 
united industrial and commercial economy.  Colvard and other agribusiness proponents 
understood that “teamwork of farming related business and industry” and 
                                                     
38 “Southern Agriculture is Big Business,” Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, February 1, 
1960, Box 6, Folder “Association of Southern Agricultural Workers,” North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  Used with permission. 
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“communication and understanding” between agricultural and commercial sectors 
would be essential to farm-based economic growth.39  New and strengthened 
partnerships with the business community would connect farmers and farm-related 
business with customers.  Like industry, agribusiness would require expanded 
infrastructures for farm produce handling and marketing.  In response, agribusiness 
boosters emerged from a range of institutions to build networks and seek models of 
farm-based development.  They were the officers and administrators of the federal and 
state farm organizations, as well as some interested members of Chambers of 
Commerce, the leaders of land grant colleges, state government officials, representatives 
from state boards of economic development, and crucially, members of the commercial 
banking community. 
Credit was essential to emerging agribusiness. The integration of southern 
commercial banks into the farm economy was an important project of agribusiness 
boosterism.  The South’s agricultural capital and credit needs were never adequately 
met by Southern banks before the Depression.40  The federal government began to 
                                                     
39 “Southern Agriculture is Big Business,” Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, February 1, 
1960, Box 6, Folder “Association of Southern Agricultural Workers,” North Carolina Cooperative 
Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.   
40 Farm credit institutions, either those supported or operated by the federal government or private banks, is 
a subject historians have largely left to agricultural economists.  We know next to nothing about the role of 
the community banking system or of the region’s growing nationally charted banks in farm communities in 
the post-World War II South and very little about the on-the-ground workings of the federal farm credit 
system. 
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intervene in the farm credit market early in the twentieth century.  Federal Land Bank 
(FLB) operations employed a decentralized structure similar to that of the Federal 
Reserve, and both institutions opened for business in 1916.41  Throughout the period that 
followed, National Farm Loan Associations issued Federal Land Bank loans to farmers 
                                                     
 
Prior to the Great Depression, the southern states were badly underserved by commercial banking 
institutions.  The dearth of southern banks was both a symptom and a cause of the collapse of the tenancy 
and sharecropping systems that evolved after the Civil War.  As Harold Woodman explains, in the cash-
starved economy of the former Confederacy, where plantation owners lost much of their assets to 
emancipation and black farm laborers found themselves in a position to bargain the terms of their 
employment for the first time, tenancy and sharecropping developed as a way for land owners to secure a 
labor force.  Planters tied the compensation of nominally independent workers to farm production, 
circumventing the need to pay wages in scarcely available cash.  Land owners and furnishing merchants 
provided access to farm supplies, groceries, and other basic necessities on credit, guaranteed by the 
projected value of the cotton crop growing in the field.  Tenants and share croppers who lived on this type 
of credit paid exorbitant prices for their goods and often owed their landlords or merchants far more than 
their cotton brought at the end of the year – deficit sometimes exacerbated by creative accounting by 
creditors that many victims were too illiterate or too powerless to contest.  In this economy, cotton, not 
cash, was the currency. And in the absence of cash, banks proved both unnecessary for agrarian economic 
activity and difficult to establish.  Harold Woodman, New South – New Law:  The Legal Foundations of 
Credit and Labor Relations in the Postbellum Agricultural South, (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995) 
Limited local banking options and the lack of liquid assets restricted the means and incentives for 
investment in economic development in the South by southerners.  It was no accident that much industrial 
development, especially in the textile industry, of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
originated from outside sources.  The southeastern piedmont, ranging from southern, central Virginia into 
the central region of South Carolina received the bulk of such investment.  The Piedmont could thank the 
fortunes of geography, for the region featured reliably flowing rivers and a rapidly falling elevation from 
the mountains to the coast ideal for powering textile manufacturing.  The region’s homegrown industrial 
powerhouse, tobacco processing, located in the piedmont for similar reasons, and when local tobacco 
barons, such as the Duke family, sought investment opportunities for their fortune, those same rivers 
proved ripe for electricity production.  While the eastern regions of the Virginia and the Carolinas remained 
cash poor and agriculturally focused, the piedmont grew more industrialized and wealthy.  It was to this 
history that Sam Worthington referred when he lamented that “we let the Piedmont get all the industry, 
roads and airports ahead of us.” On the growth of piedmont industries, see Jacquelyn Hall, et.al. Like a 
Family:  The Making of A Southern Cotton Mill World, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 
1987). 
41 Robert N. Collender and Steven R. Koenig, “The Role of Federal Credit Programs,” Marvin Duncan and 
Jerome M. Stam, eds., Financing Agriculture in the Twenty-first Century, (Boulder:  Westview Press, 
1998),  135. 
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and third party lenders, mostly as long-term mortgages, but more than half of NFLAs 
were failing by 1933.42  Nationally, private bank lending to agriculture (for operating 
capital and equipment, not land purchases) peaked in 1921 at nearly four billion dollars, 
but this figure fell off rapidly as the agricultural sector descended into depression in the 
1920s and did not return to this level until 1958.43  
New Deal legislation authorized a new system for distribution of FLB loans, the 
Farm Credit Administration (FCA).44  By 1937 the FCA held 40 percent of U.S. farm 
mortgage debt.  Mortgages alone could not fulfill farmers’ credit needs. The Farm Credit 
Act authorized the establishment of cooperative Production Credit Associations (PCAs).  
Operating credit from the PCA in the form of “low-cost loans were also intended to help 
farm families remain on their farms or reestablish themselves in farming” by “providing 
liquidity to farm capital markets that suffered from a withdrawal of many suppliers of 
debt capital.”45  PCAs were cooperative lending institutions organized in each county, as 
the “largely attended” meeting in Kershaw County, South Carolina, where farmers 
                                                     
42 “Chronology,” America’s Farm Credit Archive, 
http://www.farmcreditarchive.org/chronology/default.aspx, (Feb 10, 2012). NFLA is credited as the origin 
of the distinctly American 30-year mortgage. 
43 Benjamin J. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking:  A History, (Boston:  Twayne Publishers, 1990),  
202. 
44 USDA-based agricultural economists Collender and Koenig have argued that the goals of the FCAs, like 
those of the Resettlement Administration, was to promote land ownership with the belief that landowning 
farmers would be better stewards of the land than transient share cropper and tenants had been of the badly 
eroded and depleted southern soils.  Yet while the RA’s efforts were limited in scope and intended to ease 
individual families’ dependence on staple agriculture, the FCA served a broader farming public and worked 
in concert with the AAA framework of regulated commodity production. 
45 Collender and Koenig, “The Role of Federal Credit Programs,” 140. 
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gathered for “the purpose of hearing representatives of the Production Credit 
Corporation of Columbia discuss the organizing of a county association.”46  The federal 
government provided much of the capital necessary to fund the early PCA loans, and 
borrowers paid membership fees of approximately five percent of the value of the loan, 
making all borrowers members of the cooperative.  Farmers turned to the PCAs to fill 
the gaps left when traditional sources of financing fell to the Depression.  Personal 
bankruptcies and bank closings and the dissolution of the furnishing merchant system 
and person-to-person loans that had financed New South agriculture.47  
The story of Rhett McGregor’s South Carolina dairy farm helps demonstrates the 
credit obtaining strategies of farmers who struggled during the Depression, but, with 
the help of federal lending sources, emerged from the era with successful enterprises.  In 
his 1953 Master Farm Family award nomination, McGregor described his assets when he 
began farming as an adult:  “Father lost the farm[,] and I inherited 16 cows and 5 
                                                     
46 A. A. McKeown, “Monthly Report: Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics, 
State of South Carolina,” November 1933, p. 2, Box 22, Folder 665, STI, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Field Operations, 1918-1985, Series 33, STI. 
47 The ABA tracked the total dollar value of farm loans made by the FHA, the Federal Farm Mortgage 
Corporation, joint-stock land banks, Federal Land Banks, life insurance companies, commercial banks, and 
“individuals and others.”   Loans by “individuals and others” were probably under-reported in the ABA’s 
figures, but the Agricultural Credit Report found the overall value of such loans to drop sharply between 
1930 and 1935, and to continue their downward trend through 1946.  The trend then reversed, but by 1958 
the value of loans by individuals and others barely reached 1930 levels and experienced the slowest rate of 
increase for all loan types from 1945-1959.  Agricultural Commission, American Bankers Association, 
“1959 Agricultural Credit and Related Data,” Chart D, p. 26, Box 3293, File “Farm Credit 1, Loans, May 7 
- June 30 [1959],” RG16, NARA. 
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mules[.]”48  An inheritance of livestock and work animals was no small thing, but 
without land, Rhett McGregor moved nearer his wife’s family where he purchased land 
on which to grow cotton.49  His son, Sam McGregor vividly recalled the man, a Mr. 
Sessoms, from whom his father borrowed the money to purchase that farm.  “I 
remember he drove a black Packard automobile and he wore a black suit, smoked a 
cigar, and . . . you had to be nice to Mr. Sessoms.”50  The low cotton prices of the 1930s 
undermined even the best cotton farms, and as Sam McGregor recalled, theirs was not 
the best.  It suffered from  “poor soil, sandy soil and this was not a very productive 
cotton farm.  . . .  And cotton went down to five cents a pound and so [my father] went 
into the dairy business.”51   
The McGregors lost their cotton farm in 1938.52  In order to start anew on 
different land, this time in the diary business, Rhett McGregor told the Master Farm 
Family judges that he borrowed money from the Federal Land Bank.  He built his house 
with a loan from the Farmers Home Administration.  For both Rhett and Sam McGregor 
                                                     
48 “The Master Farm Family Record, Rhett M. McGregor,” 1953, Box 110, Folder 9, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
49 “The Master Farm Family Record, Rhett M. McGregor,” 1953, Box 110, Folder 9, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
50 Interview, Sam McGregor by Elizabeth Brake, September 16, 2011, transcript in author’s possession , p. 
18. 
51 Interview, Sam McGregor by Elizabeth Brake, September 16, 2011, transcript in author’s possession , p. 
18 
52 Interview, Sam McGregor by Elizabeth Brake, September 16, 2011, transcript in author’s possession , p. 
18 
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this was the beginning of a career-long relationship with federal farm credit agencies.  
Rhett McGregor served as the president of his local Production Credit Association, and 
he and his wife regularly attended PCA conferences well into their retirement.53  When 
Sam McGregor took over the operations of their dairy farm, he considered federal loans 
a competitive alternative among several available options for his credit needs.54 
Ideally, the PCA and FHA borrowers would acquire assets and develop cash 
flow thanks to federal credit and the modernization of their farming operations and 
homes that such credit terms encouraged and enabled.  These families and farms would 
emerge from the federal lending apparatus as homeowners and experienced borrowers, 
creditworthy customers of their community’s private banks.  Practical circumstances 
created more fluid realities.  Federal loans did not merely offer credit with training 
wheels for needy rural customers.  Federal lending institutions enjoyed important 
advantages over small scale community banks that made them attractive lenders for 
more affluent farmers.  Because they could draw public funds, Federal Land Bank and 
Production Credit Association loans in many areas were larger and offered longer 
                                                     
53 “The ‘Master Farm Family Record’:  Rhett M. McGregor,” 1953, Box 110, Folder 9, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI; Rhett McGregor attended a PCA meeting in 
Camden, S.C., in July, 1967 attended the national PCA conference in Atlanta, June 1969, Sam McGregor,  
“Laurinton Dairy Farm, Daily Log, 1962-1973,” (unprocessed), July 27, 1967, June 7, 1969, Acquisition 
Number 07-69, 09-74, STI. 
54 For instance, Sam McGregor applied for a loan from the Federal Land Bank to build a new milking shed 
in January, 1967.  In 1971, he was making payments on a Production Credit Association loan.  Sam 
McGregor,  “Laurinton Dairy Farm, Daily Log, 1962-1973,” (unprocessed), February 1-3, 6, 1967, May 28, 
1971, Acquisition Number 07-69, 09-74, STI. 
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repayment terms than  local banks, which were reliant on deposits, could offer.  Federal 
loans better suited than community bank loans to the requirements of larger commercial 
farms seeking larger sums and repayment terms tailored to the agricultural business 
cycle. 
Southern farmers depended most heavily on PCA loans for operating capital and 
other non-real estate purchases.  In 1959, the value of non-real estate bank loans to 
agriculture, nationally, outpaced PCA loans 54 to 46 percent.  Yet in PCA District 2, 
comprised of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, the PCA made, on 
average, 52 percent of all non-real estate farm loans.  District 2 was the only district in 
the country in which the PCA made more than half of all loans.   In its nearest rival, 
District 4, consisting of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the PCA made only 37 
percent of farm loans.55  In California, Kansas, and Iowa, agricultural giants to which 
Carolina agribusiness advocates looked for example business models, commercial banks 
made an average  of 90 percent of all non-real-estate farm loans.  (See table 5, below, for 
a comparison of District 2 states and other selected agricultural states.) 
 
                                                     
55 Agricultural Commission, American Bankers Association, “1959 Agricultural Credit and Related Data,” 
pp. 28-29, Box 3293, File “Farm Credit 1, Loans, May 7 - June 30 [1959],” RG16, NARA. 
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Table 5:  Comparison of Bank PCA non-real estate loans to agriculture, January, 195956 
 
 
In the years between the 1930s and the mid-1950s, commercial banks largely left 
the field of agricultural financing to the federal credit agencies in the Carolinas.57 This 
began to change the farm sector generally became more prosperous and stable, and as 
agribusiness sought new sources of capital. Farm programs that provided effective price 
floors and nearly guaranteed markets made issuing credit for agricultural production 
less risky for commercial lenders than before the New Deal.  Further, lending statistics 
suggest that PCA credit was sufficient to maintain regulated commodity production, but 
it was not sufficient for expansion into agribusiness ventures like packing, and ginning, 
                                                     
56 Agricultural Commission, American Bankers Association, “1959 Agricultural Credit and Related Data,” 
p. 28, Box 3293, File “Farm Credit 1, Loans, May 7 - June 30 [1959],” RG16, NARA. 
57 For an analysis of developments in farm credit and their effects on farm investment, see Sally Clarke.  
Clark demonstrates that in the Depression years there was a net transfer of farm lending from commercial 
sources to government lenders thanks to refinancing programs.  Sally Clark, Regulation and Revolution in 
United States Farm Productivity (Cambridge, U.K.:  Cambridge University Press, 1994), 187-190. 
State District 
%  Non-Real 
Estate Farm 
loans by Banks 
%  Non-
Real Estate 
Farm loans 
by PCA 
US  54 46 
N. Carolina 2 54 46 
S. Carolina 2 44 56 
Georgia 2 59 41 
Florida 2 48 52 
California 10 88 12 
Iowa 8 93 7 
Kansas 9 87 13 
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and would not finance industrial scale processing, marketing, and distribution facilities.  
For that new sources of capital would be necessary.   
Farm agencies and organizations also explained their agribusiness goals to their 
local bankers and business community.  In counties across South Carolina these groups 
came together in tentative efforts to understand each other’s needs and press their own 
agendas.  This process involved network building among these groups.  Farm agency 
officials and farm organizations partnered with banks and local Chambers of Commerce 
to promote the message that farming is “big business.”  The Southern Agricultural 
Workers, and organization of farm agency employees and officers, laid out a “platform 
for progress” that pointed to the need for such cooperation.  In addition to research and 
education, rural progress would require “teamwork of farming related businesses and 
industry” as well as “communications and understanding” among these groups.58 
In 1958, the South Carolina Extension service surveyed the Chambers of 
Commerce in South Carolina to determine what kind of agriculture related programs 
they conducted.59  They found that many of South Carolina’s Chambers of Commerce 
were newly organized or struggling.  The Oconee County chamber was established in 
                                                     
58 D. W. Colvard, “Southern Agriculture is BIG Business,” Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, 
February 1, 1960, p. 2,  Box 6, Folder “Assoc. of Sou. Agr. Workers, 1941-60,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
59 The archive holds survey responses from 14 Chamber of Commerce organizations, found in Box 29, 
Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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1952,60 Conway’s in 1958,61 and the Aiken Chamber of Commerce nearly disbanded in 
1957.62  Survey responses showed these groups’ uneven and mostly tentative 
engagement with agricultural issues in the 1950s, as well as emerging efforts to cross the 
divide.  Typically Chambers of Commerce sponsored farm contests and 4-H 
competitions and awards, but were otherwise not directly involved in agriculture unless 
there were direct implications for town and commercial facilities.  For this reason, 
several took an active interests in watershed management, as erosion could affect both 
farms and municipalities.63  The Anderson Chamber of Commerce, was an exception. 
The county was home to Clemson University, and the Chamber was engaged in 
promoting business growth based on farm product processing and storage.  Packing 
sheds and dairy facilities, grain elevators, and farmers markets were among the 
Anderson Chamber’s projects.64   
Ventures of this type were exactly what that southern agribusiness proponents 
hoped to develop further.  In 1953, the Progressive Farmer published a special issue on the 
                                                     
60 John W. [Duncan], “Activities of the Oconee County Planning and Development Board,” May 6, 1958, 
p. 1, Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
61 E. Arthur Tate to George B. Nutt, n.d., Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 
1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
62 A. H. Ward, “Activities of the Aiken Chamber of Commerce,” p. 7, May 2 1958, Box 29, Folder 1, 
Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
63 John M. Duncan, “Activities of the Oconee County Planning & Development Board,” May 6, 1958, p. 4, 
Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI; J. W. 
Grazier, “Activities of the Chester County Board of Commerce & Development,” May 5, 1958, p. 4, Box 
29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
64 Z. W. Meeks, “Activities of the Anderson, South Carolina Chamber of Commerce,” n.d. [1958], p. 2, 
Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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development of farm-related businesses in which it emphatically described the unmet 
economic potential of agriculture-related business in the South.  “Every crop and every 
animal enterprise included in Southern farming systems demands marketing, processing, and 
distribution equipment and services.  FEW ARE ADEQUATELY AND COMPLETELY SERVICED AT 
THE PRESENT TIME.  Also, every supply item that farmers buy must be made and distributed.  
New enterprises – crops and animals – mean new kinds and types of supply equipment 
and materials, therefore, new business opportunities.”65 1960s included new 
agribusiness tours in which the farm community showed off their Efforts to forge tighter 
links between farm and business interests in the late early existing marketing and 
processing facilities and made a pitch for further interest and support in these endeavors 
from local businessmen.66 
 
                                                     
65 “New Rural Industries that Fit Your Community,” The Progressive Farmer Raleigh, N.C., 1953, p. 4, 
Box 14, File “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director 
Records, 1914-2010, NCSU.  Emphasis as in original. 
66 For an analysis on how Georgia onion growers pursued marketing and production strategies that 
converted Vidalia onions from a local and only seasonally available crop to a nationally marketed and 
internationally produced commodity available in stores year round, see Tore C. Olsson, “Peeling Back the 
Layers:  Vidalia Onions and the Making of a Global Agribusiness,” Enterprise and Society, 13:4, 
(December, 2012):  762-772.  Olsson demonstrates that Vidalia growers engaged in boosterish strategies 
that traded on the identity of onion growers as family farmers and the special qualities of Georgia soil to 
market onions on a national scale.  
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Figure 16:  Cover of a 1953 Progressive Farmer publication, advocating for 
development of farm-related industries67 
Farmers could not expanded  their agribusiness enterprises alone.  The farm 
economy required investment from and cooperation with the local business community.  
In an effort to nurture these relationships, farm agencies and the business community 
                                                     
67 “New Rural Industries that Fit Your Community,” The Progressive Farmer Raleigh, N.C., 1953, Box 14, 
File “P, 1948-1959,” North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-
2010,Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina State University Libraries.  Used with 
permission. 
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staged farm tours and other events designed to promote contact and conversation 
between the two groups.  Orangeburg’s Chamber of Commerce had organized two 
“Business-Farm Days” in which businessmen toured local farms.68  Chester County’s 
Chamber planned a “Farmer-Merchant picnic” for June 1958.69  On June 8, 1959, Sumter 
County, South Carolina held a county tour, billed as its “first annual Agri-Business 
Day.”70  Early that morning, attendees piled into two air-conditioned busses outfitted 
with public address equipment and departed on a tour of the county.  Brief visits and 
drive-by viewings of the area’s agribusiness gems and most successful farms filled their 
morning while Extension officials narrated the scene.  Tour stops emphasized large scale 
enterprises over smaller; crop diversity over cotton monoculture; storage and marketing 
facilities over production; and modernization across the board.  Tour organizers invited 
participants to marvel at Sumter’s the steps the county’s farmers were already taking to 
develop agribusiness in their communities and to see the potential for future growth.   
Planning for the agribusiness day festivities began as a joint project between the 
Sumter County Extension office and the agricultural committee of the Sumter Chamber 
                                                     
68 S. Ernie Wright, “Activities of the Orangeburg South Carolina Chamber of Commerce,” May 5, 1958, p. 
5, Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
69 J. W. Grazier, “Activities of the Chester County Board of Commerce and Development,”  May 5, 1958, 
p.6, Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
70 Prior to May 1958, the Sumter Chamber of Commerce had held a “pasture tour” and a “tour of 
agricultural leaders in cooperation with the extension service.”  Worth D. Holder, “Activities of the Sumter, 
South Carolina Chamber of Commerce,” May 3, 1958, p. 3, Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension 
Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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of Commerce.  The cooperation between the Chamber and the county’s agricultural 
organizations had been limited prior to the organization of the tour.  In 1958, the 
manager of Sumter’s Chamber of Commerce explained in an Extension Service survey 
that “agricultural activity by the chamber is one of its most difficult areas of endeavor.  
This is caused by the fact that agriculture is so highly organized that there are very few 
areas where programs are not now being sponsored.”  The chamber’s role, he explained 
was primarily one of “support and assistance.”  “We have informed” the agricultural 
organizations “that we will aid them in every way when THEY need our help.”71  From 
the Sumter Chamber’s point of view, with the many state programs and farm groups 
active in the region, agriculture was both organized and insular.  It was not clear to 
them, or to most of South Carolina’s Chamber of Commerce, gauging from the response 
surveys, how best to address agricultural questions or even if they should. 
This limited engagement with agriculture likely explains the Sumter Chamber’s 
general lack of interest in event planning and promotion surrounding the first Agri 
Business Day.  As the report of the planning committee explained, “the secretary of the 
Chamber of Commerce sent invitations to all members of the Chamber of Commerce to 
purchase tickets but the response was very discouraging.” Undeterred, organizers 
reached out to the local business community directly, without the intervening influence 
                                                     
71 Worth D. Holder, “Activities of the Sumter, South Carolina Chamber of Commerce,” May 3, 1958, p. 7, 
Box 29, Folder 1, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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of the Chamber, with success.   The steering committee sold tickets to individual 
businessman.  Each purchaser received two tickets, one for himself and one he was to 
use to bring a farmer as his guest.  Thanks to sponsorship by Sumter County’s banks 
who covered the cost of the entire venture, tickets sold for only a nominal price.  They 
served not to fund the project but to encourage attendance by making individuals feel 
invested.  “No ticket was sold to a businessman unless he promised to attend. . . . [The] 
sale of these tickets were [sic] responsible to a large degree for the success of the day.”72  
With or without the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce, Agribusiness Day 
organizers brought the farm and business community together and facilitated 
cooperation between the two. 
 The planning committee gave great attention to the local politics that shaped 
relationships within and between of the Chamber, agricultural agencies, and farmers in 
the community, and went to great lengths to avoid controversy over the choice of 
participants in its first Agri-Business Day.  These efforts began with the Chamber of 
Commerce, which retained organizing credit even though its membership lacked 
enthusiasm for the project.  Though disappointed in the Chamber’s response to the 
initial invitation to purchase tickets, the steering committee explained that reaching out 
to the members in such a manner had been necessary for it “serve[ed] to make all 
                                                     
72 “Outline of Development and Carrying Out of the Agri-Business Day in Sumter County, 1959,” p. 1, 
Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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members feel they were invited.”  Nor was it only the members of the Chamber of 
Commerce who required special attention.  Organizers invited state level officials of the 
various farm agencies to attend a dinner at the home of the Sumter County Agent on the 
evening preceding the tour.  Officials met over plates of barbecue chicken in an informal 
gathering that “create[d] a better spirit of friendship between the agencies.”  In addition, 
the steering committee took great care in choosing the farms and facilities they visited.  
“To avoid criticism we called in representatives of other agencies along with our 
agricultural committee to select farmers from geographic locations and the standpoint of 
farm interests.”  The choice of tour guides and narrators was also made carefully. 73  
Gathering together the four distinct constituencies that made up Sumter’s emerging 
agribusiness community in a celebration of the county’s agricultural success and a pitch 
for greater investment required careful attention.   
The organizers were attempting to forge connections and build relationships.  
They chose participants with an eye to reputation, skill, and official position.  They 
wanted to avoid conflict that would prove a distraction from their goals.  The theme of 
the day, “the inter-relationship and the inter-dependence of Agriculture and Business,”74 
was woven through the commentary.  More to the point:  agriculture was Sumter’s 
                                                     
73 “Outline of Development and Carrying Out of the Agri-Business Day in Sumter County, 1959,” p. 1, 
Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
74 “Outline of Development and Carrying Out of the Agri-Business Day in Sumter County, 1959,” p. 2, 
Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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business.  Listeners heard that Harvin Packing Company employed fifty people with a 
total annual payroll of $168 thousand dollars, and that the facility processed nearly four 
million pounds of pork and beef annually.  They learned that Sumter Grain Elevator’s 
had a 325,000 bushel capacity.75  They visited the operations of established and respected 
master farmers and up-and-coming growers such Tom Keels, “one of our leading young 
farmers” whose “wife has done a great deal on [the] Home Demonstration Council, 
especially in . . . 4-H work.”76  Farming operations that tended large acreages, raised 
substantially sized herds, or engaged in conservation measures – including crop 
diversification and rotation – received ample admiration.   
The take home message for Sumter’s bankers and businessmen was that farmers 
had money to spend in local business, that they were themselves managers of complex 
businesses that required significant investment.  When the tour passed through an 
heavily farmed area known as “Mayes Opening,” the guides emphasized the point.  
Several Mayes Opening farmers had a quarter of a million dollars invested in equipment 
alone, such as a single farmer who owned six self-propelled combines.  His equipment 
investment proved both necessary and feasible because Mayes Opening operations  
were by 1950s Carolinas’ standards very large, with two farmers raising 3,400 acres of 
                                                     
75 “Agri-Business Day, Sumter, South Carolina, Guide’s Commentary,” p. 1, Box 2B, Folder 25, 
Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
76 “Agri-Business Day, Sumter, South Carolina, Guide’s Commentary,” p. 1-2, Box 2B, Folder 25, 
Cooperative Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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cotton and another raising 2,000 acres of soy beans. Robert C. Edwards, president of 
Clemson College echoed the point in his luncheon remarks.  After all the assembled 
crowd saw that morning, he spoke of “the Agricultural Empire of Sumter County” 
where capitalization was increasing, farmers were thinking like businessmen, and the 
meaning of the word “agribusiness”77 could be clearly seen in practice.  Referencing the 
extraordinarily large equipment fleets of the Mayes Opening farmers, and the 
preponderance of young farmers making the switch from mules to tractors, Edwards 
concluded that “With this new advance in agriculture much more capital is needed, 
therefore the credit systems had to be revised and bankers and lending agencies are 
having to take a new look in order to keep abreast with this big business of progressive 
farming.”78 
The pursuit of agribusiness offered one approach to reconciling simmering 
tensions between the county’s farming and industrial interests. Edwards offered both 
praise and gentle admonishments to the commercial and agricultural factions in the 
room. He celebrated the cooperation the members of his audience that contributed to the 
                                                     
77 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 2, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
78 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 4, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI.  An agribusiness tour of the Chesterfield County in 1961 had a 
similar message.  The State reported that the goals of the purposes of the tour were “1.  To recognize that 
agriculture is still our most basic industry; 2. To promote the idea that agriculture and business are 
dependent upon each other for success; 3. And to acquaint businessmen with many of the changes that 
taken place in agriculture in Chesterfield County.”  Bob Bentley, “Agriculture Still Held ‘Basically 
Important,’” The State (Columbia, S.C.), June 15, 1961.  
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success of agribusiness in the county.  “Much of this was brought about by vision, hard 
work, and cooperation by farmers, your county agent, the business people and your 
Chamber of Commerce.  All goes to show what can be done with vision, cooperation 
and hard work in this thing called Agribusiness.”79  Sumter’s Agri-Business Day and 
similar efforts in counties across the South provided an opportunity for farmers and 
businessmen to “discuss the mutual problems and try to reach more of a common 
understanding.”80   
Edwards recognized the efforts of the Industrial Development Committee of the 
Chamber of Commerce, whose work expanded Sumter’s industrial sector in the 1950s.  
The trend offered mixed blessings to the Agricultural Empire, for while Sumter’s farms 
were growing larger and more mechanized, Edwards told his audience, approximately 
three percent of the county’s farms ceased operations every five years.  “Where are they 
going,” he asked.  “To our new industries which are furnishing employment as well as 
more markets for Agricultural products.”81  Therefore, he cautioned farmers not to resist 
industrialization in their communities in the interests of lower labor and land costs 
when “much of this blame cannot be laid at the feet of your local businessman but goes 
                                                     
79 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 3, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
80 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 8, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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far deeper into tariffs, labor laws, etc.”82  Edwards used the language of the parity here, 
but with a twist.  He enjoined farmers to remember that whatever disadvantages felt 
they endured at the hands of middlemen and consumers in the wider economy, at home 
such resentments should not stand in the way of cooperation with the business 
community to promote local prosperity. 
And lest the industrialists and the professionals in this audience forget, Edwards 
declared that in Sumter, agriculture was still the “goose that lays the golden egg.”83  His 
remarks reflected a particular bias in the thinking of agricultural policy makers and farm 
agency leaders of the time.  Even as individuals left the farm, the assumption endured 
that agriculture was the default occupation of rural people.  While commending local 
industry for creating jobs in rural areas, Edwards diminished the importance relative to 
agriculture.  This bias is clear in the Chamber of Commerce surveys as well.  The survey 
did not ask what the Chambers were doing to attract new industry to their communities.  
They asked what was being done in order to “develop new industries to provide 
employment of [the] surplus farm population.”  This perspective was not unique to 
South Carolina.  At a 1957 meeting of the North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations 
and Agencies, David Weaver’s presentation discussed the potential of agricultural 
                                                     
82 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 8, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
83 Robert C. Edwards, “Remarks,” June 18, 1959, p. 8, Box 2B, Folder 25, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI. 
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processing to provide employment for “the agricultural youth, “boys who normally look 
at farming as a career,” but “would have to look elsewhere” as farms grew larger and 
more reliant on machinery.84  Even in “surplus,” rural workers were farm workers first. 
If South Carolina’s farm leaders viewed industrial development as secondary to 
farm development, why did they court the business and banking community so 
assiduously?  Their agenda was both political and financial.  Edwards embarked on a 
passionate defense of farm support programs, speaking to those who might have 
doubted their necessity when faced with the prosperity showcased by the tour.  Farming 
was risky business, supports were necessary to raise rural standards of living.  Edward’s 
message was clear.  Sumter would thrive on agribusiness, but agribusiness would thrive 
in Sumter only if ready financing could be found in a supportive policy environment, 
both locally and nationally. Successful agribusiness required overcoming the divisions 
between agriculture and industry that parity so successfully built. 
South Carolina’s state officials and leading newspaper joined the agribusiness 
boosters.  In June 1961, Governor Ernest Hollings published his vision for South 
Carolina’s economy in The State.  The paper used Hollings’s statement to kick off a series 
of lengthy features on South Carolina’s industries and agriculture.  They outlined for 
                                                     
84 “Minutes of Semi-Annual Meeting of North Carolina Board of Farm Organizations and Agencies,” July 
17-18, 1957, p. 5, Box 14, Binder, North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director 
Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
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citizens and potential investors alike the potential of a blended agricultural and 
industrial economy, what Hollings called a “progressive economy.”85  The State reported 
that North and South Carolina competed neck and neck for the designation of “No. 1 
textile state” in the United States, but South Carolina imported most of the cotton 
needed to keep its looms running.  Though facing competition from synthetic fibers, 
South Carolina’s textile industry hoped to increase their share of the market by adding 
garment assembly to the already existing weaving and dying processes in the state, and 
by supporting and investing in research into new cotton varieties that would yield 
greater quantities of better quality cotton closer to home.86  This integrated approach to 
industry and agriculture was one way Governor Hollings hoped to provide employment 
for “the rural citizen who has been squeezed out of his livelihood by federal policies.”87  
South Carolina looked for economic development models and new markets 
across the county. During Hollings’ first two years in office, he traveled to many 
industrial US cities in the north as part of a “trade promotion task force.”88  South 
Carolina’s farm leaders adopted a similar strategy. For five years, from 1958-1962, 
Wachovia Bank sponsored Agribusiness Caravans, which gathered sizable delegations 
                                                     
85 Ernest F. Hollings, “Governor Says:  New Alertness Sweeps S.C. Ahead,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 
June 4, 1961. 
86 “Textiles:  An Industry Woven into the Fabric of State,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), June 4, 1961. 
87 Ernest F. Hollings, “Governor Says:  New Alertness Sweeps S.C. Ahead,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 
June 4, 1961. 
88 Ernest F. Hollings, “Governor Says:  New Alertness Sweeps S.C. Ahead,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 
June 4, 1961. 
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drawn from among South Carolina’s state officials, federal agricultural agency 
employees, bankers, agribusiness operators, and farmers to visit other farm states with 
thriving agribusiness sectors.  The June, 1961, trip to southern California reveals the 
goals of South Carolina’s top agriculture officials and the model for agribusiness in the 
South that they hoped to follow. This trip coincided with the first non-stop flights from 
Atlanta to Los Angeles, which South Carolinians hoped would help the state lure west 
coast investors and customers.89   The delegation included Governor Hollings, President 
R. C. Edwards of Clemson College, South Carolina’s Chief Bank Examiner, and a 
representative of the State Development Board.  These men were joined by twenty eight 
community bankers (over half of whom carried the title of bank president, director, or 
senior vice president), fifteen agribusiness operators, twenty three farmers, and fourteen 
other representatives from federal farm agencies, local governments, and Clemson 
College.90 
That Wachovia Bank sponsored the South Carolina Agribusiness Caravan to 
California is indicative of the evolution of both agribusiness in the Carolinas and the 
new interest the banking community took in the development of the farm sector in the 
                                                     
89 Henry F. Cauthen, “Southern Economic Advances Seen in Jet Trail West,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 
June 6, 1961.   
90 “Persons Who Have Gone on Agribusiness Caravans,” pp. 10-12, Box 2B, Folder 27, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Administration, 1918-1987, Series 32, STI.  While assigning roles to caravans 
attendees, I assumed “farmers” were those who only had address listed, without job titles or business 
affiliation.  Most of these persons have rural route addresses. 
 324 
 
post war period.  The Winston-Salem based bank’s history was rooted in the New South.  
It was closely associated with local industrial giants, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 
and Hanes Hosiery.  In spite of its links to tobacco processing, agriculture lending was 
not a primary focus for Wachovia prior to World War II.91  Thanks largely to its 
industrial connections and under the leadership of Robert M. Hanes (president 1931-
1956), by 1954 Wachovia attained the status as the largest commercial bank between 
Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, and was the sixty-fourth largest commercial 
bank in the United States.92  With the wherewithal to make individual loans up to two 
million dollars, Wachovia aspired to provide financing for North Carolina’s growing 
industries and business “at home,”93 and the bank began to turn an eye toward 
agribusiness investment. 
This is in part attributable to Wachovia’s internal leadership.  Long-time bank 
officer and three-time Winston-Salem mayor, Wayne Corpening began his career as an 
Extension agent.94  When he left Extension for a position at Wachovia in 1953, he wrote 
                                                     
91 On Wachovia’s links to R.J. Reynolds and Hanes Hosiery, see Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, pp. 64-
65.  For summary of Wachovia’s industrial focus and Robert M. Hanes’s presidency of Wachovia Bank 
(1931-1956), see Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, “Wachovia Bank . .  . 75 Years of Progress,” 
(Wachovia Bank, 1954) pp. 6-7, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. 
92 Wachovia was the 65th largest of 14,000 commercial banks. Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, 
“Wachovia Bank . .  . 75 Years of Progress,” (Wachovia Bank, 1954) pp. 1, 23, David M. Rubenstein Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. 
93 Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, “Wachovia Bank . .  . 75 Years of Progress,” (Wachovia Bank, 
1954) p. 11, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. 
94 Corpening rose to the rank of Senior Vice President at Wachovia.  He was a three term mayor of 
Winston-Salem and served as the present/chairman of the North Carolina Agribusiness Council from 1972-
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to David Weaver referencing a common hope for agricultural and rural development 
between the bank and the Extension service.  “The only way I know to make it work is 
for Capital and Education to team up and work together.  With this kind of thinking you 
can see where we will have to lean heavy on the extension service for advice.”95  Weaver 
replied in whole-hearted agreement.  “I feel exactly like you in this matter of advancing 
the interests of the rural people of North Carolina.  This is one of the reasons why I was 
content to let you leave us for the important position you now occupy.  It seems to me 
that if you can play a small part in making many of the various interests in North 
Carolina see the importance of a strong agricultural program, you will have served the 
rural people well.”96 The Extension service had long been committed to commercial 
                                                     
 
1974.  See “Former Winston-Salem Mayor Wayne Corpening Dies,” The Business Journal April 13, 2004, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2004/04/12/daily10.html (accessed Feb 5, 2013); NC 
Agribusiness Council, 
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95 Wayne Corpening to David Weaver, July 6, 1953, Box 6, Folder “C, 1950-1953,” North Carolina 
Cooperative Extension Service, Office of the Director Records, 1914-2010, NCSU. 
96 David Weaver to Wayne Corpening, July 8, 1953, Box 6, Folder “C, 1950-1953,” North Carolina 
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the organizers to C.B. Ratchford, Extension assistant director, and Wayne Corpening, Vice President at 
Wachovia. In 1956, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia established a liaison service to “collect and 
disseminate information to all banks and to help them in their efforts to promote rural development.”  The 
purpose of the conference was to put bankers, extension workers, and researchers in Australia into 
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agriculture, but strengthened ties between the Extension Service and commercial 
banking would reinforce the farm agencies’ tendency to promote farm development in a 
manner that made farms into good investments for bankers.  This was the kind of 
businesslike development that agribusiness boosters promoted. 
The Wachovia caravan looked to California for a model of agribusiness to adapt 
to South Carolina.  Large scale agribusiness came to dominate that state’s agriculture 
sector early in the twentieth century.  The investments in irrigation infrastructure 
required for successful commodity production in southern California were such that 
corporate enterprises and government spending were best able to accomplish.  Even 
government programs designed to subsidize and protect small scale family farmers in 
the region failed because arid agriculture required economies of scale unattainable by 
the small famer in order to operate profitably.  Crops amenable to small-scale 
production, such as grapes for raisins or strawberries, required large-scale packaging 
and marketing efforts to reach urban and distant markets, a need filled by large, 
monopolizing cooperatives.  These factors, combined with practically year-round 
                                                     
 
conversation with each other, in the service of modernizing Australian agriculture.   D. W. Colvard to Ron 
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growing seasons, contributed significantly to the development of California’s 
agribusiness sooner than in other regions of the United States.97  South Carolina 
agribusiness boosters looked for a model to emulate in California.  As Governor 
Hollings explained, “Californians are doing many things in farm marketing, industry, 
and the business world that we can and must do in the Carolinas if was are to make the 
progress we want.”98 
The 1962 Caravan traveled southern California for a week.  The tour emphasized 
the areas in which South Carolina most hoped to learn from California’s agribusinesses.  
Coping with the rising labor prices and land values associated with flourishing 
agribusiness and industrial development was a central concern for the South Carolina 
delegation.  They quickly discovered that these same problems existed in California on 
an entirely different scale than in South Carolina.  On the first day of the tour, the 
caravan visited the Roger Jessup Certified Dairy, in Glendale, California, hosted the 
delegation.  The tour packet informed visitors that the Jessup Dairy reigned as the 
                                                     
97 On the development of agribusiness in California, see:  Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to 
Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California, 1850-1931, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984); Devra Weber. Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Victoria Saker Woeste, The Farmer’s Benevolent Trust: 
Law and Agricultural Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865-1945, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998). 
98 “S.C. Group is Touring California,” The State (Columbia, SC), June 15, 1961. 
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“largest independent dairy in the United States.”99  Detailed information described the 
dairy’s methods and markets, its herd size and milk volume, and the special challenges 
it faced due to its location.  We can imagine the reactions – part shock and part 
admiration – of the delegation members who read that the Jessup Dairy’s twenty three 
acres of land were valued at approximately seventy thousand dollars per acre, and that 
the milkers commanded salaries of $500 per month, plus benefits.100 
In comparison, South Carolina’s small dairies contended with a perpetual 
shortage of qualified diary workers.  Sam McGregor advertised in national publications 
in the 1960s when he needed to hire experienced dairy labor and had trouble enticing 
such workers to remain in South Carolina.101  He competed with operations like Jessup 
for skilled workers, but could pay nothing like California, or even mid-west, dairy 
wages.  How were South Carolina farmers to cope with competition from out-of-state 
agribusiness as well as rising land values and wages at home?  The agribusiness caravan 
emphasized that efficiency was the answer.  At Jessup Dairy, “because of the extremely 
                                                     
99 “South Carolina Agribusiness Caravan to California, June 13-20, 1961, Sponsored by Wachovia Bank 
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high value of the land and the high wages which are paid to the workers, efficiency is of 
the utmost importance.”102  Jessup achieved this efficiency through a combination of 
technological modernization, product specialization, and great demands for worker 
productivity.  Jessup employees worked very hard for their wages:  six-day weeks of ten 
hours days, year-round, except for a two-week paid vacation.  Similarly, at the Van Dam 
Dairy in Artesia California, each worker alone milked ninety cows, twice daily.  Thanks 
to these methods, many of which “could be put back to use back home in South 
Carolina,” the Jessup and Van Dam dairies operated profitably.103  “This is the type of 
efficiency which our dairymen at home will have to strive for if they are to compete 
successfully in the dairy business in the months and years ahead,” the delegation’s 
information packet declared.104 
Efficiency continued the theme of the tour, with additional emphasis on attention 
to consumer preferences and the production of high-quality crops.  At the Imato Tomato 
Produce and Packaging Farm the delegation encountered a much smaller family 
operation than at other stops along the tour, but one that specialized in a high-value, 
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high-risk crop.  The operation, described as “not large” but “very efficient,” invested in 
quality plant stock, advanced methods of pest and disease control, and labor-intensive 
production practices.  This added up to an investment of a thousand dollars per acre, 
prior to harvest which brought additional labor costs, and therefore a large outlay of 
cash before any income returned. 
Here was a direct lesson for South Carolina’s truck farmers and fruit and 
vegetable packers, and a more subtle one for the bankers on the trip.  Growers were to 
observe that “even small farmers . . . can be successful if they study the market carefully 
and determine what the market needs and preference are for specialty crops.”  The 
bankers received a glimpse into the high risk world of vegetable farming, with steep up-
front costs, extensive labor requirements, and unpredictable markets that made it quite 
different from South Carolina’s more traditional commodity crops.  If the South 
Carolina’s farmers wished to attempt this sort of production, they would require 
financing from bankers who understood the special requirements of their industry.  Like 
the Imato brothers’ farm where “no stone is left unturned,” success would require that 
the ambitious farmer spare no expense and cut no corners.  This required a robust 
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partnership between a farmer and his lending institution and a strong stomach for risky 
investments.105 
Questions of financing continued when the caravan visited Ballantine Packing 
Company in Sanger California, located in Fresno County.  Fresno, according to the tour 
packet, generated a farm income of nearly three-hundred and seventy million dollars in 
1960.  This figure was roughly equivalent to the farm income generated by the entire 
state of South Carolina during the same period.  Ballentine’s operation contributed 
significantly to those earnings, with an annual pack-out of 1,100 freight train cars of 
fruit.  But of greatest interest to the South Carolina delegation was not Ballentine’s 
product volume, but the additional services, beyond packing, that it offered its “grower 
clients.”  Ballentine maintained a “farm service department” though which it provided 
credit and consulting to its growers.  Ballentine, and other business like it, shipped 
throughout the country, making them potential competitors for South Carolina’s peach 
growers in some markets.  The tour packet suggested that the southern peach packers, 
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especially, the larger ones, consider the Ballentine example and expand the services they 
provided for growers in order to enhance their competitive prospects.106 
In terms of scale and direct applicability, Earl Smittcamp’s Packing Shed might 
have been the more realistic model for South Carolina.  The “family enterprise that has 
become a full-fledged agribusiness unit” packed peaches nearly five months per year.  
Smittcamp expanded from packing only his own fruit to those of thirty-five growers, 
with family members in key positions throughout the operation.  The tour packet 
commentary suggested that large scale, centralized packing for South Carolina’s peach 
farmers along the model seen at Smittcamp’s was “the only way that expenses can be 
kept under control in the constantly increasing labor costs of this industry.”107 Farm 
agency leaders like C. B. Ratchford saw vertical integration as a sensible strategy for 
Southern farmers to address the needs of the market.  “I have a feeling that [vertical 
integration] is much more significant in the South than in the Corn Belt.  Southern 
famers are being pushed into vertical integration through the need for capital and the 
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demands of the present-day marketing system for consistent supply and quality, and 
large volume.”108   
Southern California’s agribusiness industry dwarfed Sumter’s locally impressive 
but grandiosely named “Agricultural Empire.”  Carolina farmers could not change the 
limitations of climate and topography that would prevent them from ever out-
producing California.  Instead an integrated approach to agribusiness could, policy 
makers and boosters hoped, help Carolina farms compete by lowering their production 
and marketing costs.  The caravan’s visit to the Douglas Aircraft Company’s DC-8 
aircraft plant in Long Beach, California, demonstrated that even when workers 
“command a premium wage,” streamlined, efficient production methods kept labor 
costs under control, just as “the most efficient systems which can be devised” would do 
for agriculture.109  Carolina farms could never achieve the volume of the California fruit 
and vegetable industry, Kansas grain growers, Iowa corn farmers, or Mississippi delta 
cotton plantations.  With the right resources, they could compete with large producers 
on efficiency and quality.  Ultimately – in an echo of Clemson’s President Edward’s 
words in Sumter two years prior – the tour’s message reassured its participants, 
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industrialization of agriculture was not a process to be feared or resisted.  With great 
risk comes great reward for the farmer, the businessman, and the banker who meet the 
challenge. 
Instituting agribusiness in South Carolina on any scale required a new coalition 
of farmers, businessmen, bankers, and the federal farm agencies, and the tours put these 
groups in conversation, offering them common goals and points of reference.  Agri-
Business days and Agribusiness Caravans served important network-building functions, 
on the local and the national scale, that were essential to the development of South 
Carolina’s rural economy along the agribusiness model.   The Sumter tour must have 
held few surprises as participants gazed at operations owned and managed by their 
neighbors.  But a carefully chosen group, gathered together for a morning to survey and 
congratulate themselves on their own accomplishments would have proved fertile 
ground for building and strengthening relationships and spotting opportunity. In 
California, a more high-powered group pursued a wider network of institutional 
investors, suppliers, and allies that could support larger-scale agribusiness in the 
South.110  This new network would be essential if commercial agriculture was to have a 
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future in the Carolinas, where the logic of progressive agriculture had made small farms 
untenable, and the larger farms it created faced competition on a new level, where even 
the largest Carolina farm were small-time. 
Conclusion 
As the Carolinas entered the 1960s, the economy of progressive family farms, built so 
tenaciously at the expense of the region’s smallest farmers, faced new challenges.  
Agriculture was fundamentally different than it has been in the 1930s when policy 
makers embarked on the path of progressive agriculture.  David Weaver wrote that 
“agriculture no longer means simply the production of farm commodities, but it has 
grown to mean the industries which supply agriculture with its needs and those 
industries that take the products of agriculture and convert them into more salable units 
for the market.”111  Under this expanded definition, Weaver determined that 
agribusiness employed 40 percent of Americans, but only 12% were involved in 
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“farming,” or the production of agricultural commodities in 1955.112 In the Carolinas, 
this economic adjustment created anxieties about the region’s future. 
Southern towns, even towns like Rocky Mount, North Carolina, that had once 
prospered thanks to a single farm commodity, chafed at the limitations agriculture 
policies imposed on their future growth by tying up resources and creating serious 
disincentives for farmers to yield to diversified development projects.  Rural people 
forced out of agriculture required new jobs that progressive farms alone could not 
create.  And farmers who remained on the farm feared that the relentless progress of the 
agriculture treadmill would overtake them, too.  They keenly felt Ratchford’s warning 
that to stand still was to move backward.  For the progressive farming community, the 
next step forward was agribusiness.   
Farm policies founded on progressive agriculture and parity had created a world in 
which agriculture was separate from the business community it now needed to rejoin.  
Forces both internal and external to agriculture required policy shifts and new coalition 
building in order to chart a path forward.  Agribusiness was vision the progressive 
farming community offered in answer to the commercial and industrial calls for 
diversification.  Coalitions of diversifiers, made up of town boards of aldermen, 
Chambers of Commerce, the media, and federal programs that underwrote 
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infrastructure development threatened the primacy of the agricultural economy and of 
farm politics in the rural Carolinas.  Agribusiness boosters recruited those same actors, 
with the full weight of the USDA behind them.  They pitched the potential of an 
agribusiness economy to provide growth and investment opportunities while 
maintaining the identity of communities rooted in family farming.  They did so with a 
sense of urgency, as they came to understand that the progressive farm sector they had 
created and protected at such high cost could not outrun the treadmill they themselves 
had set in motion.   
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Conclusion 
Federal farm policy of the mid-twentieth century, as developed in Washington 
and adapted and implemented in the Carolinas, was built on separate but related 
principles:  parity and progressive agriculture.  This ideological foundation produced 
specific policy outcomes in the region.  Federal farm programs changed the ways in 
which families practiced agriculture. They deepened the reach of the federal 
government into rural communities, and they shaped the economic development of the 
region at a time when the South underwent economic transformation. 
The concept of “parity” was one that traded on farmers’ sense of being left out of 
the nation’s economic prosperity and the frustration they felt at the disadvantages they 
endured in the market place as price takers.  Arguments in favor of high levels of parity-
based support of commodity prices evoked farmers’ suffering under the twin tortures of 
the agricultural treadmill and the price-cost squeeze.  Individual farmers wrote to their 
local newspapers, to USDA officials, to their Congressmen, and to the president of the 
United States describing their desperate financial circumstances, entreating their policy 
makers for relief and support.  Those who advocated for parity policies used these 
distress calls as justification for the continuance of commodity programs in the post war 
era. 
Regardless of their populist appeal, parity-based policies did not build programs 
that ultimately supported American farmers.  Instead these policies supported farm 
commodity production.  The distinction is crucial.  A production allotment and 
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marketing quota for a given commodity guaranteed to the owner or tenant of a tract of 
farmland the right to grow, market, and receive a minimum price in a given year for that 
commodity so long as the he complied with conservation and production regulations 
and met minimum standards of produce quality.  Commodity programs did not 
guarantee the size or value of individual allotments.  Technology enabled increased 
yields during and after World War II, and consequently allotments tended to shrink 
over time.  This technology required investment, and the expense of tending smaller 
acreages grew.  Economies of scale became increasingly necessary for commodity 
farmers whose only way of responding to the price-cost squeeze was to reduce their per 
unit production costs.  In the context of an allotment program, the only way to achieve 
scale was to acquire more land with associated allotments.  (See Appendix A for a 
narrative example and diagram of how this process occurred.)   
Carolina farmers without the resources to invest in advancing technology or 
additional land slowly dropped out of the market.  The region’s farms grew larger and 
the sector more concentrated, but aggregate commodity production continued unabated.  
Allotments and parity-based price supports did not guarantee a minimum income for 
farming families  or support struggling farmers in their endeavors to continue farming.  
Allotment policies only guaranteed the production of agricultural commodities in 
sufficient quantities and with specific characteristics suited to the requirements of 
processors,  manufactures, export markets, and domestic consumers. 
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The progressive farming paradigm compounded the problem.  In the 1920s 
progressive farming advocates were mostly concerned with rural standards of living.  
Their ideology promoted modern or “scientific” methods of production and 
homemaking.  They encouraged crop diversification and the production of food crops, 
gardens, and farm animals for sale and for family consumption.  In this respect, 
progressive farming ideology pushed back against the intensification of mono-crop 
staple commodity cultures that held southern farm families hostage to unstable 
commodity markets in the 1920s. 
With the advent of the New Deal, the progressive farming paradigm quickly 
incorporated the expanding Farm State.  It included compliance with production 
regulations and engagement with the full slate of farm programs, including 
conservation and credit programs, as essential elements of modern farming.   In the 
1940s and 1950s, progressive farming remained a family farm-centered paradigm that 
judged its success by farm standards of living.  But the new markers of success at 
progressive farming were those of middle class economic status and 1950s domesticity.  
Progressive farming, its promoters promised, offered well-appointed and maintained 
homes, family vacations, leisure activities for farm women, and education and 
extracurricular activities and freedom from mature labor for children.  
This preoccupation with standards of living might have helped policy makers 
and administrators who subscribed to progressive agriculture ideals to soften or push 
back at the destructive aspects of parity-based commodity programs.  However 
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progressive farming came with its own biases that exacerbated rather than ameliorated 
the worst tendencies of those programs.  The characteristics of the ideal progressive 
farm family, the  Master Farm Families, demonstrated that in the Carolinas progressive 
agriculture was too narrow a paradigm to include the farmers who struggled most or to 
respond to their particular challenges.  Farm programs created by progressive farming 
supporters favored white landowning families with high levels of educational 
attainment and track records of leadership and entrepreneurialism.  Tenants, minorities, 
and the poor who did not display the characteristics of the ideal progressive farm found 
themselves excluded from whatever benefits they might have gleaned from commodity 
programs. 
All of this might have been prevented if the economic democracy of the New 
Deal Farm State had lived up to its promise.  Policy referenda and the committee system 
could have provided a forum for a diverse farm population to influence policy makers.  
The committee system in particular had real potential to allow farmers to create the 
grassroots policies that commodity programs claimed to be.  While the committees were 
not true grassroots institutions, they were well integrated into rural communities and 
connected many farmers directly to the Farm State.  Instead, the greatest challenge of 
commodity programs came from outside the farm community, spurred by the 
availability of federal funds in support of other economic endeavors. 
Commercial interests in towns such as Rocky Mount chafed at the limits that 
commodity programs placed on industrial growth and infrastructure development.  
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Allotments held the economy in a kind of stasis.  Growth in staple production was 
limited because allotments prevented area farms, as a whole, from increasing how much 
they grew and sold.  Fewer farmers were raising crops on the same amount of land, 
meaning there were fewer farm customers for merchants and professionals in town.  At 
the same time, the existence of the allotments and quirks in their administration 
provided strong disincentives for farmers to sell their land to developers.  Commercial 
and industrial boosters who wished to improve local infrastructures were frustrated by 
the farm community’s apparent unwillingness to make room for highway 
improvements or airports.  Rural towns badly wished to join in the early growth of the 
Sunbelt, made possible largely by federal investments and contracts, but farm policies 
created road blocks to this development in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Glossing over 
the nuances of farm program, some commercial boosters believed that intractable and 
backward farmers were to blame. 
To the contrary, agricultural interests understood that the concentration of the 
farm sector in the Carolinas and the unrelenting progress of the agricultural treadmill 
necessitated some kind of new economic development in the region.  They favored a 
solidly farm-based approach to that development rather than the more diversified path 
some commercial groups preferred.  They built a coalition of farm agency workers, 
progressive farmers, local businesses, and commercial banks to promote agribusiness.  
They proposed local investment in the manufacture and supply of farm inputs and the 
processing of marketing of agricultural products.  Boosters looked to the agribusiness 
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giants across the United States, especially in California, for models of efficiency and 
labor relations.  They found that even the most productive and integrated of the 
Carolinas’ progressive farms faced a steep climb if they hoped to remain competitive in 
national and international markets. 
While this project is a study of farm policy in the Carolinas in the past, its 
findings have implications for other fields of study and for policy discussions in the 
present.  The interdisciplinary study of regulatory governance is one such field.   
Economic democracy in the Farm State was deeply flawed in its implementation, but 
many characteristics of the system suggest that democratized administration of 
economic or social regulatory programs could be implemented successfully.  The 
committees were dominated at the top by a few perennial committeemen.  Yet beneath 
them was a more dynamic and much larger cadre of community committeemen and 
paid staff, also drawn from farm communities, who actively and over a period of 
decades participated in the unglamorous work of policy implementation.  While 
experience taught landless and minority farmers that this work was not for them, they 
initially approached the mechanisms of economic democracy with hope and cautious 
enthusiasm.  They were willing to participate and do their part in the system if that 
system would engage them in good faith.  
The potential power of the farmer committees was such that three Secretaries of 
Agriculture – Benson, Freeman, and after leaving office, Brannan – favored 
consolidating the authority of the Secretary’s office over program implementation and 
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trimming the discretionary power of the committees.  They did not do this in order to 
combat the problems the committees had with fairness or discrimination.  They did so to 
undermine what was proving to be an alternate source of political power and an 
institution though which Congress could pressure the USDA on policy questions.  
That the committees failed to live up to their potential does not mean that a 
system of democratized administration must fail.   The experience of the farmer 
committees teaches that such institutions can only work if voting is truly free, fair, and 
open.  This history also shows that any institutions tasked with oversight of such a 
system must be invested in its success.  They cannot be in competition with each other, 
as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture was with the farmer committees.  These 
lessons can apply beyond the world of agriculture programs, and offer guidance to other 
regulatory programs that require buy-in from dispersed regulated concerns or that 
would benefit from administration by actors intimately familiar with localized 
circumstances.  
These findings are also important for current discussions surrounding farm 
policy.  The focus on commodity production and the promotion of the managerial 
family farm rendered farm labor, aside from continuous laments that labor was short 
and wages too high, almost entirely invisible in farm policy debates of the 1950s and 
1960s.  The result was that questions of labor safety, compensation, and exploitation 
were not part of mainstream farm policy conversations of the post-war era.  This 
remains true today.  The problems of worker safety and migrant labor employment have 
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been siloed into categories of public policy separate from farm policy.  They are kept 
separate by appeals to the virtue and the plight of the family farm, which casts all child 
workers as apprenticing family members and migrant laborers a symptom of labor 
shortages.  The real problems of farming families, the people they employ, and the 
consumers who purchase their goods can only be addressed with a clear eyed view of 
the linkages between the managerial, progressive family farm and the agribusiness 
economy on which they depend. 
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Appendix A 
The following table illustrates a common process through which allotment 
consolidation took place on North and South Carolina farms in the 1940s and 1950s.  
Dates and individual allotments are hypothetical, but the trends are realistic reflections 
of those experienced by North Carolina flue-cured tobacco farmers.  This example 
proposes four original farms.  All begin with generous war time allotments in 1943. 
For policy purposes in the late 1930s through the 1950s, an allotment of 2 acres or 
less was categorized as a very small farm.  The allotments of small farms such as Farm A 
were not exempt from adjustments when allotments underwent across-the-board 
reductions, but the AAA/PMA/ASC reduced such allotments at a slower rate. 
In 1948, for this example, Farms B, C, and D with allotments exceeding 2 acres 
receive 50% cuts, while the farm with the 2-acre allotment is reduced by only 37%.  This 
example is indicative of post-World War II significant allotment reductions.  In 1948, all 
four example farms remain separate, independent farms producing tobacco. 
In 1953, Farm A received a 20% cut, while Farms B, C, and D received 25% cuts.  
Farm B began renting the allotment acres of farm C, raising Farm B’s total allotments 
above its 1948 acreage.  Farm C no longer produces tobacco, but the allotment on the 
land associated with Farm C remains administratively separate from Farm B’s 
allotments. 
In the 1958 example, Farm A receives a 10% cut, as does the allotment on Farm C, 
now under 2 acres.  The original allotments of Farms B and D remain over 2 acres and 
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receive 20% cuts.  In 1958, Farm B purchases the land it once rented from Farm C and 
begins renting the allotment acres of Farm D.  Farm D also ceases producing its own 
tobacco. Therefore, in the 1958 example, the only producers remaining are Farms A and 
B.   
Farm B pursues a progressive farming strategy of increasing production of 
allotted commodities by acquiring more land.  His total 1958 allotment is approximately 
70% of his war-time high, and thanks to advances in technology, his yields per acre are 
much higher than they were in 1943.  Farm A is one of the very small, “part-time” or “in-
between” farms that late 1950s policy makers found increasingly problematic.  Farm A 
has not increased land holdings, and the farmer likely has some off-farm job. The yield 
on Farm A’s allotment is also likely higher than 1943 per-acre yields, but very small 
farms were less likely to invest in the most recent technologies.  Therefore, Farm A’s 
yield is smaller than that achieved by Farm B. 
This model is over-simplified.  It ignores the possibility that any of these farms 
might sell land for non-farm purposes, which would affect their allotment assignments.  
It also cannot account for the many individual determinations that county committees 
could make when assigning allotments.  It instead uses consistent percentages to make 
equivalent reductions across farms.  By using tobacco as the example crop, this model 
also does not account for years in  which allotments and marketing quotas were not in 
effect for other commodities, nor does it include any other commodity crops an 
individual farm might grow in addition to tobacco.  A farm such as Farm B, if located in 
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eastern North Carolina, might have also grown cotton, peanuts, soybeans, corn, or 
grains, all subject to separate allotment and quota programs.  All of these variables 
would have complicated the farm consolidation process.  This model does accurately 
capture the effect of shrinking allotments and land acquisitions strategies on commodity 
farmers over the long term. 
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Figure 17:  Process of consolidation of farmland through allotment adjustments and land sales/rental 
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